CHAPTER 5
The Minsk Group
Constitutional status
Other issues
Occupied lands
The Lachin Corridor
Security guarantees
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
IDPs and Shusha
International peacekeepers
The Lisbon summit
Direct talks
Postscript to the 'latest talks'
Countdown to the 'velvet coup'
Refugees/displaced persons

Nagorno-Karabakh
" We regard the illegal decision taken by the Kavbureau in 1921 to include Nagorno-Karabakh inlo the Azerbaijani SSR as freezing the Nagorno-Karabakh problem" (Naira Melkumyan, Foreign Minister Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 2 June 1998)
The 'conflict' in Karabakh is now over a decade old, the ceasefire recently 'celebrated' its fourth anniversary and talks have not been conducted for over twelve months. The prospects for a lasting settlement seem dim, yet the Minsk Group still search for one.

THE MINSK GROUP
The Minsk (Conference/)Group (henceforward Minsk Group) of the OSCE was established on 24 March 1992, during a Council of Foreign Ministers (of the CSCE) meeting in Helsinki [2]. It was charged with preparing a peace conference to be held in Minsk (capital of Belarus) upon the reaching of an accord. Such 'accord1, however, has never been reached and today the emphasis has shifted (considerably) towards merely the means to facilitating any accord.
The chairmanship of the Minsk Group was first held by Sweden, only for Russia to join it following the Budapest summit of (5-6) December 1994 - Russia being made a permanent co-Chairman. On 21 April 1995, Finland took over from Sweden as co-Chairman. Following the Lisbon summit (2-3 December 1996), the number of co-Chairmcn was increased from two to three - with France and the United States replacing Finland. Russia, France and the United States remain, to this day, the three co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group [3].
Since 10 August 1995, the Chairman-in-Office (of the OSCE) has been represented, in issues related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, by his Personal Representative on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference [4].

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
While Azerbaijan insists that the status of Karabakh should be 'accommodated' within the framework of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,Armenia and Karabakh argue that the latter's status should be defined 'from a clean sheet' [5].
Attitudes towards Karabakh's 'supposed' exercise of its right to self-determination have not always been consistent. Although it is commonly asserted that Stepanakert (capital of Nagorno-Karabakh) exercised its right according to the terms of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Law on Secession, of the 3 April 1990, other opinions have been asserted. Current President of Nagorno-Karabakh, Arkadiy Gukasyan, when Foreign Minister, claimed in an interview with the Armenian news agency Noyan Japan, on 4 March 1996, for example, that not only did Karabakh and Azerbaijan exercise their right to self-determination at the same time, Karabakh itself was never 'within Azerbaijan' [6]. Thus, he has viewed the negotiations as proceeding upon the premise that there are 'two independent states in the territory of the former Azerbaijan Soviet Republic' [7].
The above sentiments accurately reflect the 'point of departure1 of the conflict. Azerbaijan believes it started in 1988, Armenia and Karabakh 1918. Of course, whereas in 1988 the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was a constituent part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, in 1918 Karabakh was, at least according to the 'Armenian' side, an autonomy (albeit disputed) within Armenia.
The Armenian side has been unwilling to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. This was perhaps most graphically illustrated during the (OSCE) Lisbon summit of December 1996 (see below). However, there have been other occasions. On 22 April 1996, in Luxembourg, former Armenian President, Levon Ter-Petrosyan refused to sign a political declaration; to be signed also by the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia; when Azerbaijani President, Heydar Aliyev 'demanded' that the principle be included in the document [8].
While Yerevan (capital of Armenia) has been unwilling to recognise the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh de jure [9], it has been keen to promote the reality of its de facto independence [10]. Baku (capital of Azerbaijan) has been unwilling to accept even this: consequently refusing the possibility of establishing a 'confederation of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan' or a dejure sovereign Azerbaijan over a de facto independent Karabakh. For as state advisor to the Azerbaijani President, Vafa Guluzade commented (in the autumn of 1996), 'a confederation means independent states' [11].
Azerbaijan will only consider the possibility of an 'internal' type of self-determination. During his visit last summer to the United States, Azerbaijani President, Heydar Aliyev in his speech at Georgetown University, on 30 July 1997, stated: 'we will not allow a second Armenian state to be created on the territory of Azerbaijan, nor will the world community, the global society, allow this. However, we are prepared to grant Nagorno-Karabakh, within Azerbaijan, the very highest powers and the very highest status' [12]. Baku has been criticised, however, for its lack of elucidation as to what kind of status this would be, as well as the nature of Karabakh's powers. Naturally, much of this criticism has emanated from the Karabakhi side. They frequently draw the international community's attention to the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan - adopted in a referendum, on 12 November 1996 [13]. The Constitution declares, in Article 7(1), Azerbaijan to be a 'unitary republic' [14]. Beyond this, the Constitution fails to mention Nagorno-Karabakh anywhere [15], although Azerbaijan has contended that when a Political Agreement is signed, a special clause on Karabakh 'could' be added [16].
Not only has Baku been, publicly at least, evasive as to the future status of Karabakh, their position has been weakened by their earlier reluctance to provide anything more than 'cultural autonomy' [17]. It was not until President Aliycv's official visit to France, in December 1995, that, in an interview with the AFP news agency (on the 3 December), he spoke of Baku's willingness to grant the region 'political autonomy' [18]. However, this would be only in return for 'Armenia's recognition of our sovereignty over the region' [19]. It should be noted that just prior to this visit, in an interview with the Azerbaijani news agency Turan, (former) co-Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimirov had criticised Baku's failure to be more specific on the matter: 'the readiness to give Nagorno-Karabakh the highest independent status in the Azerbaijan Republic, but it is in not in a hurry to make real steps towards this direction' [20]. It has been indicated by Azerbaijan's Ambassador to Russia, Ramiz Rizayev, that Karabakh would have a status up to the 'level' enjoyed by 'autonomous republics'. However, whether this would be to the 'level' enjoyed by 'autonomous republics' during the Soviet period or to a 'level' defined by the Azerbaijani side is unclear.
Vafa Guluzade has spoken of the possibility of Karabakh being granted the right to open their own missions (abroad) and establish foreign economic relations with other countries. In an interview for the Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo (published on 29 June 1996), he stated: 'As far, on the other hand, as the right of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to have some missions and contacts of there own is concerned, our president has spoken about the high status of autonomy. In the modern world, the high status of autonomy grants the Armenians all this'. He continued: 'No one would prohibit anyone from freely travelling around the world or from entering into some financial, economic or cultural relations' [21].
A number of existing mechanisms have been considered to facilitate the reaching of a political agreement. The Bosnian version is unacceptable to Azerbaijan. They will not accept the principle of 'two states created within the framework of one state'. Instead, they prefer a level of autonomy similar to that enjoyed by the Aland Islands [22] or Tatarstan [23]. These, at least, are unacceptable to Yerevan [24], which views the 'state of affairs' in these autonomies as being considerably different to the situation in the South Caucasus, let alone Karabakh [25]. Stepanakert favours, if it has to consider the question of autonomy, something similar to the union of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, or to Andorra [26], which is under a dual protectorate. Most recently, on 25 May 1998, Nagorno-Karabakh President, Arkadiy Gukasyan, during a visit to France, raised the possibility of the methodology applied in Northern Ireland being 'repeated' in Karabakh [27]. Naturally, other models have been recommended during the negotiation process. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, Tofig Zulfugarov has, previously, suggested that the 'autonomous' region of Nagorno-Karabakh should take the form of a dual Armenian-Azeri entity, with two 'ethnically-based' administrative centres. The Azeri centre would be in Shusha (two-thirds Azeri before the war), while the Armenian centre would be in Stepanakert (overwhelmingly Armenian before the war). This proposal, known as the 'Cyprus model', has received little support from the mediators and only ridicule from the ^Armenian' side [28]. The federalisation of Azerbaijan has been raised by former (ousted) President of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov. Speaking during an interview with the Moscow newspaper Kuranty (published on 15 September 1995), he declared: 'I am for the full autonomy of the NKR within Azerbaijan, provided that the Azerbaijani part of the population return. Relations between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan would be built on the basis of bilateral agreements' [29].
Karabakh's true position is ambiguous. While, on the one hand, they have insisted on being granted de jure recognition and to being made a subject of international law, on the other they speak of their 'unification' with Armenia [30]. For example, on the 2 September 1996, the fifth 'anniversary' of Karabakh's 'declaration of independence', Robert Ko-charyan (at that time President of Nagorno-Karabakh) spoke of the wish of the Karabakhi people to unite with Armenia. He added: 'every resident of Karabakh continues to support the idea of unification' [31]. Further, in reply to a question from a deputy in the Armenian parliament, on 14 May 1997, the then newly-appointed Prime Minister of Armenia, Robert Kocharyan [32] noted that 'serious discussion' could be given to the possibility of incorporating Nagorno-Karabakh as an administrative-territorial unit within Armenia. He said that consideration of the problem could begin following a formal statement 'to this effect' by the Nagorno-Karabakh government, adding: 'it is important to take into account the opinion of the Nagorno-Karabakh population' [33]. 
In their public pronouncements, whether inside Armenia or not, one thing is certain in the eyes of Stepanakert. In the words of Kocharyan, on the second anniversary of the ceasefire, 'Azerbaijan will never rule Karabakh again' [34]. However, in private, the Karabakhi side does accept a possibility of future treaty relations with Azerbaijan and some form of truncated statehood: although they insist upon these relations being of a horizontal type (any kind of vertical relationship being out of the question). According to Gukasyan: 'we have no intention of negotiating with Azerbaijan as regards autonomy. We intend to negotiate with it as regards the status of Nagorno-Karabakh' [35].
In truth, it is ironic that while Azerbaijan has been unwilling to grant the people of Karabakh their right to 'external' self-determination, they fcave not been willing to 'deny' this right to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. President Aliyev has twice, publicly, declared that Azerbaijan shares Pakistan's support for a pro-independence movement in this predominantly Muslim Indian state [36].

OTHER ISSUES
The possibility of a constitutional settlement being reached in Nagorno-Karabakh is not, merely, predicated upon its future constitutional status, or even its relationship with Baku. The negotiations have been dominated by a range of other issues which will ultimately form part of the constitutional 'package' and which, in their own right, will determine, to a very large degree, whether peace will prove a lasting phenomenon (or not). I will outline them one-by-one.

Occupied Lands
The Karabakh armed forces currently control 7 rayons beyond the region's former Soviet boundaries [37]. Baku, naturally, has throughout the negotiation process been calling for their return. Indeed, for Baku, their return has been viewed as a prerequisite to the solution of other key problems, including the legal status of Karabakh [38]. Former Azeri Foreign Minister, Hasan Hasanov went even so far as to say that any talk of a political settlement was a 'political bluff unless 'Armenia' did not free Azerbaijani 'land' [39]. Stepanakert, undoubtedly, regards these territories as a 'bargaining chip1. Although they have agreed to return all the occupied rayons (with the exception of Lachinskiy rayon [40]), they will not be returned until agreement has been reached on Karabakh's future status and further agreement that the rayons, themselves, be demilitarised [41]. Besides, they fear that any unilateral return could be used by Baku as a means to halt the talks and restart the war, having regained certain strategic heights and, even if this did occur, the ambiguity of the line to where their armed forces should be withdrawn to is also unacceptable [42].

The Lachin Corridor
The future status of the, so-called, Lachin Corridor is key to any
settlement. During the Soviet period, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast existed as an enclave within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. It was separated from the Armenian SSR by a narrow 'plinth' of (mountainous) territory, which formed the Lachinskiy rayon [43]. At its nearest point, Karabakh was separated from Armenia by only 9 km. Today, Stepanakert will not consent, under any circumstances, to becoming, once more, an enclave, but Azerbaijan will not consent to any territorial revision [44]. Yerevan would like to see the Lachin Corridor as either part of the 'Nagorno-Karabakh Republic' or, at least, under the control of its troops. This is unacceptable to Baku. They insist that Lachinskiy rayon be demilitarised, that 'refugees1 be allowed to return and that formal Azerbaijani control over the corridor be restored. In return they would introduce a humanitarian corridor (sometimes referred to as a transit corridor) manned and controlled by international observers acting as guarantors [45]. The matter of leasing Lachin to Karabakh has been recommended. While this was initially resisted by Stepanakert [46], they have more recently been amenable to the idea. Indeed, they have even mooted exchanging a (unspecified) part of Karabakh territory, in return for Lachin [47]. Alternatively, the possibility of Kelbadzhar, to the north of Lachin, providing the crucial link with Armenia has been raised [48].

Security Guarantees
The legitimacy of a positive response on the part of Armenia in the event of military operations being resumed has also been raised by the Karabakhi side. They want included, in any political agreement, the expressed right of Nagorno-Karabakh to seek 'outside force' in the event of any resumed hostilities on the part of Azerbaijan. Thus, according to (former) Chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh National Assembly, Artur Tovmasyan, in such circumstances, 'Azerbaijan's attack on Karabakh will be viewed as aggression against Armenia' [49]. Baku, understandably, has been highly reluctant to conscience this. Indeed, previously, the possibility had even been raised that Karabakh would, in the event of an agreement, have to 'disband' its armed forces [50].

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
While Yerevan and Stepanakert, at least in public, have never denied the possibility of the return of (overwhelmingly Azeri) IDPs to Karabakh, they will not accept such a possibility without the attendant right of Armenian refugees/IDPs returning to Azerbaijan proper [51]. The fate of Azeri refugees from Armenia, as far as Baku is concerned, is bound up with the return of the displaced. Stepanakert has confirmed that it would 'create a security system' for those returning to Karabakh [52], The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees believes that, in the event of any settlement, the return of IDPs to Karabakh should proceed, entirely, on a voluntary basis and that measures should be taken to guarantee their security and human dignity.

IDPs and Shusha
If there have been any doubts in Stepanakert about the possibility, anywhere, of the IDP's return, they have been in respect to Shusha. The strategically important city of Shusha (with a majority Azeri population before the war), almost literally, overlooks Stepanakert, resting as it does on a mountain top. It was from Shusha that Azeri heavy weaponry, daily, bombarded the Karabakh capital, at the beginning of the war in 1991-92. The 'liberation1 of Shusha (Shushi, to the Armenians), on 10 May 1992 [53], marked a highly symbolic gain(/victory) for the Karabakhis - for the Azeris it was a terrible psychological blow.
Stepanakert fears the restoration of Azeri administrative control over Shusha and the effects this could have on the future sustainability of Karabakh. Troop withdrawal and the return of Azeri IDPs, in their eyes, threatens this: they will not 'permit' the creation of another Jerusalem [54], Consequently, they have resisted Baku's previous offer to withdraw their troops from Shahumyanovskiy rayon (Armenian populated before the war, outside the NKAO's borders, now entirely under Azeri control) in return for the return of Azerbaijani IDPs to Shusha [55].

International Peacekeepers
Upon the signing of the political agreement, it is envisaged that a multinational peacekeeping force will be deployed in the region. However, the lack of any agreement has prevented any deployment since the principle was first enshrined in the Budapest summit declaration of 6 December 1994 [56].
Despite the failure to reach a political agreement, agreement has not been reached even in respect of the logistics of the force; a matter entrusted to the High Level Planning Group (of the OSCE) since the Budapest summit [57].-Stepanakert has demanded that the force be stationed between Stepanakert and Baku, and not Baku and Yerevan, the latter being demanded by Baku [58]. While Yerevan and Stepanakert insist that the operation last for '10 to 20 years', Baku has insisted that it be completed 'within 6 to 7 months' [59]. The OSCE member states, whose armed forces would make-up the force, would never agree to the former, but their situation is, broadly, complicated by a lack of political will, even at the first instance, to participate in such a force anyway [60]. Finally, while Turkey asserts its right to participate, Yerevan and Stepanakert refuse to entertain such a possibility [61].

THE LISBON SUMMIT
It was hoped, particularly in Baku, that the OSCE Lisbon summit, of 2-3 December 1996, would mark a defining moment in the process towards a settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In the end it didn't, and, if anything, the summit only contributed to the sharpening and 'funda-mentalisation' of the divisions between the 'respective' sides.
The Azerbaijani delegation formulated three principles to be contained in the, final, summit declaration. First, recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity; second, autonomous status for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan; and third, guaranteed security for the inhabitants of Karabakh. Initially, however, an entirely different clause was presented in the draft declaration, following the protest of Armenia. The rather 'bland' clause, contained in 'Article 18', merely, called for the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to be resolved peacefully, for a continuation of the ceasefire, and the necessity to step up the negotiation process in order to reach an agreement based upon mutual compromise. Following a protest on the part of the Azerbaijani delegation, their proposals were included in a newly drafted 'Article 20'. However, the Armenian delegation used its veto to exclude 'Article 20' from the declaration, claiming that the Karabakhi Armenians would be faced with the threat of 'genocide' if adopted [62]. In turn, this caused the Azerbaijani delegation to threaten to block the entire declaration. A brief impasse followed, which was only overcome when the US delegation proposed to drop Article 20 and to append a special, public, statement to the declaration by the President of the OSCE, 'expressing the wishes' of the members of the OSCE. Azerbaijan 'conceded1 and the declaration was adopted without the offending 'Article 20' and with a separate statement (Annex 1: Statement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office), devoted to the Karabakh conflict, 'appended alongside', in its place. The statement reads as follows:
'You all know that no progress has been made in the past two years in a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and on the question of the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic. I regret that the efforts of the co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference to reconcile the parties' views on the principles of a settlement have been unsuccessful.
'The three principles that should shape a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been recommended to the co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group. These principles are supported by all members of the Minsk Group. They are as follows:
'the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic;
'legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement, based on self-determination [63], which accords Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-government within Azerbaijan;
'guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its entire population, including mutual commitments to ensure all parties1 compliance with the provisions of the settlement.
'I regret that Armenia has been unable to accept this. These principles have the support of all other participants.
This statement will be included in the documents of the Lisbon summit' [64],
The Chairman-in-Office's statement did not receive a favourable response in Stepanakert. As early as 6 December, Noyan Tapan disseminated the 'Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic'. The Declaration assessed the OSCE statement as 'a flouting of law, fairness, and common sense in the face of gross blackmail on the part of Azerbaijan' [65]. In a statement issued on 12 December, the Nagorno-Karabakh parliament condemned the 'attempt' to dictate the status of Karabakh, 'in total disregard of the people's right to self-determination and other OSCE principles' [66]. Yerevan, mockingly, labelled the Chairman-in-Officc's statement as merely containing the proposals of Baku [67] and claimed that they could only 'complicate the negotiation process' [68]. By contrast, President Aliyev reacted favourably, claiming that the statement would 'lay a good foundation for further talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement' [69]. Indeed, the negotiations should now be 'based' on the principles contained in the settlement [70].
The Lisbon summit was succeeded by a 'chill wind'. Yerevan refused to continue with the negotiations without the formal, parallel, participation of Nagorno-Karabakh [71]. Baku, as before, refused. Vafa Guluzade, President Aliyev's foreign policy advisor, in an interview with the Interfax news agency, declared: 'As long as Armenians in Karabakh claim independence, any direct talks with them will be premature'. Direct talks could take place only if the Karabakhi side accepted the 'guidelines' laid down by the OSCE at the Lisbon summit and 'abandoned' their 'demands' [72].
When talks did, finally [73], resume, in Moscow on l(-3) April 1997; the first to be co-Chaired by the three co-Chairmen; little or no progress was made [74]. Armenia refused to conduct talks on the status of Karabakh, Azerbaijan refused to conduct direct talks with Karabakh without Armenia recognising the 'Lisbon principles' and Armenia refused to do this.

DIRECT TALKS
The dispute concerning the possibility of conducting direct Karabakh-Azerbaijani talks (according to either the 'three plus three' or 'one plus one' formula' [75]) predates Lisbon. The mandate of the Minsk Group adopted, on 24 March 1992, at the meeting of the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers (in Helsinki), granted Karabakh, merely, the right to participation as an 'interested party'. Such 'participation' of the 'elected and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh'; that is, both the Armenian and Azeri communities; effectively, recognised the ethnic-duality of the region - something which was unacceptable to Stepanakert [76]. Stepanakert, consequently, failed to attend the first two sessions of the Minsk Group, in June 1992 [77].
'Clarification' of the matter was not assisted by the Budapest summit declaration. Karabakh was 'recognised', by implication, as a party to the conflict, on account of their being signatories to the ceasefire accord introduced on 12 May 1994 [78], However, this was not recognised by 
Azerbaijan (during the meeting of the Minsk Group, on 6 February 1995, in Moscow). Baku's insistence eventually compelled the co-Chairmen, Valentin Lozinskiy (Russia) and Jan Eliasson (Finland), to send letters to the respective sides in essence recognising three sides to the conflict: two (Armenia and Azerbaijan) being recognised States, the third, Nagorno-Karabakh, whose status 'remains to be determined' and, finally, 'the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh as an interested party' [79].
Baku has been concerned, throughout, that the conducting of direct talks with Stepanakert would provide the latter with some form of 'official' (de facto] recognition. This fear was, to some extent, justified by the sentiments of Robert Kocharyan (while Karabakh President), during an interview with Respublika Armeniya, published on 30 October 1996. He accepted that the effects of direct negotiations with Azerbaijan would 'thereby be indirectly recognising the NKR' [80].

POSTSCRIPT TO THE 'LATEST TALKS'
In an interview with Interfax, on 7 April 1997, Vafa Guluzade, responding to Yerevan's assertion (on 3 April) that the 'final document' was '70% coordinated' [81], admitted that the 'key problems' remained to be solved. While many provisions of the 'comprehensive political agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh' were coordinated 'three key problems' remained -the cities of Shusha and Lachin, and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh [82].

COUNTDOWN TO THE 'VELVET COUP'
Conscious of their fresh 'mandate', the co-Chairmanship of the Minsk Group proceeded to draw up a set of new proposals to facilitate the signing of the 'long overdue' agreement. These new 'initiatives' were forwarded to Yerevan, Stepanakert and Baku (in that order) during 31 May-1 June 1997 [83]. Interfax, on 26 June 1997, quoting a 'highly-placed Azerbaijani diplomat', reported that "the essence of the proposals is a mutual exchange of compromises between Baku and Yerevan'. According to the proposals, the Armenian side would have to free earlier-occupied Azerbaijani territories not only beyond the former boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, but also Shusha district in Karabakh itself. Baku, in turn, would allow the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh to be preserved, although they would be obliged to withdraw to within the former boundaries of the Oblast as per 1988. If these terms were observed, the mediators would guarantee strict international control over and registration of military equipment located in Nagorno-Karabakh. The armaments possessed by Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenians, in that case, would be included in Armenia's quota envisaged in the CFE treaty. In accordance with the proposed scenario, the territory freed by the Armenian side would be filled by an OSCE peacekeeping contingent representing Russia, the United States and 'European countries'. These peacekeepers would be responsible for the security of the Azerbaijani refugees returning to the 'liberated territories' and, at the same time, would act as guarantors of the security of the Nagorno-Karabakh population. They would also ensure free passage along a road linking Goris (in Armenia) with Stepanakert in the, to be defined, Lachin corridor (which would be leased to Azerbaijan by the OSCE): although the road itself would bypass the town of Lachin. In parallel with this, Baku and Stepanakert would have to hold talks on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. (The source reported that the status 'must be as high as possible, but below that of independence'.) Nagorno-Karabakh would be entitled to its own constitution, emblem, national anthem and flag. It would also be proclaimed a 'free economic zone', where any currency could be used and possessing a budget which would be 'financed exclusively from its own resources'. International mediators would get involved at different stages of the talks and Yerevan could act as an observer. On completion of the talks, following the signing of an agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Nagorno-Karabakh armed units would be reduced to the 'operational minimum', in effect becoming a 'militarised police force' [84].
Taking due account of the points raised by the sides [85], amendments to the original draft were submitted by representatives of the Minsk Group [86]. The 'package' formula was now replaced by a 'step-by-step' ('two-stage') approach to the settlement. First, Karabakh troops would be withdrawn from six out of the seven occupied districts (excluding Lachinskiy rayon), international peacekeepers being deployed in their place: 'refugees' would return to their former homes in these districts. Second, the issue of Lachin and Shusha would then be resolved. Only after these had been settled would the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh be considered [87]. Owing to the holding of presidential elections in Nagorno-Karabakh, on 1 September 1997, however, further discussions were interrupted [88].
'Yerevan', which had always been sympathetic to the 'step-by-step' formula [89], now seized its opportunity [90]. On the 2 September, during a press conference in Yerevan, arranged to congratulate Arkadiy Gukasyan on his election to the post of President of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian Presidential spokesman, Levon Zurabian noted that a possible mutually acceptable variant could not embrace all aspects of the settlement. Zurabian added: 'The provisions on which agreement is not achieved will become the subject of further talks' [91]. On the 26 September, President Ter-Petrosyan went a stage further. During what, for him, was a rare press conference (in Yerevan), he confirmed his support for the 'stage-by-stage' process. In order to illustrate this, he presented what, in his opinion, were the 'five variants' to the 'Karabakh conflict settlement'. Variant number four was introduced in the following way: 'To demand independence and nothing else or join Armenia. It is the same. It is an ultimatum. In this case the international sanctions will be more strict and effective. I don't think that Karabakh is capable of forcing Azerbaijan to its knees, because it will have to seize Baku, but if it tries to seize one more region now, not Baku, the whole world will not let it...' [92].
The Armenian President's remarks were seized upon by Baku [93] and those in the (Armenian) opposition [94], but what made them particularly damaging was the way in which they were reported. ITAR-TASS, on the 26 September, quoted him as having said: 'Ultimatum demands of independence of Nagorno-Karabakh or its joining of Armenia are also senseless because they will entail efficient international sanctions'. On the 27 September, Snark reported: 'he also believes that right now the demands that Nagorno-Karabakh be given full independence or be united with Armenia, just like any attempt to use force to make Azerbaijan capitulate, are not realistic' [95].
'Yerevan's isolation' was compounded when, on 1 November 1997, the Yerevan-based newspaper Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (Republic of Armenia) published an article by President Ter-Petrosyan, entitled: 'War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness'. In the article he expanded on the 'sentiments expressed during his 26 September press conference, indicating his motivation for making them. He, further, responded to the opposition's charges levelled against him. Warning of coming dangers for the Armenian people, both in Armenia and in Karabakh, he concluded: 'Let us not be preoccupied with self-deception and let us not cherish hollow illusions. On the issue of Karabakh's independence we have no allies. No one will resolve the present enigma but us. We are the ones who must resolve it to the extent that our capabilities allows us. Our only ally is our rejection of adventurism. It is not my intention to present a tragic picture or to sound the alarm because I am confident of the circumspection of our people' [96].
The 'whole' process now appeared to depend on the signing of a draft document before the end of the year [97]. This had first been reflected during the Minsk Group's visit to Baku, on 23 September, and Georges Vogier's (French co-Chairman) remarks (reciprocated by President Aliyev [98]} that the intermediaries were 'fully resolved to attain a settlement of the NK problem in principle before the end of 1997' [99]. By the beginning of November it was consuming the debate [100]. Expectation shifted towards the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, in Copenhagen, in the December.
In the end, after 7 months of intensive 'shuttle diplomacy', the Copenhagen meeting (18-19 December 1997) proved to be a huge disappointment for the co-Chairmen: while Yerevan and Baku [101] were both willing to sign-up to the Minsk Group peace plan, Stepanakert refused. Karabakh President, Arkadiy Gukasyan was to explain the basis for their action during an interview with the Armenian news agency Snark, on 19 January 1998. He said: The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic leadership is striving to reach a full and above all final settlement of the conflict in order not to leave a legacy of unsettled relations with Azerbaijan for the next generation of politicians and for our descendants as a whole. We already have a bitter experience of the freezing of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its awakening under favourable conditions ... What the Minsk Group co-Chairmen propose today is a temporary freezing of the situation with the poorly-concealed aim of restoring the status quo of 1988. The result of this will be a guarantee that the conflict will not be settled for decades' [102],
Stepanakert insisted on a 'package' approach, but not one based on 'preconditions'. On 6 November 1997, the Nagorno-Karabakh Foreign Ministry had released a statement which explained why Stepanakert had been unable to support the Minsk Group's earlier, package, variant. It stated: 'In May 1997 the co-presidents of the Minsk Conference proposed an outline for a comprehensive agreement on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The proposal was comprised of two parts; a first agreement to end armed confrontation and a second agreement about status. As such, the outline of the so-called comprehensive agreement constituted a package option in terms of its methodology. However, both of the proposed accords were based on the principles stated in the declaration of the executive presidency of the OSCE summit in Lisbon. Naturally, based on those considerations, the said package of comprehensive agreement could not be accepted as a basis for future negotiations' [103], While a package formula could be unacceptable to Stepanakert, certain 'variants' of stage-by-stage would be acceptable.
Leonard Petrosyan, (then) Prime Minister of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, had stated, on 17 November: 'at the first stage the status of NKR should be defined, then at the second its borders will be determined. Only after that can forces be withdrawn from the territories controlled by the NKR' [104].
Agreement could not be reached, even, on a summit statement on the conflict. During discussions on Karabakh, the Azerbaijani delegation proposed that a resolution should be adopted which would again confirm the principles contained in the Lisbon statement. The Armenian delegation rejected this. Another, very similar, text was proposed, again by the Azeris, as an alternative, in the form of a statement by the OSCE Chairman, but this was again rejected by Armenia. As a result, upon the advice of the United States and France (but interestingly not Russia) [105], no document was adopted and only the report of the co-Chairmen was submitted [106].
Levon Ter-Petrosyan had staked his future on the 'Copenhagen' plan and he had failed. His position had now become unsustainable. On 2 February 1998 a series of resignations were announced [107], in the heart of the Armenian political establishment, which culminated, on the 3, with his own. In his statement, broadcast live on Armenian Television that evening, President Ter-Petrosyan began: T have been presented with a demand for my resignation from bodies of power that are well-known to you. Given that in the prevailing situation executing the constitutional powers of the President is fraught with a serious risk of destabilising the country, I accept this demand and announce my resignation'. During the remainder of his announcement, he spoke of the 'Artsakh issue' having been only a pretext to those concerned. Comparing his own position with that of former Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin he declared, 'the party of peace and worthy accord suffered a defeat'. He noted: 'Life will show who did what for Artsakh and who is in fact selling out' [108].
Following his election as Armenian President, Robert Kocharyan [109], during an interview with Interfax, was quick to stress the new approach to the negotiations in Yerevan. Their position was governed by three principles: 'the impossibility of subordinating one party to the other ('Nagorno-Karabakh cannot stay in Azerbaijan as an autonomous region') [110], the impossibility for Nagorno-Karabakh to exist as an enclave and security for Karabakh'. Further, 'any Karabakh settlement must be recorded in an internationally recognised document1 [111].
The impossibility of autonomy/possibility of horizontal ties with Azerbaijan is something that Arkadiy Gukasyan, President of Nagorno-Karabakh, had been developing during the previous few months. Speaking on Ekho Moskvyy radio, on 13 October 1997, Gukasyan admitted that it was 'unlikely that Nagorno-Karabakh could be a state of full value' [112]. 'We are realists and are aware that we won't be able to create a normal state' However, despite this, Gukasyan has been keen to stress that Karabakh, while it has not abandoned its aspiration to full independence, is prepared to have relations with Azerbaijan as only 'an equal partner'. Only subsequent to this would they be 'prepared to sacrifice certain elements of independence'. During an interview with Interfax, on 20 October 1997, President Gukasyan ventured some possibilities for sharing power: These could be ecological issues, joint economic projects, finances, customs, fighting drug trafficking and the protection of human rights' [114]. In an interview with the Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo, published on 1 November 1997, he 'added': 'As a subject of international law, Karabakh is prepared to limit its statehood. This may be applicable to the most diverse spheres; the military sphere, the right to join in military alliances, empowerment in the foreign policy sphere, the right to establish embassies in other states, representation in the United Nations' [115].
Baku has ruled out the possibility of Azerbaijan establishing, in effect, horizontal (treaty-based) ties with Nagorno-Karabakh. On 24 June 1998, President Aliyev, during a meeting with a delegation from the European Parliament, told Karin Jones (deputy head of the delegation) that the possibility of establishing confederal relations between Azerbaijan and Karabakh was out of the question, as Azerbaijan was a unitary state [116]. Earlier, on 18 June 1998, Vafa Guluzade had stated that 'Azerbaijan's denial of the idea of autonomy would imply both the recognition of Karabakh's independence and the fact of its union with Armenia' [117]. In an interview with Snark he 'repeated' that Karabakh could 'have almost all the attributes of an independent state, like all the world's autonomies with high status, (but) with two exceptions: an army (a local police force is possible) and foreign policy (foreign economic representation is possible)' [118].
If proof were needed that the negotiation process was becoming exhausted [119], it was provided by Vardan Oskanyan on 18 June 1998. Noting Yerevan's unwillingness to allow the talks process to continue 'forever', Oskanyan said: 'If over two, three, four or five years, Azerbaijan refuses to solve the problem by means of peace negotiations (hoping for a settlement by military means), Armenia should take other steps, one of which is the issue of Karabakh's reunification with Armenia. We can ensure Karabakh's security only by creating such a level-playing field, that's to say by creating a joint army through reuniting the two countries,
with whose aid it will be possible to withstand the Azeri threat' [120], Baku's response was immediate. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, in a statement, on 20 June, stated that the remarks were an 'open challenge to the world community and an untenable attempt to dictate terms of settlement to the OSCE' [121].
In truth, the process of unification may have already started. In May two highly significant, but lightly reported, documents were signed. First, on the 11 May, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh signed a protocol on consultations and cooperation between the foreign ministries of the two states. The signing ceremony, Snark reported, took place in the 'historical capital' of Karabakh, 'Shusha'. According to the protocol, the sides confirmed that they had political interests in common and pledged to establish close cooperation, proceeding from the need to develop dialogue on issues of mutual interest and to coordinate foreign policy activities. This cooperation would entail holding consultations of an international, regional and bilateral nature, establishing regional and supra-regional security mechanisms and further developing diplomatic cooperation between the two [122]. Second, on 15 May, the respective parliament chairmen signed, in Stepanakert, an agreement on cooperation between the two legislatures. The agreement envisaged the creation of a permanent inter-parliamentary commission for cooperation (meeting at least twice a year), which will 'coordinate the approaches of the two parliaments on key international issues'. Perhaps most significant of all, however, the agreement provided that Armenia would seek to include Karabakh representatives in its parliamentary delegations at international fora [123].

REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
Azerbaijan hosts around 188000 refugees from Armenia. The government in Baku is also assisting 551000 IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding rayons [124]. Armenia accommodates 200000 refugees from 'Azerbaijan'; 14000 from Nagorno-Karabakh and 3800 from Shahumian district [125].

NOTES
[1] (Yerevan, Snark, in Russian, 1050 gmt, 2 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-154, 5 June
1998). [2] Originally, it was made up of 11 member states: the United States, Russia,
Germany, France, Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, Belarus, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. See: (ITAR-TASS World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 1625 gmt, 26 March 1992) (SU/1341 Cl/4, 28 March 1992).
[3] The present co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference are: Valentin Lozinskiy (Russia), Jacques Blot (France) and Strobe Talbott (United States). The, equivalent, co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group are: Yuny Yukalov (Russia), Georges Vogier (France) and Lynn Pascoe (United States).
[4] The current Personal Representative (since 1 January 1997) is Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk of Poland.
[5] See, for example, Arkadiy Gukasyan's comment in his interview with the Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo, published on 1 November 1997. (Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, 1 Nov. 1997, no. 43, pp. 16-17) (FBIS-SOV-97-323, 21 Nov. 1997).
[6] Gukasyan added: 'both were within the USSR and seceded from it simultaneously on the same juridicial basis'. (Yerevan, Noyan Tapan, in English, 1718 gmt, 4 March 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-045, 7 March 1996).
[7] (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 0634 gmt, 17 April 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-075, 18 April 1996).
[8] The presidents had been in Luxembourg to sign the 'Accord on Partnership and Cooperation' between'the South Caucasian states and the EU. (Tbilisi, Resonance, in Georgian, 25-26 April 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-085, 2 May 1996).
[9] In July 1996, Zhirayr Liparilyan, at that time advisor to Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan and chief Armenian negotiator at the Nagorno-Karabakh talks, was quoted in the Turkish Daily News as having said that he did not consider the 'official' recognition of Karabakh as a 'major step towards anything'. (Ankara, Turkish Daily News, in English, 25 July 1996, p. A4) (FBIS-SOV-96-147, 31 July 1996).
[10] Former Internal Affairs Minister (later Mayor of Yerevan), Vano Siradegyan, in fact claimed, on 28 June 1994, that Nagorno-Karabakh had been incorporated, de facto, into Armenia. (Yerevan, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, in English, 2003 gmt, 28 June 1994) (FBIS-SOV-94-125).
[11] (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 30 Oct. 1996, p. 4) (FBIS-SOV-96-237-S, 11 Dec. 1996).
[12] (Baku, Bakinskiy Rabochiy, in Russian, 2 August 1997, p. 1) (FBIS-SOV-97-237, 26 August 1997).
[13] For text see: (Baku, Azerbaydzhan, in Russian, 11 Nov. 1995, no. 42, pp. 1-4) (FBIS-SOV-95-232-S, 11 Dec. 1995).
Alternatively see: <http://www.constitutional-court-az.org/const-conlents. htm>
[14] Under the rubric 'The Azerbaijani Slate', Article 7(1) states: The Azerbaijani State shall be a democratic, legal, secular, unitary republic'. For text of Constitution see: <http://www.constitutional-court-az.org/const-chapter2.php>
[15] In an interview for the Russian-language daily Zerkalo, not long after the referendum, former Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, Hasan Hasanov declared, 'only within the framework of the state of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan's borders and Azerbaijan's constitution, can any kind of autonomy be afforded to Nagorno-Karabakh'. He then continued: 'All of this is stipulated in the formula proposed in the draft constitution - that autonomies may be formed within the unitary state'. It never stated this. (Baku. Zerkalo, in Russian, 21 Oct. 1995, no. 39, p. 5) (FB1S-SOV-95-231-S. 11 Dec. 1995).
[16] According Ramiz Rizayev, Azerbaijani Ambassador to the Russian Federation. (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 30 Jan. 1996, pp. 1,3) (FBIS-SOV-96-029-S, 14 Feb. 1996).
[17] Former Azerbaijani President, Abulfaz Elchibey maintains, to this day, that the Karabakh Armenians should be offered nothing more than this. See: (Baku, Turan, in Russian, 1545 gmt, 29 Oct. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-302, 31 Oct. 1997) and (Baku, Turan, in Russian, 0550 gmt, 30 Dec. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-364, 1 Jan. 1998).
[18] Very interestingly, only a few days later, during an official visit to Baku by Turkish President, Suleyman Demirel the Turkish daily Turkiye was writing about the 'pressure' that Turkey was putting on both sides, Azerbaijan included. It quoted 'Foreign Ministry officials1 in Ankara as requesting Baku 'to give substance to its promise that it will 'grant the broadest rights and freedoms to the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh'. It continued. 'Ankara believes that 'Azerbaijan should explain what it means by the granting of the broadest rights and freedoms'. Just as interesting, these 'Foreign Ministry officials' were quoted as 'saying' the following, in respect of the means by which a settlement could be reached: 'Establishing a horizontal status between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in return for opening a corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, [and] giving guarantorship to a third country for the status of Nagorno-Karabakh'. (Istanbul, Turkiye, in Turkish, 8 Dec. 1995, p. 15) (FBIS-WEU-95-238, 14 Dec. 1995).
[19] Not only recognition of this, but importantly also coupled with an 'Armenian' withdrawal from Lachin. President Aliyev added: 'Armenia wants to maintain control over the province of Eachin ... which goes against international law'. (Paris, AFP, in English, 2100 gmt, 3 Dec. 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-232, 11 Dec. 1995).
[20] (Baku, Turan, in English, 1309 gmt, 1 Dec. 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-232, 11 Dec.
1995) Still, following the Moscow summit in January 1996, Boris Yeltsin said that the status of an autonomous republic is to be 'the upper boundary of the autonomy' for Karabakh. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1648 grnt, 29 Jan.1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-020, 31 Jan. 1996).
[21] (Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, 29 June 1996, no. 26) (FBIS-SOV-96-138-S, 18 July 1996) Confirmed in a later interview, for Respublika Armeniya. He added: 'Nagorno-Karabakh may have everything except two things - an army ... and foreign policy services'. (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 30 Oct. 1996, p. 4) (FBIS-SOV-96-237-S, 11 Dec. 1996).
[22] See, for example, the comments made by the Chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament (the Milli Majlis), Rasul Guliyev, during a meeting in Baku on 6 May
1995. with a delegation of the Russian Federation Council and the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. (Baku, Turan, in English, 1359 gmt, 7 May 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-088).
[23] See the interview with Rasul Guliyev for the Moscow newspaper Novoye Vremya, July issue. (Moscow, Novoye Vremya, in Russian, July 1996, no. 31, pp. 16-17) (FBIS-SOV-96-208-S, 29 Oct. 1996).
[24] In an interview for the newspaper Respublika Armeniya, Deputy Foreign Minister, Vardan Oskanyan has spoken against these 'scenarios1: They are unequivocally unacceptable ... None of the world's existing autonomy models can today satisfy the requirements of Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly the problem of security'. (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 21 August 1996. p. 1) (FB1S-SOV-96-208-S, 29 Oct. 1996).
[25] A view expressed by (former) Armenian Foreign Minister, Vahan Papazyan in an interview for Respublika Armeniya (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 30 Oct. 1996, p. 4) (FBIS-SOV-96-237-S, 1 1 Dec. 1996).
[26] The Andorra model was, according to Arsen Gasparian (Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesman), recommended, by Rome, to Armenian Foreign Minister, Vardan Oskanyan during his visit to Italy in July 1998 (22-25). Gasparian, addressing a press conference in Yerevan, on 27 July 1998, stated: 'individual aspects of Andorra's state system will most probably be applied to the problem of Karabakh's status ... Of course, elements of such a state set-up will be welcomed by the Armenian side'. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 0937 gmt, 27 July 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-208, 28 July 1998).
[27] Although he did acknowledge that Northern Ireland had its own 'peculiarities'. (Yerevan, NoyanTapan, in Russian, 0400 gmt. 26 May 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-147, 29 May 1998).
[28] Arkadiy Gukasyan 'ironically' confirmed, in reply, that the 'Azeri centre already exists in Baku, and the Armenian centre has been set up in Stepanakert'. (Yerevan, Snark, in English, 1140 gmt, 10 July 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-132) See also, more recently: (Yerevan, Noyan Tapan, in Russian, 0400 gmt, 8 Oct. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-281, 9 Oct. 1997) and (Moscow, Interfaks-AiF, in Russian, 10-16 Nov. 1997, no. 45, p. 5) (FBIS-SOV-97-318, 19 Nov. 1997).
[29] (Moscow, Kuranty, in Russian, 15 Sept. 1995, p. 7).
[30] 'The existence of two Armenian states in 1996 is conditioned by current realities. Unsolved problems and a threat of Azerbaijani aggressions force Nagorno-Karabakh to retain a model of society adequate to that of war time. It would not be reasonable to unite two states having different military and political orientations ... Meanwhile, every resident of Karabakh continues to support the idea of unification'. (Yerevan, Snark, in English, 1255 gmt, 2 Sept. 1996) (FB1S-SOV-96-174, 9 Sept. 1996).
[31] (Yerevan, Snark, in English, 1255 gmt, 2 Sept. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-174, 9 Sept. 1996).
[32] Robert Kocharyan had been appointed Prime Minister of Armenia, by President Ter-Petrosyan, on 20 March 1997. He replaced Armen Sargsyan (the former Armenian Ambassador to the United Kingdom) who had stepped down, for health reasons, on 6 March 1997 (he had only been in the post since 4 November 1996).
[33] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1435 gmt, 15 May 1997) and (Baku, Turan, in Russian, 1000 gmt, 15 May 1997) both (FBIS-SOV-97-135, 16 May 1997).
[34] (Yerevan, Snark, in English, 1252 gmt, 13 May 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-094, 16 May 1996).
[35] (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 30 Oct. 1996, p. 4) (FBIS-SOV-96-237-S, II Dec. 1996).
[36] First, while addressing the Azerbaijani parliament, on 11 October 1995, during an official visit to Baku by (then) Pakistani President, Farooq Ahmed Khan Legari. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1733 gmt, 11 Oct. 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-197) Second, during an official visit to Islamabad, in April 1996. President Aliyev reiterated his 'unflinching support1 for Pakistan on the Kashmir question, during the visit to Baku of Pakistani Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, on 16 July 1997. (Islamabad, Radio Pakistan Network, in Urdu, 0200 gmt, 17 July 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-198, 18 July 1997).
[37] They are (clockwise): Agdamskiy, Fizulinskiy, Dzhebraylskiy, Zangelanskiy, Kubatlinskiy, Lachinskiy and Kelbadzharskiy rayons.
Baku claims that 20% of the country is occupied by Armenian armed forces. It should be noted that (according to Armenian figures) 15% of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is presently occupied by Azeri forces. This includes the entire Shahumyanovskiy rayon (proclaimed a part of the Republic in both the Reunification Resolution (1 December 1989) and the Declaration of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (2 September 1991), although not previously forming part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, see Chapter 1) and parts of Mardakertskiy and Martuninskiy rayons (both within the former boundaries of the Autonomous Oblast).
[38] The resolution of this issue will imply the resolution of all other key settlement issues, Hasan Hasanov commented prior to the meeting of the OSCE Minsk Group in Baden, on 24 July 1995. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1622 gmt, 20 July 1995) (FB1S-SOV-95-140).
Baku's approach goes some way to explaining why a peace treaty has never been signed between the conflicting sides. On 27 December 1994, (former) Azerbaijani Foreign Minister, Hasan Hasanov outlined the 'conditions' for a peace treaty: 'At first, a political agreement on cessation of hostilities must be signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The agreement provides for liberation of all Azeri territories, including Shusha and Lachin [my emphasis], and refugees coming home'. (Baku, Turan, in English, 1708 gmt, 27 Dec. 1994) (FBIS-SOV-94-242).
[39] View conveyed during a meeting with the UN Secretary-General's special envoy, Aldo Agello, in Baden, on 13 September 1995. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1839 gmt, 13 Sept. 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-178).
[40] Perhaps, also, Kelbadzharskiy rayon. Consider the view of Samvel Babayan, Defence Minister of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (wields considerable influence in the republic), during two interviews conducted in September 1997. During an interview with Noyan Tapan he said: 'Even if they gave us the status of a separate state today, there could be no talk of returning Lachin and Kelbyadz-har. More than 500000 Armenians were driven out of Azerbaijan. Where are these people to live? Some of them have made Lachin District their base and they have settled in Kelbyadzhar ... Azerbaijan does not have the right to deprive them of their homes a second time'. Earlier, during an interview with the Moscow newspaper Moskovskiye Novosti, he had noted: 'We must be sure that there is no wedge between us and Armenia. When Azerbaijan mentions these territories, and even begins laying claim to Shusha, it becomes clear to me that it really does not want a settlement'. (Yerevan, NoyanTapan, in Russian, 1500 gmt, 11 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-255, 15 Sept. 1997) and (Moscow, Moskovskiye Novosti, in Russian, 7-14 Sept. 1997, p. 9) (FBIS-SOV-97-253, 11 Sept. 1997).
[41] Yerevan insisted on this latter point even during the presidency of Levon Ter-Petrosyan. See, for example, remarks made by (then) Deputy Foreign Minister, Vardan Oskanyan at a press conference in Yerevan, on 22 May 1995. (Yerevan, Snark, in English, 1657 gmt, 22 May 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-099).
[42] Arkadiy Gukasyan expressed the 'dilemma' in the following way: 'Let us take, for example, the question of borders. It is demanded that we withdraw troops from the occupied territories. On what principles is this demand based? To where should the troops be withdrawn? There are no borders today in practice. Azerbaijan has liquidated the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast, we have declared our independence. To where should we withdraw the troops from Agdam, say? How in Azerbaijan's understanding does Agdam differ from Stepanakert? And unless some borders are defined, even if not state borders, a situation could arise tomorrow where our troops are withdrawn from Agdarn, and Azerbaijan insists on their withdrawal from Stepanakert, or are Stepanakert and Agdam one and the same thing for Azerbaijan today?' (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 20 Sept. 1995, p. 3) (FBIS-SOV-95-186).
[43] It should be noted that on 5 September 1995 the 'Nagorno-Karabakh Republic government' renamed Lachinskiy rayon, Kashatagh district. (Yerevan, Radio Yerevan International Service, in Armenian, 2100 gmt, 9 Sept. 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-176).
[44] Vafa Guluzade has illustrated the point in the following way: 'You understand that were Britain to begin to declare that 'we are an island, we can no longer be an island, we have to be connected with dry land. We have, therefore, to build a bridge to France and take a piece of France's territory''. (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 30 Oct. 1996, p. 4) (FBIS-SOV-96-237-S, 11 Dec. 1996). 
[45] See, for example, the remarks of President Aliyev, on 24 April 1995, in Baku, during a meeting with a delegation from Russia's State Duma. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1016 gmt, 25 April 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-079) Hasan Hasanov, on 17 September 1994: provided 'that it is not used by the Armenian side for military purposes'. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, 2054 gmt, 16 Sept. 1994) (FBIS-SOV-94-181) (dates as published). Interestingly, (former) Russian co-Chairman of the Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimirov later suggested that this 'humanitarian corridor' or 'transit zone' could initially come under the control of the 'Armenian' armed formations. (Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, 16 March 1996, no. 12, pp. 14-15) (FBIS-SOV-085-S, 2 May 1996).
[46] The proposal of 'Boris Yeltsin' to 'offer' 'Armenia' a 99-year lease over Lachin, prior to the Bonn talks in November/December 1995, was strenuously denied by co-Chairman of the Minsk Group Vladimir Kazimirov. (Baku, Turan, in English, 1309. gmt, 1 Dec. 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-232, 11 Dec. 1995). 
[47] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 0752 gmt, 19 June 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-119, 20 June 1996).
[48]An alternative frequently conveyed to me during my visit to Karabakh, in April 1996. See also Arkadiy Gukasyan's interview with Respublika Armeniya (published on 20 September 1995). (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 20 Sept. 1995, p. 3) (FBIS-SOV-95-186).
[49] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1223 gmt, 8 May 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-091, 13 May 1996).
[50] Vafa Guluzade has told the newspaper Zerkalo: 'Nagornyy Karabakh, being part of Azerbaijan, cannot have its own armed forces, which could be used against Azerbaijan'. (Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, 29 June 1996, no. 26) (FBIS-SOV-96-138-S, 18 July 1996).
[51] Arkadiy Gukasyan: 'I believe that all refugees must have the right to return voluntarily to their homes ... When I speak about refugees, I mean absolutely everyone, including the 500000 Armenians who fled Azerbaijan'. (Moscow, Interfaks-AiF, in Russian, 10-16 Nov. 1997, no. 45, p. 5) (FBIS-SOV-97-318, 19 Nov. 1997). 
[52] Ibid.
[53] See: (Mayak Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 1210 gmt, 10 May 1992) (SU/1378 C2/ 1, 12 May 1992).
[54] An idea propounded by (former) Minsk Group co-Chairman, Vladimir Kazimirov. See: (Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, 5 Nov. 1994, pp. 1,8) (FBIS-SOV-94-217). He later told the Armenian news agency, Armenpress, that Shusha 'should not be a city inhabited by a single ethnic group'. In order to radically change the fate of Shusha, he added, it should be 'transformed' into a 'historic-cultural centre', a 'symbol of coexistence between the two nations and their religions'. (Yerevan, Radio Yerevan International Service, in Armenian, 2000 gmt, 9 March 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-049, 13 March 1996).
[55] Under the rubric, '[Budapest Decisions]
II. Regional Issues. Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict', paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 'Budapest Summit Declaration on Genuine Partnership in a New Era' provide:
'4. They agreed that, in line with the view of the parties to the conflict, the conclusion of the (political) agreement mentioned above would also make it possible to deploy multinational peacekeeping forces as an essential element for the implementation of the agreement itself. They declared their political will to provide, with an appropriate resolution from the United Nations Security Council, a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force following an agreement among the parties for the cessation of the armed conflict. They requested the Chairman-in-Office to develop as soon as possible a plan for the establishment, composition and operations of such a force, organised on the basis of Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992 and in a manner fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. To this end the Chairman-in-Office will be assisted by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference and by the Minsk Group, and be supported by the Secretary General; after appropriate consultations he will also establish a high-level planning group in Vienna to make recommendations on, inter alia, the size and characteristics of the force, command and control, logistics, allocation of units and resources, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing States. He will seek support of the United Nations on the basis of the stated United Nations readiness to provide technical advice and expertise. He will also seek continuing political support from the United Nations Security Council for the possible deployment of a CSCE peacekeeping force.
'5. On the basis of such preparatory work and the relevant provisions of Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992, and following/agreement and a formal request by the parties to the Chairman-in-Office through the co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference, the Permanent Council will take a decision on the establishment of the CSCE peacekeeping operation'. International Legal Materials, 34 (1995) pp. 764-807 at 777.
[56] The Budapest Summit Declaration states (in II, Regional Issues, Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, para. 4): 'To this end the Chairman-in-Office ... after appropriate consultations he will also establish a high-level planning group in Vienna to make recommendations on, inter alia, the size and characteristics of the force, command and control, logistics, allocation of units and resources, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing States'. Ibid.
[57] See: (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1732 gmt, 13 July 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-135).
[58] Cited by Vladimir Kazimirov during an interview with Turan, on 25 March 1995. (Baku, Turan, in English, 2114 gmt, 26 March 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-059).
[59] Such a reality was recognised by Laszlo Kovacs, Hungarian Foreign Minister (and, at that time, OSCE Chairman-in-Office), on 4 March 1995, while delivering a lecture at an international conference on peacekeeping. He also recognised the difficulties in financing such an operation and the lack of experience of the troops. (Budapest, MTI, in English, 1956 gmt, 4 March 1995) (FBIS-EEU-95-044-A).
[60] See, for example, the remarks made by Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ferhat Ataman, on 1 March 1995. (Ankara, Anatolia, in Turkish, 1510 gmt, 1 March 1995) (FBIS-WEU-95-042).
[61] For Yerevan see, for example: (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1732 gmt, 13 July 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-135) For Stepanakert: (Yerevan, Snark, in English, 1056 gmt, 26 Jan. 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-018).
[62] President Tef-Petrosyan testified to 'the actions of genocide' perpetrated in Azerbaijan - citing Baku, Sumgait and Gyandzha as examples. (Baku, Bakinskiy Rabochiy, in Russian, 12 Dec. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-97-022-S, 4 Feb. 1997).
[63] Interestingly, it was reported in Zerkalo, on 14 December 1996, that the text of the Chairman-in-Office's statement, as published in the newspaper Azerbaydzhan, did not contain the word 'self-determination'. (Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, 14 Dec. 1996, no. 50, p. 14) (FBIS-SOV-97-041-S, 4 March 1997).
[64] Although the statement, as with the summit declaration itself, is not legally binding, in the words of the Russian Ambassador to Armenia, Andrey Urnov, they do carry a 'certain moral and political weight'. (Yerevan, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, in Armenian, 25 Jan. 1997, p. 2) (FBIS-SOV-97-047-S, 14 March 1997).
The following (Annex 2), is the (response) statement of the Armenian Delegation: 'With regard to the statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the Delegation of Armenia wishes to express its concern over the following issues:
'I. The statement does not reflect the spirit or the letter of the Minsk Group's mandate as established by the Budapest Summit 1994, which proposed negotiations with a view to reaching apolitical agreement. The problem of status has been a subject of discussion in direct negotiations which have yet to be concluded.
'2. The statement predetermines the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, contradicting the decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council of 1992, which referred this issue to the competence of the OSCE Minsk Conference to be convened after the conclusion of apolitical agreement.
'3. The Armenian side is convinced that a solution of the problem can be found on the basis of international law and the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, above all on the basis of the principle of self-determination.
'4. In the interests of reaching a compromise solution, the Armenian side is prepared to continue with the most intensive negotiations, both within the Minsk Group and on the basis of direct contacts co-ordinated by the co-Chairmen of that Group.
'request that this statement be annexed to the Lisbon Summit Declaration'.
For the text of the Declaration see:
<http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/Summits/lisbo96e.php> 
[65] (Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, 14 Dec. 1996, no. 50, p. 14) (FBIS-SOV-97-041-S, 4
March 1997). 
[66] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1514 gmt, 12 Dec. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-242, 17
Dec. 1996). 
[67] View expressed by (former) Armenian Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Arzumanyan
at a meeting of foreign ambassadors in Yerevan, on 6 December 1996, after the
Lisbon summit. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1943 gmt, 6 Dec. 1996)
(FBIS-SOV-96-237, 10 Dec. 1996). 
[68] (Former) Armenian presidential spokesman (under Ter-Petrosyan), Levon Zur-
abian informing a news conference in Yerevan on 5 December. (Moscow,
Interfax, in English, 1625 gmt, 6 Dec. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-237, 10 Dec. 1996).
[69] Speaking in Baku following his return from Lisbon on 6 December. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1311 gmt, 6 Dec. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-237, 10 Dec. 1996).
[70] View conveyed, for example, to NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana during a two-day visit to Baku on 14 February 1997. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1719 gmt, 14 Feb. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-032, 19 Feb. 1997).
[71] An official statement on this matter was made by the Armenian Foreign Ministry at a news conference attended by its spokesman, Arsen Gasparian, on 11 March 1997. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1934 gmt, 11 March 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-070, 14 March 1997).
[72] According to Vafa Guluzade, even then only an 'inter-Azerbaijani dialogue' could be discussed, centreing, only, on 'the level of self-rule for the Armenian community in Karabakh as part of the Azerbaijani state'. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1622 gmt, 6 March 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-065, 10 March 1997).
[73] The talks had been 'put on hold' due to the change in the co-Chairmanship of the OSCE. The three co-Chairmen had first met in Paris, in mid-March, to outline a general line for discussion during the talks. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1031 gmt, 1 April 97) (FBIS-SOV-97-091, 2 April 1997).
[74] In a communique of the OSCE Minsk Group, released on 7 April 1997, summing up a meeting held in Moscow on 4 April, it was noted that the co-Chairmen 'reaffirmed their conviction that the principles set out in the statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE at the Lisbon summit must become an integral part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict'. (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1206 gmt, 8 April 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-098, 9 April 1997) and (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1410 and 1556 gmt, 7 April 1997) both (FBIS-SOV-97-097, 8 April 1997).
[75] 'Three plus three': Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh plus the three co-Chairmen. 'One plus one': Azerbaijan plus Nagorno-Karabakh.
[76] See: (ITAR-TASS World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 1625 gmt, 26 March 1992) (SU/1341 CI/4, 28 March 1992).
[77] Both sessions were held in Rome. The first from 1-5 June; the second, between 15-21. See: (Armenian Radio, Yerevan, in Armenian, 1730 gmt, 1 June 1992) (SU/ 1397 CI/1, 3 June 1992) and (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 2138 gmt, 23 June 1992) (SU/1416 C4/4, 25 June 1992).
[78] The accord was signed by the defence ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, in Moscow. (ITAR-TASS news agency World Service, Moscow, in English, 0946 gmt, 12 May 1994) (SU/1996 F/l, 13 May 1994). The Budapest summit declaration states: '1. Deploring the continuation of the conflict and the human tragedy involved, the participating States welcomed the confirmation by the parties to the conflict of the ceasefire agreed on 12 May 1994 ...' See: International Legal Materials, 34 (1995) pp. 764-807 at 776.
[79] See Zhirayr Liparityan's interview with the Yerevan newspaper Azg (published on 17 March 1995). (Yerevan, Azg, in Armenian, 17 March 1995, p. 4) (FBIS-SOV-95-077-S).
[80] (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 30 Oct. 1996, p. 1) (FBIS-SOV-96-237-S, 11 Dec. 1996).
[81] Armenia's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Arsen Gasparyan, addressing a news conference, in Yerevan, on 3 April 1997. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1154 gmt, 3 April 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-093, 4 April 1997).
[82] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1833 gmt, 7 April 1997) (FBIS-TAC-97-097, 9 April 1997).
On the subject of Shusha, (then) Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister, Tofig Zulfugarov, during a news conference in Baku, on 7 April, did note that the Armenians had recognised the 'need for the return of Azerbaijanis to Shusha'. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1559 gmt, 7 April 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-097, 8 April 1997) and (Baku, Turan, in Russian, 1500 gmt, 7 April 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-098, 9 April 1997). See (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1154 gmt 3 April 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-093,4 April 1997).
[83] For Yerevan (31 May) see: (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1249 gmt, 31 May 1997) For Stepanakert (31 May) see: (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1714 gmt, 31 May 1997) For Baku (1 June) see: (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1349 gmt, 1 June 1997) all (FBIS-SOV-97-153, 3 June 1997).
[84] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1157 gmt, 26 June 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-177, 27 June 1997).
[85] These official responses were given by the respective sides during a round of shuttle diplomacy, by the Minsk Group, between the 13-14 June 1997. Starting in Stepanakert, on the 13 June, and finishing in Baku on the 14 June. See (respectively): (Yerevan, Snark, in Russian, 1600 gmt, 13 June 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-166, 17 June 1997); (Yerevan, Snark, in Russian, 1600 gmt, 13 June 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-165, 17 June 1997); and (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1736 gmt, 14 June 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-166, 17 June 1997).
[86] Baku, on 18 July. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1455 gmt, 18 July 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-199, 22 July 1997) Stepanakert and then Yerevan, on the 19 July. (Yerevan, Armcnpress, in English, 21 July 1997).
[87] In my opinion, the best explanation of the 'two-stage' settlement process was not published until 4 February 1998 (after both Copenhagen and Ter-Petrosyan's resignation), by Interfax. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1118 gmt, 4 Feb. 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-035, 6 Feb. 1998).
[88] According to Radio Rossii, the 'two-month interval' had also been necessitated by the 'failure of their [the Minsk Group's] earlier blueprint for a settlement to the conflict'. (Moscow, Radio Rossii Network, in Russian, 2000 gmt, 20 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-263, 23 Sept. 1997).
[89] Consider, for example, President Ter-Petrosyan's speech, delivered at the 6th Congress of the, then ruling, Pan-Armenian National Movement, in November !994(\}: 'Were we to attempt to settle all questions simultaneously ... we would never achieve peace. The maximalisation of the parties, which is perfectly natural and which is manifested in all such conflicts, could simply torpedo the process of the establishment of peace'. (Yerevan, Respublika Armeniya, in Russian, 29 Nov. 1994, p. 1) (FBIS-USR-94-133).
[90] President Ter-Petrosyan had already indicated his support for the Minsk Group's latest plan, on 29 August 1997, in Moscow. He stated: 'Azerbaijan is returning to the principle of a stage-by-stage resolution of the conflict it rejected several years ago ... [proceeds to outline the formula]. This scenario, similar to the plan of settling the Chechen problem will satisfy all parlies, including the co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference'. (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1628 gmt, 29 August 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-241, 3 Sept. 1997).
[91] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1343 gmt, 2 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-245, 3 Sept. 1997).
[92] For full text of the press conference, see: (Yerevan, Armcnpress, in English, 29 Sept. 1997).
[93] For example, see: (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1431 gmt, 28 Sept. 1997)(FBIS-SOV-97-271, 30 Sept. 1997) and (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1321 gmt, 30
Sept. 1997) (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1808 gmt, 30 Sept. 1997) both (FBIS-SOV-97-273, 2 Oct. 1997).
[94] For example, on the 30 September, Vazgen Manukyan, Chairman of the National Democratic Union and defeated candidate in the September 1996 presidential elections, accused President Ter-Petrosyan of 'capitulation'. (Yerevan, Armen-press, in English, 30 Sept. 1997).
[95] (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 2122 gmt, 26 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-269, 30 Sept. 1997) and (Yerevan, Snark, in Russian, 0430 gmt, 27 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-270, 30 Sept. 1997) Compare these with Noyan Tapan's report of the 27 September, with its mere use of the phrase 'compromises'. (Yerevan, Noyan Tapan, in Russian, 0430 gmt, 27 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-270, 30 Sept. 1997).
[96] For full text of the article see: (Yerevan, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, in Armenian, 1 Nov. 1997) (Yerevan, Armenpress, in English, 3 Nov. 1997).
[97] Yerevan formally accepted the Minsk Group's proposals on 9 October 1997, Baku on the 10 October. See, respectively: (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 0815 gmt, 10 Oct. 1997) and (Baku, Turan, in Russian, 1100 gmt. 10 Oct. 1997) both (FBIS-SOV-97-283, 14 Oct. 1997).
[98] Sec: (Baku, Turan, in Russian, 1200 gmt, 23 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-266, 24 Sept. 1997).
[99] (Moscow, Interfax, In English. 1620 gmt, 23 Sept. 1997) (FBIS-SOV-97-266, 24 Sept. 1997).
[100] For example, in Time for Thoughtful ness' President Ter-Petrosyan wrote: The main thing today is the resumption of negotiations that have been interrupted for a year. This requires that finally the parties to the conflict sometime soon accept a draft document that would constitute the basis for the negotiations. If that does not occur before the next Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE to be held in Copenhagen, in December, then we can expect serious complications'. (Yerevan, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, in Armenian, 1 Nov. 1997) (Yerevan, Armenpress, in English, 3 Nov. 1997).
[101] It should be noted that Baku had not always been in favour of the'stage-by-stage' variant. Through most of the negotiations Azerbaijan had been in favour of the package approach, in order that they could ascertain whether Karabakh was willing to accept the status which it wished to accord it and, thus, 'making sure' the deployment of peacekeepers did not, merely, lead to a freezing of the situation.
[102] (Yerevan, Snark, in Russian, 0500 gmt. 19 Jan. 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-020, 21 Jan. 1998).
Earlier, during an interview with the Moscow newspaper Obshchaya Gazeta, President Gukasyan had stated the following: 'I disagree with the President of Armenia's statement concerning a 'Bosnian version'. Were we to leave these (occupied) territories without having even outlined the general contours of a future settlement and without having agreed on how we would live in the transitional period, a sharp disturbance of the military balance with an absence of political compensation would ensue. This is a situation closer to war than peace'. On the subject of the Bosnian variant, he added: 'One hundred thousand NATO troops; a real combat force which none of the parties to the conflict could confront; were deployed in Bosnia. Here, though, it is contemplated committing a purely symbolic 'peacekeeping force', some 2000/3000 persons, with a very limited mandate, what is more. In the event of a provocation, they would simply turn and leave ... In addition, those wishing either to pay for such an operation or to take part in it are today not to be seen'. (Moscow, Obshchaya Gazeta, in Russian, 30 Oct-5 Nov. 1997, no. 43, p. 5) (FBIS-SOV-97-309, 6 Nov. 1997).

and the joint statement adopted. This confirmed their 'adherence to a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by political means, by way of continuation of negotiations within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, and express their readiness to observe strictly the ceasefire regime established in May 1994. The Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia express their readiness to assist the work of the co-Chairmen of the Minsk Conference and their representatives aimed at achieving real progress in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict'. (Yerevan, NoyanTapan, in Russian, 1030 gmt, 29 April 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-119, ! May 1998).
[120] (Yerevan, NoyanTapan, in Russian, 1200 gmt, 18 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-171, 23 June 1998).
[121] (Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, 1211 gmt, 20 June 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-171, 23 June 1998).
[122] (Yerevan, Snark, in Russian, 0420 gmt, 12 May 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-132, 13 May 1998).
[123] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1243 gml, 15 May 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-135, 19 May 1998).
It should be noted that, on 4 August 1998, in Yerevan, Gagik Yeganyan and Lenslon Dulyan, the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh Ministers of Social Security signed an agreement on cooperation between the two ministries. The document provided for cooperation on social security issues and the exchange of opinions and information on the normative, legal and social aspects of joint training and retraining of social security sector employees. The agreement further provided that the ministries would jointly work on the problems of employment in the two 'Republics1, of refugees and migration, children and old people without families, and on issues of finance and accounting. (Yerevan, Snark, in Russian. 1130 gmt, 4 August 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-216, 6 August 1998).
[124] See: <http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/azerbaij.php>
[125] See: <http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/armenia.php>

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