CHAPTER 6
Tbilisi
Sukhumi 
False dawns 
Outside forces 
Gali district 
Peacekeeping and monitoring 
Refugees/displaced persons 

Abkhazia
"The Abkhaz side abides by the Geneva agreement of 4th April according to which Abkhazia is a separate state. It is time everybody understood that Abkhazia will never be a constituent part of Georgia. The Abkhaz people will not allow this. We are not talking about Abkhazia seceding from Georgia, but about the fact that Abkhazia is no! and never will be part of Georgia. In one or two years' time Abkhazia will be recognised as an independent state" [1] (Konslantin O/gan, (former) Abkhaz Foreign Minister, August 1996)
On 26 September 1997, at the end of an intensive period of talks [2], despite the re-activation of the Geneva process [3] and following the promising meeting, in Tbilisi, of Abkhazian President, Vladislav Ardzinba and Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze [4], envoy to the Abkhazian President, Anri Jergenia announced that the Abkhaz side was prepared, only, to sign the protocol on settling the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict originally drafted by the Abkhaz side in February 1996 and based on the principles of 'complete equality of two constituents of the state'. According to this protocol, a 'union state' would be created, in which foreign policy, defence, foreign economic relations, border and customs policy, ecology and the protection of the rights of national minorities would be spheres 'jointly governed by the two constituent republics'. According to Anri Jergenia, Abkhazia did not intend 'to make any changes in the text of the protocol or in the course of current negotiations' [5].
I believe this single event to have been a turning point in the search for a constitutional settlement to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. It is noticeable how, since then, the negotiation process has stalled; how tempers have become frayed; and how close the two sides have come to resuming the armed conflict [6]. Despite valiant work, the United Nations, which has led the international effort to find a lasting solution, has not been able to re-direct discussions back to the fundamental issues at hand. (Its decision to convene ('finally') the Coordinating Council (following the Geneva talks, of 17-18 November 1997), has failed to re-ignite the talks [7].) Instead, debate has concentrated on the lifting of economic sanctions (Abkhazia), the return of internally displaced persons/refugees (Georgia) and the patrolling of Georgia's coastal waters. While, undoubtedly, important issues, such discussions can only mask the fundamental issue (problem) at hand: Abkhazia's future political status.
The extent of the deadlock has been manifested in the frustrations of the 'two' Presidents during the past twelve months. On 1 January 1998, in his New Year address (broadcast on Georgian Radio), President She-vardnadze noted that although 'the international community recognised that Georgia had taken the right stance ... [at some stage it would have to] raise the issue of implementing a peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia following the so-called Bosnian format' - unless tangible results were reached in settling the conflict and returning refugees in the near future [8]. While this was not the first time President Shevardnadze had raised the possibility [9], the 'Bosnian' variant; 'the use of force to establish peace if one of the conflicting sides fails to meet its commitments' [10]; drew a sharp response from President Ardzinba, who viewed the call an attempt to 'erode the negotiating process' [11] (it also drew a negative reaction from Moscow [12]).
For President Ardzinba the negotiating process appears increasingly futile. On 21 March 1998, he called for Abkhazia to be given the right to attend the CIS summit (in Moscow) as an independent representative. He said: 'It is totally obvious that we have nothing to do with Georgia and we can attend the summit only as an independent participant'. He continued: 'We used to be an autonomous region (actually republic), Abkhazia was just being turned into an appendix of Georgia. Talks can now be held only on a package political agreement and establishment of 'horizontal' relations between Abkhazia and Georgia, without any domination. Georgia is wasting time. If Tbilisi does not want to establish equal relations with Sukhum, Abkhazia can do just fine' [13]. Abkhazia was not invited.
The resoluteness of both sides has compounded these frustrations. The February 1996 set of Abkhazian proposals [14] (then Anri Jergenia claimed that they would establish a 'federal union', containing the 'elements of both a federation and a confederation' [15]) have not been received positively in Tbilisi. On 16 February 1996, Georgian presidential spokesman, Vakhtang Abashidze complained that the 'new' proposals contained nothing new. 'The essence of these proposals remains the same: a confederative state system, which is unacceptable for Georgia' [16]. Sukhumi, however, maintains its position to this day.

TBILISI
Tbilisi has insisted that talks be premised upon Abkhazian recognition of its territorial integrity, with the consequent establishment of a federal republic [17]: most recently an 'asymmetric federation' [18]. President Shevardnadze has attempted to scotch fears that any 'Georgian Federation' would lead to the eventual break-up of Georgia. Speaking on 24 June 1995, to a meeting of the state constitution commission, he announced: 'Federation is far from being a system which constitutes any threat of disintegration. That is because it is up to us, up to our constitution to ensure that there is no ground for separatism in any part of the country'. Opinion in the commission had been divided as to whether Georgia should be a 'federal' or 'unitary' state [19]. The former view, under the 'guidance' of President Shevardnadze, eventually, 'after six weeks of heated debate', prevailed. The constitution was approved by the constitutional commission on 2 July 1995 [20].
Tbilisi has been 'mystified' by the Abkhaz side's 'preference' (if given a choice) to constitute an 'autonomous' part of the Russian Federation [21]. Speaking on 26 October 1995, (former) Georgian Ambassador to Russia, Vazha Lortkipanidze (recently appointed Prime Minister) claimed that Georgia was prepared to give Abkhazia wider powers than those enjoyed by any constituent part of Russia [22]. Eduard Shevardnadze, during his inauguration (as Georgian President) speech of 26 November 1995, speaking on this matter, added: 'We have always stated, and we are stating now, that time has determined that Georgia's state structure be shaped on a federal basis. Abkhazia will be a subject of the federation in Georgia with a broad political status. It will have its own constitution, which will have to be in conformity with the constitution of a single united state. The Republic of Abkhazia will have its own parliament (and government), supreme court, anthem, state emblem and other features of a state' [23]. Expanding on this, Vazha Lortkipanidze, speaking at a press conference in Moscow, on 24 January 1996, claimed that Abkhazia would 'be represented in all federal organs of legislative, executive and judicial power and their governing bodies, and the federal parliament's decisions affecting Abkhazia's interests will come into force only after the consent of a majority of Abkhaz deputies has been obtained [24].
In a letter to the UN Security Council, Tbilisi presented in full (for the first time) its position regarding Abkhazia's future status within the framework of a federal state. According to the letter, Abkhazia, as a subject of the federation, would exercise wide discretionary power and would have its own constitution, anthem, flag, emblem, parliament, the highest executive and judicial authorities, and other attributes of statehood - 'whose competences would be determined by both the federal and Abkhazian constitutions and through a formal agreement on the delimitation of competences between the federal state and Abkhazia'. Abkhazian, along with Georgian, would have the status of 'state language' on the territory of Abkhazia. The government of Abkhazia would exercise full authority over its own budget; local taxes; formation of a supreme court; issues related to culture, education and health care; trade; social welfare programmes and the use of natural resources. The competences of the federal government would include foreign policy and foreign economic relations; defence, the armed forces and security; the monetary system and the federal budget; the status and protection of the state borders; the protection of human rights, civil liberties and minority rights. Abkhazia would be entitled to enter into agreements within the framework of its competences, while keeping the relevant federal bodies informed. The federal state would, however, be a single entity in the context of international relations and holding membership of international organisations. The federal legislature would act within the limits agreed upon by both sides. An agreed number of seats would be reserved in the federal legislature for Abkhazian representatives. Decisions of the federal legislature directly affecting Abkhazian interests would come into force only upon the consent of the majority of Abkhaz representatives to the federal parliament [25].
Despite the above, it would be disingenuous to suggest that Tbilisi' is united on the subject of the future status of Abkhazia. Tamaz Nadar-eishvili, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (made up, almost entirely, of ethnic-Georgian 'political exiles' from Abkhazia), is perhaps the most vocal 'opponent' of government policy (he is, actually, Deputy Prime Minister). For example, on 29 July 1995 (at that time he was head of the Georgian delegation to the talks), he presented proposals stipulating the protection of Georgia's territorial integrity and en masse return of refugees(/internally displaced persons) (henceforth, where appropriate, 'refugees') to Abkhazia, 'without any application forms' - the Abkhaz side was demanding that each returning family fill out an application form - and that Georgia's jurisdiction should be restored 'as far as the Psou river1 (the border with Russia) [26].

SUKHUMI
Abkhazia has insisted upon being granted, at the very least, equal status with Georgia [27]. To this day, they maintain that the negotiations should proceed according to the 'principle1 enshrined in the 'Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict', of 4 April 1994, (through its continued use of the phrase 'the parties') 'whereby' Abkhazia is an equal party to any agreement [28],Abkhazia prefers the example of the confederation of Switzerland as a possible model upon which to base any future relationship with Tbilisi [29]. While willing to conceive an existence within the boundaries of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and, thereby, guaranteeing Georgia's territorial integrity, Abkhazia has been unwilling to give up its existing 'autonomy' [30]. For example, the Sakinform news agency reported, on 6 May 1997, that President Ardzinba had declared: 'Abkhazia is offering Georgia the same formula as in Chechnya, Bosnia and Cyprus, which envisages blending some elements of federation and confederation. While some of the key functions would be passed to the central bodies, Abkhazia will retain a strong domestic sovereignty' [31]. As Speaker of the Abkhazian Parliament, Sokrat Jinjolia told Interfax, on 15 May 1995, however, 'one [Russia, in this case] should remember about the limit below which the Republic of Abkhazia cannot go'. Responding to a memorandum drawn up during talks between the Russian and Georgian sides [32], in Moscow, at the end of April 1995, which would have granted Abkhazia the status of an autonomous republic within a federal Georgia (with South Ossetia and Ajaria also forming constituent elements), Jinjolia noted that 'Russia should help the search for a compromise between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, instead of boosting the creation of a federal Georgian state' [33]. Indeed, as Vladislav Ardzinba, addressing a joint session of the parliament and government, on 7 June 1995, noted, Abkhazia would not be integrated into Georgia with the status of a subject of a federation [34]. For example, Abkhazia would agree to unite with Georgia on condition that the president of Abkhazia was given the 'right to veto any major bilateral issue' [35].
As with Tbilisi, so with Sukhumi, it would be wrong to assume that opinion is united in Abkhazia about the future status of the region. In fact, there has even been a history of 'conflict' between government and parliament. On 27 November 1995, for example, a draft Abkhaz protocol was rejected by the Abkhaz parliament. Rather than 'insisting' on a confederation, it was reported that the 'draft1 proposed a loose federation with Georgia. The protocol also provided for the reservation of seats for Abkhazia in the Georgian parliament, a right of veto for Abkhaz deputies, 'more say to Sukhumi' in defence and budget matters, but one currency [36]. Interfax reported that the Abkhaz deputies, among other things, could not accept the fact that there was no provision that the political agreement be ratified by the parliaments on both sides [37]. 'In its place', in a statement issued on 30 November 1995, President Ardzinba proposed the formation of a 'union state1, consisting of 'two equal subjects' and 'who1 'might agree to concede part of their equal rights under a common jurisdiction' [38].
On occasions it has appeared as if a political agreement were about to be concluded. Sadly, however, an 'obstacle' has always got in the way.

FALSE DAWNS
During talks in Geneva, in February 1995, it appeared as if both sides were close to making a breakthrough. This concerned the creation of a 'federal legislature' which, it was reported at the time, contained both federative and confederative structures. According to ITAR-TASS, it was 'agreed' that the spheres of joint activity would cover foreign policy and foreign economic relations, border and customs services, federal taxes, energy, transport, communications, ecology and human rights. However, it was surmised that decisions of the federal legislature on matters of 'immediate concern' for Abkhazia would go into effect only if approved by the 'Abkhaz majority' in the parliament [39]. Despite initial optimism, no documents were signed. Once again, agreement could not be reached on the legal status of Abkhazia. While the Abkhazian side had insisted on being granted the status of a sovereign state [40], equal within the proposed 'union', the Georgian side had insisted on Abkhazia accepting the territorial integrity of Georgia merely as a constituent part of any 'federation' [41].
When talks resumed in Moscow, on 1 March 1995, it was reported that agreement had been reached at the level of experts, defining the devolution of power between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. Igor Akhba, Abkhazian envoy, told Interfax that the would-be-treaty would vest Tbilisi with decision-making powers on 'crucial issues': 'foreign policy and economic matters, border and customs controls, federal budget, energy, transport and communication, environment, human and minority rights, meteorology and the anti-epidemic service'. However, once again, it was Sukhumi's insistence on the 'new federal state' being set up by 'two equal entities' that, finally, prevented the Georgian side from signing [42].
Tripartite (Russian-Georgian-Abkhazian) consultations, in June 1997, suggested that a formula for possible legal relations, in the form of a draft protocol, between Georgia and Abkhazia had been found. According to a 'high-ranking source in the Russian Foreign Ministry', the draft protocol ('proposed by the Russian side') fixed that the conflicting sides agreed to build relations within the limits of the borders of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, Abkhazia would stay in the rouble zone and have the right to pursue its own security policy [43]. Commenting on the draft protocol, President Ardzinba stated that the time of the 
protocol's signing was contingent 'only' on the Georgian side, because Abkhazia had 'made a maximum of concessions'. The draft protocol had been 'virtually agreed' by the two sides during talks on the 13-14 June. However, when the Georgian side consulted President Shevardnadze, he made a number of new proposals and, in the words of Abkhaz President, Vladislav Ardzinba (19 June 1997), 'started to insist on a new version of the agreement' [44]. Once again, nothing was signed.

OUTSIDE FORCES
The bitter outbreak of war in Chechnya, in the New Year of 1995, hardened Vladislav Ardzinba's attitude towards the status of Abkhazia. While in The Hague that January, Ardzinba commented that Abkhazia would join a confederative union with neither Georgia nor, even, Russia. While Abkhazia was already de facto independent, Ardzinba claimed that the 'blood being spilt' in Chechnya would assist the course toward Abkhaz independence [45]. Both Abkhazia and Chechnya would soon gain international recognition; after all, in Abkhazia's case, Russia and Georgia had already recognised Abkhazia's sovereignty in the Moscow declaration of 4 April 1994 [46].
The re-election of Boris Yeltsin, as Russian President, seemed, initially, to 'provoke' a 'softer' line from President Ardzinba. In a statement, on 12 July 1996, President Ardzinba expressed his 'desire' to meet President Shevardnadze and 'discuss' the issue of 'coexistence'. He had earlier been 'reported' as telling Georgian First Deputy Minister of State Security, Avtandil loseliani, during a visit to Sukhumi, that Eduard Shevardnadze was their 'common president' [47].
The conclusion of a political agreement in Chechnya and the decision to postpone consideration of Chechnya's political status for five years (see Chapter 11), hardly surprisingly, engendered a highly favourable reaction in Abkhazia. Speaker of the Abkhaz parliament, Sokrat Jinjolia hailed the agreement as being 'advantageous for the settlement of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict'. Sokrat Jinjolia's thesis was as follows: if Abkhazia and Georgia were not able to reach a 'compromise today', to 'avoid deadlock', it was necessary that the talks on relations between the two sides be 'postponed' - this would allow the Abkhaz people to 'take stock', 'rule out a war' and 'only then' determine their relations with Georgia [48]. Consequently, during talks, held in Tbilisi on 27 November 1996, the Abkhaz side proposed that a Chechen option be applied to the region: that discussions on government-related and legislative issues, including the status of Abkhazia, should be postponed until the year 2001 to 'allow economic and humanitarian problems to be resolved during the period'. The proposal was rejected by the Georgian side, however [49].
The Abkhaz side continues to petition for the signing of a 'peace agreement'. President Ardzinba, for example, had noted, at a news conference, on 11 June 1997, that work on one had begun [50]. Calls for such, however, were re-activated with the signing, on 12 May 1997, of the 'Russian-Chechen Treaty on Peace and the Principles of Cooperation' (see, again, Chapter 11) [51]. This was a model Georgia was unwilling to accept [52]. During a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, in Moscow, on 16 June 1997, Georgian Foreign Minister, Trakli Menagharishvili 'stated categorically' that the Georgian side considered it 'unacceptable' to sign such an agreement. He said there were 'various reasons' why it was 'impossible to draw a parallel between the two conflicts' [53]. 

GALI DISTRICT
One other issue remains: the future of the previously overwhelmingly Georgian-populated (and today largely depopulated) Gali District [54]. An ITAR-TASS report of 5 May 1997, for example, claimed that during 'recent' clandestine talks between Abkhaz President, Vladislav Ardzinba and 'two highly placed representatives of the Georgian leadership', in Tbilisi, the possibility of dividing Abkhazia into two parts - a Georgian part with the city of Gali as a centre and an Abkhaz part, in Gudauta -had been discussed: a claim strenuously denied, however, by the press secretary of the Georgian President, Vakhtang Abashidze (on 4 May 1997) [55]. Whatever the reality, officially at least, Abkhaz President, Vladislav Ardzinba has rejected such a possibility. On 7 August 1996, the Iprinda news agency reported him as saying: 'The border of Apsny [historical Abkhazian name for Abkhazia] is sacrosanct and untouchable' [56]. _
This may be becoming increasingly true. Georgian Radio reported, on 23 August 1998, that the 'Abkhaz separatists' had begun constructing a barbed-wire fence along the Abkhaz side of the Inguri river (separating Abkhazia from Georgia) [57]. The 'separation' of the sides would now appear to be assuming more permanent proportions.

PEACEKEEPING AND MONITORING
The Agreement on a Ceasefire and Disengagement of Forces signed in Moscow, on 14 May 1994 (henceforth the 'Ceasefire Agreement'), has proved to be the main instrument regulating the peacekeeping process. It provided for the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force, developed the mandate of United Nations military observers, and 'mapped out' the lines of separation of the respective forces (Georgian and Abkhaz) and their military equipment.
Forces and equipment are 'delimited' by means of a security zone (sometimes referred to as the 'safe zone') and a restricted weapons zone. Article 2(1) of the 'Ceasefire Agreement' states: 'The armed forces of the sides will be separated in accordance with the following principles: (1) The region between lines B and D on the attached map will be the security zone. There should be no armed forces and heavy equipment in this zone. The territory between lines A and B and lines D and E will be the weapon restriction zone. There should be no heavy combat equipment within it. Local civil authorities will operate in the security and weapon restriction zones. The police or militia being used for this purpose can have their own weapons. Heavy combat equipment includes: - all artillery pieces and mortars with a calibre of more than 80 mm; - all tanks; - all APCs [58]. The security zone is 24 km wide, 12 km on each side of the Inguri river (which separates the conflicting sides). The restricted weapons zone, in both the Abkhax (between A and B) and Georgian-controlled (between D and E) sectors is (in each) 25 km wide (see map C),
The CIS peacekeeping force [59] has been deployed in the conflict zone since the 16 June 1994 [60]. Further to Articles 2(2) and 2(4) of the 'Ceasefire Agreement', the peacekeeping force has, since then, patrolled the security zone [61] and the Kodori gorge(/valley) [62]. By agreement of the parties, they continue to patrol 'Abkhazia's' coastal waters [63]. The peacekeeping force is presently 1600 servicemen strong [64], It is under the command of General Sergey Korobko (its headquarters are located in Gali).
The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has operated in the conflict zone since August 1993 [65], It, further to the 'Ceasefire Agreement', carries out surveillance in the security zone (Article 2(2)), restricted weapons zone (Article 2(3)) and the Kodori gorge (Article 2(4)). It also (Article 2(7)) carries out surveillance of the coastal waters and airspace of the Abkhaz sector (security and restricted weapons zones) and the security zone on the Georgian side. Its mandate (if so desired) is renewed every six months by the United Nations Security Council [66]: in order to give effect to the 'Ceasefire Agreement', it was expanded in Resolution 937 (21 July 1994) [67]. UNOMIG is under the authority of the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Abkhazia,Liviu Bota (of Romania). Its administrative headquarters are in Sukhumi, maintaining a Liaison Office in Tbilisi [68]. According to the latest 'Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia', of 14 July 1998, as at 10 July 1998 the Mission consisted of 81 observers from 22 countries [69].
The presence of Russian peacekeepers is not appreciated in Tbilisi: accused of being nothing more than 'border guards' [70]. Although, under Georgian pressure, it was decided at the Council of CIS Heads of State (Moscow, 28 March 1997) to expand the security zone to cover the whole of Gali District [71], this resolution was not effected due to opposition in Sukhumi [72].

REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
An estimated 280000 people fled Abkhazia, mainly to the western Georgian regions of Samegrelo and Imereti as a consequence of the war. Despite the inability of the Quadripartite Commission (established further to the 4 April 1994 Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, para. 4 [73]) to secure agreement between the sides for an organised return of 'refugees', it was estimated that, since 1994, 53000 people had returned to the Gali District of Abkhazia [74]. However, owing to the upsurge in violence at the end of May, an estimated 40 000 of these returnees have since fled
[75].
Previously, Sukhumi had linked the organised return of 'refugees' to progress being made towards reaching a political settlement [76]. However, during the past twelve months, as discussions on the future status of Abkhazia have grown stale (non-existent?), it has been noticeable that Sukhumi has, increasingly, come to link an organised return with the lifting of Georgian and 'CIS(-wide)', (mainly) economic, sanctions [77].

NOTES
[ 1 ] (Iprinda news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1315 gmt, 26 August 1996) (SU/ 2703 F/
5, 29 August 1996). 
[2] Instituted on 11 June (1997), in Moscow. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in
English, 1539 gmt, 11 June 1997) (SU/2944 F/2, 13 June 1997). 
[3] In Geneva between 23-25 July 1997, after a nearly two-year 'absence'. (ITAR-TASS
news agency World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 1636 gmt, 23 July 1997) (SU/
2980 F/1,25 July 1997). 
[4] On 14 August 1997, this time under the auspices of Moscow. (Prime-News news
agency, Tbilisi, in Russian, 0830 gmt, 14 August 1997) (SU/2998 F/l, 15 August
1997).
[5] (Republic of Abkhazia Radio, Sukhumi, in Russian, 1410 gmt, 26 Sept. 1997) (SU/
3036 F/5, 29 Sept. 1997).
[6] In May of this year. Hostilities, which erupted on the night of the 19-20 May, were not quelled until 25 May, with the signing, by both sides, of a Protocol on a Ceasefire and Withdrawal of Armed Formations (in Gagra, Abkhazia). See: S/ 1998/497 (10 June 1998), paras. 2 and 4.
The Report of the Secretary-General, of 10 June 1998, has preferred the following (possible) explanation: 'A particular provocation that raised the tension level substantially was a one-day action staged by representatives of the Abkhaz Government-in-exile, which involved, among other activities, the raising of the Georgian flag in the Gali district. This event followed shortly the relocation of the headquarters of the Abkhaz Government-in-exile from Tbilisi to Zugdidi and the announcement by its leadership of its intention to create a 'liberated zone' in the Gali district'. Ibid, para. 2.
[7] The Coordinating Council, the main product of the Geneva talks, consists of three working groups responsible for each of three aspects of the negotiations: the lasting ; non-resumption of hostilities and security problems; refugees and internally displaced persons; and the settlement of social and economic problems. (Kontakt news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1550 gmt, 20 Nov. 1997) (SU/3086 F/7, 26 Nov. 1997) This was the first time, since the start of the negotiations, that the Abkhaz side had consented to the establishment of a permanent body to work towards a : resolution of the conflict. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0513 gmt, 24 Nov. 1997) (SU/3087 F/l, 27 Nov. 1997) It should be noted that the establishment of a 'Coordinating Commission' had first been proposed in the spring of 1994. See: S/ 1994/529 (3 May 1994), paras. 14, 15 and Annex III ('Proposal for the Establishment of a Coordinating Commission'). 
[8] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 0811 gmt, 1 Jan. 1998) (SU/3115 F/3, 3
Jan. 1998).
[9] The signing of the Dayton Peace Accord had, as it turns out, a lasting effect on Shevardnadze's viewpoint as to the 'approach' that should be taken to settle the conflict. In an interview on Georgian Radio, he told listeners: 'the measures which have been taken to settle the Bosnian conflict are very important. I have said more than once in the past that, unless they envisage the use of force when inevitable, political methods in the settlement of conflicts are doomed to failure. This is especially true when one of the parties is trying to legalise the situation achieved by violence and, in our case, by genocide'. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0609 gmt, 18 Dec. 1995) (SU/2491 F/2, 20 Dec. 1995).
One should further note the tone of President Shevardnadze's letter to the Chairman of the UN Security Council, dated 9 July 1996. Here, he 'urged' the UN Security Council to apply the 'tactic of peaceful coercion' to resolve the conflict. In his letter, Shevardnadze expressed the hope that a new Security Council resolution would serve as the 'last warning' to the Abkhaz side. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 1952 gmt, 9 July 1996) (SU/2662 F/2, 12 July 1996).
[10] The words of Chairman of the Georgian Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee, Kakha Chitaia. (Prime-News news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1550 gmt, 8 Jan. 1998) (SU/3122 F/7, 12 Jan. 1998). 
[11] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1620 gmt, 8 Jan. 1998) (SU/3122 F/6,
12 Jan. 1998).
[12] Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennadiy Tarasov noted, on 6 January 1998: 'It is dangerous to use mechanically settlement plans which had justified themselves in one region for settling other conflict situations'. The use of force, he continued, 'we are convinced, may only exacerbate the situation and lead to new bloodshed'. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1353 gmt, 6 Jan. 1998) (SU/3119 B/12, 8 Jan. 1998).
This should be 'contrasted' with the resolution of the Tbilisi-based, pro-Georgian, Supreme Council and Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, who, at a joint meeting on 8 January, resolved to give this option priority in their future activities. The meeting appealed to the United Nations Security Council to call a special meeting to discuss the problem of Abkhazia and resolve the problem of Georgia's territorial integrity. 'Otherwise', as Tamaz Nadareishvili, Chairman of the Supreme Council noted, '300000 displaced people will declare international organisations untrustworthy, will take stones, clubs and automatic rifles and will march to Abkhazia to regain the region'. (Prime-News news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1550 gmt, 8 Jan. 1998) (SU/3122 F/6, 12 Jan. 1998).
[13] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1023 gmt, 21 March 1998) (SU/3182 F/7, 23 March 1998) Responding, President Shevardnadze said, on 23 March 1998: 'The CIS is a regional international organisation whose members are subjects of international law. Abkhazia is an integral part of Georgia. Thus, it can never be a subject of international law'. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0520 gml, 23 March 1998) (SU/3184 F/2, 25 March 1998).
[14] These provided for a joint national border, joint activities in six spheres and the possibility of setting up joint institutions. The protocol implied that, under a mutual agreement, Georgia and Abkhazia could increase the number of 'coordinated policies'. It added: 'Each of the two equal sides shall keep its constitution and relations between them shall be regulated by a special treaty, which under agreement of the two sides can have the force of constitutional law'. Consultations between the Abkhaz negotiators and 'Russian officials' were held during 1 February. During that time the Russian Foreign Ministry was reported to have drawn-up a document on the final settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict which, according to the Abkhaz side, envisaged equal relations between Georgia and Abkhazia. In response to this, the Abkhaz mission in Moscow circulated a statement saying that although Georgia's territorial integrity had been confirmed in the document, if Georgia and Abkhazia were to enjoy equal rights, the name of the state would become a subject for additional talks. (Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0930 gmt, 9 Feb. 1996) (SU/2532 F/2, 10 Feb. 1996).
[15] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1826 gmt, 13 Feb. 1996) (SU/2536 F/2, 15 Feb. 1996) Confirmed later by President Ardzinba. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1659 and 1722 gmt, 15 Feb. 1996) (SU/2538 F/l, 17 Feb. 1996).
[16] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1842 gmt, 16 Feb. 1996) (SU/2539 F/ 1, 19 Feb. 1996).
Interfax quoted President Ardzinba as 'admitting' that the new structure would not amount to a 'classical type of federation'. (RIA news agency, Moscow, in English, 0716 gmt, 16 Feb. 1996) (SU/2538 F/l, 17 Feb. 1996).
[17] Mtiyak Radio reported, on 1 May 1994, that the Georgian Constitutional Commission had drawn up a programme for the country's 'political and territorial structure. In accordance with the draft, Georgia is to be divided into 12 regions, among which Abkhazia and Ajaria will be granted special political status'. (Mayak Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 1430 gmt, I May 1994) (SU/1987 F/l, 3 May 1994).
Vazha Lortkipanidze has indicated that in recognising a federal solution to the conflict, Georgia has gone as far as it is prepared to go. see: S/1995/342 (1 May 1995), para. 7.
[18] President Shevardnadze, 2 June 1998. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1545 gmt, 2 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-153, 3 June 1998) The following day he told 'correspondents' that Abkhazia, the 'Adzhar Republic' and South Ossetia would be given a special status within a single Georgian federal state: 'thus making them different from other regions'. President Shevardnadze added that his proposals for Abkhazia and South Ossetia were being studied by specialists in Spain and Germany, 'where there are similar formations'. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, 0917 gmt, 3 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-354, 4 June 1998).
[19] There had been a fear expressed that a federal state would create a danger of confrontation between the regions and the centre, and that any subsequent 'agreement' would very soon break down. (Georgian Television, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1500 gmt, 24 Jan. 1995) (SU/2339 F/2, 26 June 1995). 
[20] Members of the Georgian opposition parties reacted furiously to this. The Georgian United Republican Party, at a news conference in the party's headquarters, on 14 July 1995, declared that the division of Georgia by provinces would be 'fatal for the country'. Further, at another news conference organised the same day, the leader of the Georgian National Independence Party, Irakli Tsercteli stated that at a meeting of six parties on 12 July - the Ilia Chavchavadze Society, the National Independence Party, the Merab Kostova Society, the Agrarian Party, the Conservative-Monarchist Party and the Archevnebi (Elections) Association - they had resolved to block a motion to discuss the introduction of a federal structure for Georgia, but to have these issues submitted to a referendum instead. The attempt, however, failed. (Iprinda news agency, Tbilisi, in Russian, 1340 gmt, 14 July 1995) (SU/2357 F/5, 17 July 1995) (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1700 gmt, 14 July 1995) (SU/2357 F/4, 17 July 1995).
[21] During an interview with the Moscow newspaper. Pravda (published on 2 November 1994), Abkhaz President, Vladislav Ardzinba claimed that Abkhazia had been a part of Russia since 1810 and had never seceded from it: 'Abkhazia's autonomous status within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic is a result of Soviet perturbations based on the USSR Constitution, which no longer exists. It is inadmissible 10 present the administrative borders of that time as slate frontiers'. (Kontakt news agency. Tbilisi, in Russian, 1310 gmt, 2 Nov. 1994) (SU/2144 F/3, 4 Nov. 1994).
[22] He also claimed that Abkhazia's demand that it be allowed to form a confederation
was 'unrealistic' and 'historically unfair', since Abkhazia had never existed
separately from Georgia. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English. 1039 gmt,
27 Oct. 1995) (SU/2446 F/2, 28 Oct. 1995).
[23] (Georgian Television, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0900 gmt, 26 Nov. 1995) (SU/2473 F/7,
29 Nov. 1995).
[24] Lortkipanidze claimed that foreign policy, defence, border protection, the customs service, budget and financial policy, hard currency regulation, power engineering, transport and communications would come under the jurisdiction of the federal authorities. Abkhazia meanwhile, among other things, would be entitled to conclude international treaties and agreements 'within its ambit of responsibility'. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 1545 gmt, 24 Jan. 1996) (SU/2519 F/l, 26 Jan. 1996) It was later clarified that they would have their own 'higher courts'. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 1834 gmt, 17 April 1996) (SU/2590 F/l, 19 April 1996).
[25] S/1996/165, Annex.
[26] Commenting on these principles, Tamaz Nadareishvili stated: 'Under no circumstances shall we return to Abkhazia under the control of the Abkhaz police and Abkhaz administration'. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1110 gmt, 29 July 1995) (SU/2370 F/7, 1 August 1995).
[27] Note, Article 1 of the Constitution of Abkhazia (adopted on 26 November 1994) provides: (first paragraph) 'The Republic of Abkhazia (Apsny) shall be a sovereign democratic state based on law, which has historically become firmly established by the right of nation to self-determination'. Article 3 adds: (first paragraph) 'The Republic of Abkhazia as a subject of international law ...'
For text see: <http://www.abkhazia.org/home.phpl> (then click on 'Government').
[28] Consider, for example, the first paragraph of paragraph 7. It states: 'The parties held discussions on distribution of powers on the understanding that any agreement on this issue is part of a comprehensive settlement and will only be reached once a final solution to the conflict has been found'. The important words here are: 'The parties held discussions on distribution of powers [my emphasis]'. Note, further, the second paragraph: 'At this stage, the parties have reached mutual understanding regarding powers for joint action [again my emphasis] in the following fields'. In my opinion, 'distribution of powers' and 'joint action' do not imply, as Sukhumi has suggested, that the Declaration effects a horizontal relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia. I believe it can be equally argued(/more likely) that these were but an aspect of the formulation of parallel and shared, but crucially vertical, relations between Abkhazia and Georgia. I further believe that the use of the phrase, 'the parties', is merely an expression of the duality of the negotiation process (compare with Nagorno-Karabakh/Azerbaijan). For the sake of reaching an agreement, however, I suspect that the terminology was necessarily 'ambiguous'. The agreed 'fields' are: 'a) foreign policy and forging economic ties; b) border guard arrangements; c) customs; d) energy, transport and communication; e) ecology and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters; f) ensuring human and civic rights and freedoms and the rights of national minorities'.
For text of the Declaration see Appendix III of George Hewitt's paper, 'Post-war Developments in the Georgian-Abkhazian dispute' (London, Parliamentary Human Rights Group, June 1996), at: <http://www.abkhazia.org/postwar.phpl> During an interview with Ostankino Channel 1 (ORT1) on 10 April 1994, Eduard Shevardnadze was asked by the correspondent, on the subject of the Declaration: 'It does not mention anywhere that Abkhazia is a part of Georgia. Could it be that this wording in the statement lays down a future independent sovereign state of Abkhazia with the same rights as Georgia as it were?' Shevardnadze replied: 'As regards territorial integrity, we did not insist that Abkhazia is a part of the Georgian state, we did not insist on including this clause, this provision, because, naturally, we imply that Abkhazia is a constituent part of the Georgian state. One should keep in mind that all the documents which we signed in Moscow with Abkhazia's participation and in Sochi and the six or even seven resolutions by the Security Council which have been adopted recently - they state that Abkhazia is an integral part of the Georgian state. I believe, therefore, that at the current stage there was no pressing need to stress this once again. We imply that there can be no other decision'. (Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, in Russian, 1120 gmt, 10 April
1994) (SU/1969 F/2, 12 April 1994). 
[29] (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 1305 gmt, 17 July
1995) (SU/2359 F/1, 19 July 1995) It should be noted that the Georgian delegation has preferred a federative structure 'akin to that of Russia'. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1646 gmt, 28 June 1995) (SU/2344 F/2, 1 July 1995). 
[30] Indeed, Vladislav Ardzinba, in response to what he regarded as undue Russian/ .. Georgian pressure to agree on a 'Russian federal model', told a news conference, on  20 February 1997, that Abkhazia had been 'forced to break off all talks'. Speaking ; on the 19th, President Ardzinba had reiterated: 'Talks will yield no result unless we return to the idea of a union state, consisting of two parts with equal rights. Equal relations with Georgia is what the Abkhaz side insists upon'. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 1629 gmt, 19 Feb. 1997) (SU/2849 F/2, ;•' 21 Feb. 1997) and (Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1100 gmt, 21 Feb. 1997) (SU/2852 F/2, 25 Feb. 1997).
[31] (Sakinform news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1600 gmt, 6 May 1997) (SU/2914 F/ 1, 9 May 1997).
[32] The Abkhaz side was not consulted. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1400 gmt, 2 May 1995) (SU/2294 F/2, 4 May 1995).
[33] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1058 gmt, 15 May 1995) (SU/2305 F/2, 17 May 1995).
[34] President Ardzinba: 'The Abkhaz leadership has not discussed and will not discuss the idea of Abkhazia getting the status of an autonomy within Georgia. We are discussing the possible reinstatement of legal relations between Georgia and Abkhazia and the possibility of restoring the territorial integrity of the borders of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic'. However, 'these must be equal relations. Renunciation of this principle will mean a return to Stalinism, suppression of the rights of a less numerous people'. Over the four years of talks with Tbilisi, the Georgian president 'has never proposed anything new except the attempts to give Abkhazia the status of a broad autonomy', he said. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1256 gmt, 7 June 1997) (SU/2941 F/2, 10 June 1997). 
[35] (Kontakt news agency, Tbilisi, in Russian, 1500 gmt, 8 June 1995) (SU/2326 F/l, 10 June 1995).
[36] Note: Tbilisi has been consistent in its opposition to anything other than a single currency. See, for example: (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1132 gmt, 17 Feb. 1995) (SU/2234 F/5, 22 Feb. 1995).
[37] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1123 gmt, 28 Nov. 1995) (SU/2474 F/ 2, 30 Nov. 1995) In consideration of these 'recommendations', Abkhaz deputy, Daur Barganjia accused Vladislav Ardzinba of 'treason' and the delegation of having violated the 1994 agreements. Responding to these 'accusations' President Ardzinba told journalists, on 27 November 1995, that in keeping with Abkhazia's proposals stemming from the 4 April 1994 'statement', Abkhazia and Georgia retained their constitutions and delegated part of their powers to a 'joint administration'. For that, 'special bodies of power' would be set up, including a legislature in which Abkhaz deputies would have the right of veto. Ardzinba said that there would be a 'joint defence policy' to coordinate the activities of two armies 'Georgian and Abkhazian'. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1743 gmt, 29 Nov. 1995) (SU/2476 F/5, 2 Dec. 1995). 
[38] (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 1532 gmt, 30 Nov.
1995) (SU/2476 F/5, 2 Dec. 1995). 
[39] (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 1638 gmt, 9 Feb.
1,995) (SU/2226 F/l, 13 Feb. 1995).
[40] Speaking on the matter at the end of the Geneva talks, UN mediator, Edouard Brunner told a press conference that the Abkhaz side must understand that the UN could not recognise Abkhazia as an independent state and that a lack of flexibility on the Abkhaz side might have negative consequences for a settlement. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 1956 gmt, 10 Feb. 1995) (SU/2226 F/l, 13 Feb. 1995).
[41] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1152 gmt, 10 Feb. 1995) and (Sakin-form news agency,Tbilisi, in Russian. 2135 gmt, 9 Feb. 1995) both (SU/2226 F/l, 13 Feb. 1995).
Head of the Abkhaz delegation, Sokrat Jinjolia refuted loseliani's claim that the Abkhaz delegation had 'accepted the territorial integrity' of Georgia and was ready to help create a federation for a 'single Georgian state'. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1152 gmt, 10 Feb. 1995) (SU/2226 F/l, 13 Feb. 1995) Abkhazia would maintain its independence from Georgia. Only independent countries could create a 'confederation. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 0944 gmt, 12 Feb. 1995) (SU/2228 F/4, 15 Feb. 1995).
[42] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1543 gmt, 3 March 1995) (SU/2245 F/ 1,7 March 1995).
[43] Interfax, in its report of 20 June 1997, speculated that this might Imply' that the Russian military base in Gudauta would remain in place. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 0958 gmt, 20 June 1997) (SU/2953 F/l, 24 June 1997).
[44] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 0926 gmt, 19 June 1997) (SU/2951 F/ 1,21 June 1997).
[45] (RIA news agency, Moscow, in English, 0911 gmt, 18 Jan. 1995) (SU/2207 F/l, 21 Jan. 1995).
[46] Vladislav Ardzinba was speaking during an interview with the Austrian newspaper Die Presse, given in The Hague, while attending a meeting of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0800 gmt, 24 Jan. 1995) (SU/2211 F/4, 26 Jan. 1995).
[47] (Iberia news agency. Tbilisi, in Georgian. 1545 gmt, 1 July 1996) (SU/2654 F/3, 3 July 1996).
[48] (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1700 gmt, 6 Sept. 1996) (SU/2713 F/2, 10 Sept. 1996).
[49] (Iberia news agency,Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1300 gmt, 28 Nov. 1996) (SU/2783 F/l, 30 Nov. 1996).
[50] During preliminary Russian-Abkhaz talks in the Kremlin, on 9 June 1997, and attended by Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba, Russian representatives had stressed the need to sign a document "that would draw a line under the state of war and define the main directions and aims of talks between Georgia and Abkhazia, under the auspices of the United Nations, and with Russian mediation'. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 0608 gmt, 10 June 1997) (SU/2942 B/4, 11 June 1997).
[51 ] For text of Treaty, see Chapter 11.
[52] The Georgian reaction to this was decidedly 'prickly'. Speaking on 10 June 1997, Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee of the Georgian Parliament. Revaz Adamia stated: 'If Ardzinba wants an agreement similar to the Chechen one, all Georgian refugees must return to Abkhazia and general elections must be held there. Only after that can talks on any agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia be held'. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1941 gmt, 10 June 1997) (SU/ 2944 F/2, 13 June 1997).
[53] (Sakinform news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian. 1155 gmt, 16 June 1997) (SU/2949 F/2, 19 June 1997).
[54] According to the last Soviet census, conducted in 1989, Gali District was 93.8% Georgian (0.8% Abkhazian).
[55] Indeed, Vakhtang Abashidze even denied that President Ardzinba had paid a visit to Tbilisi. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English. 0547 gmt, 5 May 1997) (SU/2912 F/3, 7 May 1997).
[56] (Iprinda news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1250 gmt, 7 August 1996) (SU/2686 F/ 2, 9 August 1996).
[57] (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0700 gmt, 23 August 1998) (SU/3314 F/3, 25 August 1998) The Iprinda news agency had reported, on the 21 August, that the 'separatists' had imported 'about 100 tonnes' of barbed wire from the town of Yeltsy in the Donetsk region of Ukraine. (Iprinda news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1420 gmt, 21 August 1998) (SU/3314 F/3, 25 August 1998).
[58] For text of the "Ceasefire Agreement' see: (Svobodnaya Gruziya. Tbilisi, in Russian, 17 May 1994) (SU/2010 F/9, 31 May 1994).
[59] It should be noted that only Russia has ever contributed to the force.
[60] With the deployment of the 345th. Russian, airborne regiment. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, in English, 1208 gmt, 14 June 1994) (SU/2023 F/l. 16 June 1994).
[61] Article 2(2): 'CIS peacekeeping forces and military observers established in accordance with the protocol to this agreement will be located in the security zone with the aim of supervising the observance of this agreement'.
[62] Article 2(4): 'The withdrawal of Republic of Georgia forces from the Kodori gorge to their places of deployment outside Abkhazia will be monitored by representatives of CIS peacekeeping forces and UN observers with the participation of representatives of the sides. At the same time, regular patrolling by peacekeeping forces and international observers will be organised in the Kodori gorge'. The peacekeeping forces began regular patrolling of the Kodori gorge on 20 October 1994. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1502 gmt, 21 Oct. 1994)(SU/2136F/6, 26 Oct. 1994).
[63] It should be noted that, on 16 July 1998; further to an agreement initialled on 27 June 1998, between the representatives to the Russian-Georgian Working Group on Border Questions; Georgia took formal control over its territorial waters. However, following repeated warnings from the Abkhaz authorities that they would fire on any Georgian vessel if it entered 'Abkhazian' waters, Tbilisi agreed that Russian Federal Border Guards would continue, for the time being, to control Georgia's territorial waters between the Inguri and Psou rivers. (The Psou river forms the natural boundary separating Abkhaziaf/Georgia) from Russia.) See, for example: (Prime-News news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1545 gmt, I July 1998) (SU/3269 F/2, 3 July 1998) and (Kavkasia-Press news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1020 gmt, 16 July 1998) (SU/3282 F/l, 18 July 1998).
Following his meeting with President Ardzinba, in Sukhumi, Chairman of the Georgian State Department for Border Protection, Valeri Chkheidze (at a news conference in Tbilisi on 22 August) stated: 'we understand the complexity of the situation and. therefore, do not want to send our patrol boats - for the time being, of course - directly to the territorial waters of Abkhazia and to the immediate maritime vicinity of Sukhumi port. We are trying to prevent any provocations, irrespective of which side these may come from - Abkhazia or some other country'. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0700 gmt, 23 August 1998) (SU/3314 F/2, 25 August 1998).
According to President Shevardnadze, the 'stage-by-stage' process of taking over control of Georgia's coasta! waters would be completed on 10 July 1999. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0611 gmt, 13 July 1998) (SU/3279 F/l, 15 July 1998) However, Zaza Pataridze, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and National Security, indicated, on 17 July, that Georgian border guards would not patrol the border off the Abkhaz coast until an agreement was reached with the Abkhaz leadership. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1009 gmt, 17 July 1998) (SU/3282 F/l, IS July 1998).
[64] According to a report prepared by the (Russian) Federation Council's Committee on Security and Defence Issues, it consists of one airborne and two motor-rifle battalions, plus 'support units and helicopters'. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1530 gmt, 17 July 1998) (SU/3283 B/12, 20 July 1998).
[65] An advance team of UN military observers was sent to the conflict zone, further to UN Security Council Resolution 854 (6 August 1993), to (para. 1) 'verify compliance' with the 27 July 1993 ceasefire agreement between the sides. SIRES/ 854 (1993); and (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service. Moscow, 1636 gmt, 27 July '93) (SU/1753 B/4, 29 July '93) This process was bolstered, by Resolution 858 (24 August 1994), with (para. 2) the formal establishment of UNOMIG, SIRES/ 858 (1993), However, a resumption of fighting, between 16-27 September, invalidated both the 27 July ceasefire agreement and UNOMIG's (original) mandate. Consequently, UNOMIG was provided with an 'interim mandate', further to Resolution 881 (4 November 1993), paragraph 4. SIRES/881 (1993).
[66] Most recently in para. 14 of Security Council Resolution 1187 (30 July 1998): 'Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a new period terminating on 31 January 1999 subject to a review by the Council of the mandate of UNOMIG in the event of any changes that may be made in the mandate or in the presence of the CIS peacekeeping force'. S/RES/ 1187 (1998).
[67] S/RES/937 (1994), para. 6.
[68] UNOMIG possesses three sector headquarters: in Sukhumi, Gali and Zugdidi. It also possesses six team bases: three in Gali District, two in Zugdidi District and one in the Kodori gorge. However, owing to the volatile situation, the team bases in Gali and Zugdidi Districts are presently not operational. See: S/1998/647 (14 July 1998), para. 17.
[69] Ibid, Annex.
[70] Georgian Parliament Chairman, Zurab Zhvania, for example, on 14 May 1998, while receiving a delegation from the CIS Parliamentary Assembly's commission for settling the conflict in Abkhazia. (Tbilisi, Iprinda, in Georgian, 1715 gmt, 14 May 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-134, 18 May 1998).
[71] 'Decision on the Development of the Peacekeeping Operation in the Conflict Zone in Abkhazia'. For text of the summit declaration, see: S/1997/268, annex II.
[72] In an address on Abkhaz Television, on 15 April 1997. President Ardzinba 'noted' that 'neither Georgia nor Russia' would manage to implement the 'provocative decision', adding: 'We shall fire a bullet at any aggressor whoever it may be. Let nobody think that we will fight only Georgia'. (Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1045 gmt, 15 April 1997) (SU/2894 F/4, 16 April 1997). Moscow was unwilling to enforce the decision without Abkhazian approval. Speaking on 27 April 1997, the (then) commander of the CIS peacekeeping force, Dolya Babenkov commented that he expected the decision would 'probably remain on paper1 and that there was 'little chance' of implementing it because 'the Abkhaz and Georgian sides have failed to reach an accord on the issue'. (Georgian Radio, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 0600 gmt, 27 April 1997) (SU/2905 F/l, 29 April 1997).
[73] For text of the Agreement see Annex II of George Hewitt's paper, 'Post-War Developments in the Georgian-Abkhazian Dispute' (London, Parliamentary Human Rights Group, June 1996), at: <http://www.abkhazia.org/postwar.phpl
[74] See: <http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/georgia.php>

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