CHAPTER 7
Tbilisi 
Tskhinvali 
The OSCE 
Moscow 
Talks 
Peacekeeping forces 
Refugees/displaced persons 

South Ossetia
"It  is a consequence that the Abkhaz conflict has put the South Ossetian one into second place" [1] (Reso Egadze, spokesman for Shevardnadze, 14th July 1993)
Formal negotiations to consider the future political status of South Ossetia did not begin until 19 July 1995, with the convening, for the first time, of the Mixed Commission [2] for the settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict [3], in Tbilisi [4]. The Mixed Commission consists of delegations from the Russian Federation, North Ossetia (a republic within the Russian Federation), South Ossetia and Georgia, and representatives from the OSCE Mission to Georgia. On the opening day, two drafts - by separate Russian and Georgian teams of experts - on the future status of the region were presented to the commission. Not surprisingly, the Russian draft provided greater autonomy to South Ossetia than its Georgian 'equivalent1 [5].
Both the Georgian, Russian and OSCE delegations have conducted the negotiations from the standpoint of maintaining Georgia's territorial integrity. Partly in consideration of this, it was agreed at a meeting of the Mixed Commission, in Vladikavkaz (capital of North Ossetia), on 30-31 October 1995, that four 'mixed groups1 of experts would be established to work on all aspects of the settlement: one to work on 'defining' the status of South Ossetia within a 'unified Georgia' and the others to help restore South Ossetia's economic ties with other regions of Georgia, ensure security in the 'region' and strengthen mutual trust between the parties to the conflict [6].

TBILISI
Georgia has never anticipated granting South Ossetia the same status as Abkhazia. During an interview, on 3 July 1995, Eduard Shevardnadze spoke of Samachablo only taking its place 'in a single Georgia'', unlike Abkhazia which would undoubtedly 'have its own statehood1 [7]. However, under pressure from both Moscow and the OSCE, the Georgian position has changed. On 30 October 1995, then head of the Georgian delegation to the talks, Irakli Menagharishvili (at that time Deputy Prime Minister) spoke of South Ossetia being given some form of 'cultural
autonomy' within Georgia [8]. This changed, once again, on 11 March 1996, to the possibility of Tbilisi's 'consent to the formation of an autonomous entity in the Tskhinvali region', provided the leadership of South Ossetia recognised Georgia's territorial integrity [9],

TSKHINVALI
One cannot question the very real desire of the South Ossetian people to unite with their co-ethnics across the Caucasus ridge, and, ultimately, become a part of Russia [10]. On 3 July 1995, Ludvig Chibirov, (then) Chairman of the Supreme Council (now President) told the editor of the newspaper Yuzhnaya Osetiya (South Ossetia), that it was South Ossetia's 'dream' to unite with North Ossetia [11], Chibirov repeated this 'call' (on local television), on 30 October 1996, during the course of the Presidential election campaign there. He stated that the unification of the two Ossetias was a 'historical necessity which cannot be avoided' [12].
Despite these public pronouncements, President Chibirov is, without question, regarded as being a member of the 'moderate' camp. He is known to be a supporter of joint statehood with Georgia. His main opponent (and 'radical'), Vladislav Gabarayev (former Chairman of the South Ossetian Council of Ministers) favours, merely, a confederative union with Georgia: at best, a dual Russo-Georgian protectorate [13]. Some will not countenance any formal relationship with Georgia, however. Sergcy Kochiyev, Chairman of the South Ossetian Parliamentary Commission for Ethnic Policy, was quoted, on 11 November 1996, as saying that South Ossetia's position 'remains unchanged', independence with possible subsequent entry into the Russian Federation [14]. It is worth noting that, on 20 February 1996, the People's Nykhas (South Ossetian parliament) adopted a statement indicating that South Ossetia would stay within Georgia provided the latter acknowledged that South Ossetia was a republic with which Georgia would sign a 'special agreement' [15].

THE OSCE
The OSCE's work to find a suitable form of autonomy for South Ossetia has received strong criticism from some political quarters in Tbilisi. Indeed, their whole approach has been condemned by some members of the Georgian opposition, who see the Ossetian race as 'unwelcome intruders' on historically Georgian lands [16]. Nodar Natadze, who has taken a special interest on the Ossetian question, has spoken of the OSCE being 'ill-disposed toward us' (i.e. Georgians), and their conduct forming some kind of 'conspiracy' against the country. The OSCE's recommendations on the future status of South Ossetia 'were devoid of any logic'. Nodar Natadze gave a few examples to illustrate his point; '(1) The statement made by experts from the OSCE that the name 'South Ossetia' should not be changed because the Ossetians have got used to it over 69 years is not correct; in that case, what arc we Georgians to say, we who have become used to this territory being part of Georgia for the past 2000 years? ... (3) The view that if an ethnic group makes up 51% of the population of one state or another, then it has the right to decide what this state will be called to its own advantage is wrong. (4) The OSCE document states: 'You Georgians stand guilty before the Ossetians and, by way of compensation for your crime, you should increase their rights'. This should be viewed as an empty argument given that guilt can only be established by a court and there exists no fact in international practice whereby someone is punished for his crime by having a part of his country handed over to another ethnic group'. In his opinion, 'functional autonomy should serve as the basis for settling the problem of ethnic minorities in Georgia'. Functional autonomy would attach autonomy to 'peoples', while ignoring the territorial factor. It would extend both to those ethnic minorities living in compact groups and those scattered around the country. It would guarantee the creation of an 'ethnic organisation (council, commune)' that would implement 'all the measures that are necessary to protect all the members of the minority' [17]. Interestingly, Nodar Natadze did not indicate who these minorities were, whether there would be a 'process of selection' and, irrespective of this, whether the South Ossetians would 'qualify'. However, as far as the OSCE is concerned, it should be noted that, on 28 August 1995, in Vladikavkaz, (former) Head of Mission (in Tbilisi), Dieter Boden commented that it was 'unrealistic to restore South Ossetia's original status'[18].


MOSCOW
Moscow has been extremely reticent about the future status of South Ossetia. The only specific remark I have been able to find (which I doubt is entirely representative) is that made by the Director of the Russian Federal Border Service, Audrey Nikolayev, during an interview with the Interfax news agency, on 28 July 1997. He stated: 'Georgia might grant Abkhazia and South Ossetia the status of special economic zones as a way of settling the situation in these territories. In this case, the Russian regions bordering on Abkhazia and South Ossetia might establish mutually advantageous economic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia' [19]. A view that should be placed very much in the context of Mr Nikolayev's job. Consider, 'in its place', therefore, the 'clause' of Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Pastukhov, on 27 August 1996, when he commented, merely, that South Ossetia must have 'rather wide-ranging rights' [20]. In truth. I would surmise that Moscow's position would be to favour South Ossetia being granted very much the same status as it enjoyed during the Soviet period.

TALKS
The negotiations themselves have shed very little light on the possible future status of South Ossetia. At the end of talks in Moscow (under Russian mediation), on 12-13 March 1996, a document was signed (on 14 March) providing for the restoration of the 'status quo' that had existed prior to the combat actions. The protocol envisaged South Ossetia's incorporation into a 'Georgian federation' (status quo?) with the status of an autonomous republic [21], It was reported, however, on 16 March, that the People's Nykhas (South Ossetia's Parliament) had rejected the protocol [22].
If anything, more recent talks have appeared to 'deliberately' avoid discussion of South Ossetia's future status. This process has prevailed since the latter half of 1996 [23]. The nature of the much-vaunted talks between Chibirov and Shevardnadze in Java (South Ossetia), on 14 November 1997, 'heralded' for having included 'all aspects' of a settlement [24], were 'clarified' by the tentative words of President Shevardnadze. Speaking on Georgian Radio, on 17 November, he stated: 'We must try not to delay the process of denning the status of the region. We did not discuss the details of the issue in Java. We just probed some aspects of the problem. But I am certain that it will not be long before the restoration of Georgia's integrity will begin' [25].
One very real achievement of the negotiation process so far has been the initialling of the 'Memorandum on Measures to Provide Security and Strengthen Mutual Trust Between the Parties to the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict', of 17 April 1996 [26]. The Memorandum records, particularly, the sides' rejection of the use, or threatened use, of force and of encroaching upon peoples' rights on ethnic criteria [27]. The Memorandum was signed, in Moscow, on 16 May 1996 [28].
The optimism engendered by the signing of the Memorandum did not continue for very long, however. On 23 July 1996, the press secretary of Ludvig Chibirov issued a statement condemning the 15 July Vestnik programme on Georgian Television which had claimed that the Georgian president had agreed to meet 'the head of administration of the Tskhinvali region'. The statement went on to criticise the report which had claimed that persons 'forcibly deported' from Tskhinvali should be allowed to return to their homes and that Georgia was prepared to resort to 'any measures' to resolve the 'issue' and preserve its territorial integrity. The statement continued that the report by the Vestnik programme ran counter to the 'spirit and letter' of the recently signed memorandum and noted: 'Furthermore, the forthcoming Shevardnadze-Chibirov meeting is a meeting of the leaders of two equal sides in the settlement process and any attempts to present it in a different light could jeopardise the entire negotiating process'. The statement considered the 'policy' one of 'petty imperialist ambitions' and to merely 'condemn the process of settlement of Georgian-Ossetian relations to failure' [29], During its period of de facto independence, the South Ossetian Republic has been working to develop an 'independent foreign policy' and to establish diplomatic and economic relations with what it regards as 'friendly republics and peoples' [30]. Naturally, relations have been closest with North Ossetia. These close relations, indeed, even led to a temporary suspension of the talks when, on 9 November 1996, the North and South Ossetian governments signed an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation, which states: 'the treaty is a natural continuation of integration processes between the two republics' [31]. It was only when the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement renouncing the agreement, on 23 December 1996, that the impediment to continue was removed.
While the official structures in Vladikavkaz have been keen to promote South Ossetia's cause, there has never been any question that the region will ultimately remain an integral part of Georgia [32]. Even newly elected North Ossetian President, Aleksandr Dzasokhov has spoken of South Ossetia forming a part of a federal Georgia: although he did indicate that, in such an event, 'one should lavishly define' its status [33].
The Java meeting and the latest (the third) Shevardnadze-Chibirov meeting in Borjomi, on 20 June 1998, have demonstrated the increasingly 'sophisticated'(/contorted) nature of the negotiations. At Java, the 'summit' statement alluded to the need for a 'gradual' formulation of a political status for South Ossetia [34]. At Borjomi, formulation of the political status of South Ossetia was 'intentionally left out', in the words of Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov, 'so as not to jeopardise what they have achieved ... any inaccurate wording may harm it' [35]. Reflecting on the meeting, on the 22 June, President Shevardnadze stated, rather perversely: 'Incidentally, the final document, or rather joint statement, deals with a post-conflict settlement, that is the resolution of problems with the conflict already settled. It is presumed that the conflict has ended and the sides are seeking ways for rapprochement' [36]. Although this approach may succeed for the time being, at some stage the painful discussions will have to resume: or is the process that fragile?

PEACEKEEPING FORCES
The tripartite peacekeeping forces that remain in the conflict zone to this day were established under the terms of Article 3(3) of the Sochi (sometimes called Dagomys) Agreement (24 June 1992) [37]. The forces themselves, originally deployed on 14 July 1992, consist of equal numbers of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian 'guardsmen'. The Georgian and Ossetian forces are separated by a 15 km(-long) 'disengagement corridor' [38].

REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
An estimated 39 000 Ossetians fled to North Ossetia during the conflict. 5000 displaced Ossetians moved into collective centres in Tskhinvali from other districts of Georgia and an additional 10000 Georgians fled the autonomous region itself [39], approximately 7000 of which have settled in the neighbouring Gori rayon [40].

NOTES
[1] (Snark news agency, Yerevan, in Armenian, 1348 amt, 14th July 1993) (SU/1742 B/
8, 16 July 1993). 
[2] The Mixed Control Commission had been formed, on 4 July 1992, during a
meeting of representatives of Russia, Georgia, North and South Ossetia, in
Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia). (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow,
1721 gmt, 4 July 1992) (SU/ 1426 C3/ 1, 7 July 1992). 
[3] At the first round of Georgian-Ossetian talks, on 26 January 1993, three Mixed
Commissions, on assistance to refugees, human rights protection and finance and
the economy, had been established. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service,
Moscow, in English, 1553 gmt, 26 Jan. 1993) (SU/1598 B/6, 28 Jan. 3993). 
[4] This was the first time a South Ossetian delegation had come to Tbilisi since 1992. 
[5] (Iprinda news agency, Tbilisi, in Russian, 1330 gmt, 19 July 1995) (SU/2362 F/l,
22 July 1995). 
[6] (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 0825 gmt, 1 Nov.
1995) (SU/2451 F/2, 3 Nov. 1995). 
[7] (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1400 gmt, 3 July 1995) (SU/2347 F/2, 5 July
1995).
[8] (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1800 gmt, 30 Oct. 1995) (SU/2449 F/4, 1 Nov. 1995).
[9] (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1035 gmt, 11 March 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-070, 14 March 1997).
[10] See Ludvig Chibirov's address, on 23 September 1993, at the time of his election to the post of Chairman of the People's Nykhas (South Ossetia's Parliament): (Tbilisi, The Georgian Times, in Georgian, 23 Feb-1 March 1995, p. 2) (FBIS-SOV-95-055).
[11] (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1400 gmt, 3 July 1995) (SU/2347 F/2, 5 July 1995).
[12] It was reported, by the Iprinda news agency, that Chibirov had claimed that the 'process' should be developed 'step by step' after the 'two Ossetias have become independent'. (Tbilisi, Iprinda, in Georgian, 1230 gmt, 31 Oct. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-213, 4 Nov. 1996).
[13] Vladislav Gabarayev, it has been alleged, considers that any other form of union would lead to the 'gradual ouster' of Ossetians from South Ossetia. (Nalchik, Severnyy Kavkaz, in Russian, Oct. 1996, no. 43, p. 5) (FBIS-SOV-96-223-S, 19 Nov. 1996).
[14] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1526 gmt, 11 Nov. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-219, 13 Nov. 1996).
[15] (Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1115 gmt, 22 Feb. 1996) (SU/2544 F/3, 24 Feb. 1996) The South Ossetian Constitution, adopted on 23 December 1993, had declared the 'Republic of South Ossetia' an equal sovereign subject in international law. (Russia's Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 2000 gmt, 23 Dec. 1993) (SU/1882F/6, 30 Dec. 1993).
[16] The lands of the Machabeli family of Georgian princes, who once owned the present territory of South Ossetia. Historical documents named this territory as Samachablo, or the estate of the Machebeli.
It should be noted that the museum of the famous Georgian writer, Irane Machabeli, in the village of Tamarasheni, Tskhinvali district, was blown up on 23 July 1997. The explosion destroyed part of the building. Irane Machabeli was a descendant of the Machabeli family. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 0935 gmt, 24 July 1997) (FBIS-TOT-97-205, 25 July 1997).
Consider also the words of Kosta Dzugayev, Chairman of the South Ossetian Parliament's Legislative Commission, during an interview with the Georgian newspaper Resonance (published on 23 April 1996): T will state our position by quoting our Chairman, Ludvig Chibirov: 'Our republic is a historical acquisition that can be taken away only along with our lives". (Tbilisi, Resonance, in Georgian, 23-24 April 1996, p. 2) (FBIS-SOV-96-087, 6 May 1996).
[17] (Tbilisi, Kavkasioni, in Georgian, 15-16 August 1996, p. 5) (SU/2693 F/2, 17 August 1996).
Earlier, on 22 April 1995, Nodar Natadze, responding to the arrival of an OSCE delegation in Tbilisi, there to discuss ways to settle the Ossetian conflict, said: 'A special political status in Georgia can be granted only to Abkhazia, since the Abkhazians are indigenous people in that territory. As for the Ossetes, they came from across the Caucasus mountains only 300 years ago'. He 'warned' The status of autonomy granted to South Ossetia will inevitably raise the issue of unifying South and North Ossetia and we have no right to allow this'. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1251 gmt, 22 April 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-078).
[18] (Tbilisi, Iprinda, in Russian, 1310 gmt, 28 August 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-170, 3 Sept. 1996).
[19] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1517 gmt, 28 July 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-209, 29 July 1997).
[20] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1118 gmt, 27 August 1996) (SU/2703 F/3, 29 August 1996).
[21] (Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1055 gmt, 14 March 1996) (SU/2562 F/2, 16 March 1996).
[22] (Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1115 gmt, 16 March 1996) (SU/2563 F/1, 18 March 1996).
[23] Following talks held in Moscow, from 4-5 March 1997, for example, an ITAR-TASS report of the 11 March stated: 'Deplorably, the question of the status of the former autonomous republic (it was an oblast) is not yet on the agenda of the talks'. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1035 gmt, 11 March 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-070, 14 March 1997).
[24] The words of (former) North Ossetian President, Akhsarbek Galazov. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1441 gmt, 16 Nov. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-320, 21 Nov. 1997) However, this remark should be contrasted with the statement of Archil Ghambashidze, head of the joint apparatus of the State Chancellery for the settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. He claimed: 'issues connected with South Ossetia's political status were not discussed at the meeting'. (Tbilisi, Radio Tbilisi Network, in Georgian, 1200 gmt, 14 Nov. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-318,19 Nov. 1997).
[25] (Tbilisi, Radio Tbilisi Network, in Georgian, 0511 gmt, 17 Nov. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-321, 21 Nov. 1997).
It is worth noting that during the talks President Chibirov appealed to President Shevardnadze and the media not to 'disfigure' South Ossetia's historic name. Officially, the region has not been known as South Ossetia since 1992. It is called Samachablo, Shida Kartli (region) or Tskhinvali region.
[26] (Iprinda news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1150 gmt, 18 April 1996) (SU/ 2594 F/1, 24 April 1996).
[27] For text see internet site:
< http: / /www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/georosse.php >
[28] (Russia TV channel, Moscow, in Russian, 1000 gmt, 16 May 1996) (SU/2615 F/2, 18 May 1996).
[29] Statement of A. Dzhidzhoyev, press secretary of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of South Ossetia. (BGI news agency, Tbilisi, in Russian, 0820 gmt, 23 July 1996) (SU/2672 F/3, 24 July 1996).
[30] For instance, Iberia news agency reported, on 30 August 1995, that South Ossetia had been accepted as an associate member of the North Caucasian economic assembly at a 'recent' meeting in Krasnodar. (Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1200 gmt, 30 August 1995) (SU/2397 F/4, 1 Sept. 1995). Note, further, the signing of an agreement on Friendship and Cooperation with Gagauzia; see: (Chisinau, Basapress, in English, 1922 gmt, 4 August 1994) (FBIS-SOV-94-154) AND (Chisinau, Basapress, in English, 2145 gmt, 28 Oct. 1994) (FBIS-SOV-94-211).
[31] Under the treaty Vladikavkaz pledges to provide assistance in rebuilding South Ossetia and creating a 'favourable' climate for refugees' return. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1446 gmt, 9 Nov. 1996) (SU/2766 F/4, 11 Nov. 1996).
[32] When former North Ossetian President, Akhsarbek Galazov intimated such during an interview on Russian Radio, in September 1994, according to the Georgian newspaper Akhali Taoba, the 'foreign affairs minister' of the Republic of South Ossetia prepared a 'protest note'condemning the statement. The dispatching of the note was only averted upon the intervention of Chibirov. (Tbilisi, Akhali Taoba, in Georgian, 9 Sept. 1994, p. 2) (FBIS-SOV-94-178). 
[33] During an interview broadcast on Georgian Television. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 0838 gmt, 13 May 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-133, 14 May 1998). 
[34] (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1441 gmt, 16 Nov. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-320 21
Nov. 1997). 
[35] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1618 gmt, 20 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-171, 23
June 1998).
According to Iprinda, the return of 'refugees' to their homes was the main subject of
the talks. (Tbilisi, Iprinda, in Georgian, 1210 gmt, 20 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-171, 23 June 1998).
[36](Tbilisi, Radio Tbilisi Network, in Georgian, 0602 gmt, 22 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-
98-173, 24 June 1998). 
[37] Article 3(3) states: 'In order to carry out the aforesaid tasks, joint forces will be set 
up under the monitoring commission, by agreement between the sides'. For text
see: (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian, first edition, 27 June 1992) (SU/
1419 B/13, 29 June 1992). 
[38] Further to Article 1(2) of the Sochi Agreement, the nature of the corridor was
agreed at a quadripartite meeting on 4/5 July 1992, in Vladikavkaz. (ITAR-TASS
news agency World Service, Moscow, 0748 gmt, 5 July 1992) (SU/1426 C3/1 7
July 1992).
[39] See: <http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/georgia.php> 
[40] (Kontakt news agency, Tbilisi, in Russian, 1400 gmt, 2 April 1994) (SU/1964 F/10,
6 April 1994).

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