CHAPTER 3
Autonomy: Theory and Practice
The search for a definition (again) 
Territorial autonomy 
The Aland Islands 
Personal autonomy: functional/cultural 
The Sami 
Autonomy and the League of Nations 
Autonomy 'revisited': a 'right' to autonomy? 
A right to participation (merely)? 
Autonomy's potential
Autonomy's future

"One of the most dreaded expressions in Central and Eastern Europe today is autonomy ... In this region of Europe, the fear of autonomy is too great, but without , i( there can be no solution for the minority question" [ 1] (Dr Csaba Tabadji, Political Secretary of State, Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary)
The matter of autonomy is looming increasingly large in modern-day international law jurisprudence. As the former, totalitarian, Eastern bloc has crumbled, so many of the old, mainly 19th century, antagonisms between peoples have resurfaced. Europe (and Eurasia) resembles, in many respects, its condition at the end of the First World War. Empire has collapsed, with all the dislocation that that 'inevitably1 engenders, and the international community is now attempting to construct a framework to ensure lasting peace and security in countries, many ('as before') 'newly' independent, that have become prey to ethnic competition.
There is a very real danger that the 'Russian-doll effect', as suggested in the previous chapter, may be, at this moment, effected. When Empires (such as the Russian, in this case: not really 'Soviet') collapse, the breakup of the jigsaw can assume a momentum of its own which is hard to stem. A newly independent state can, particularly in central and eastern Europe, easily find a smaller people living compactly within it who aspire to their own Statehood (or, at least, conjoin with their co-ethnic neighbours). Former minorities can soon be rendered into majorities in a, seemingly, never-ending dialectic. Under such conditions, it is the duty of the international community to enforce the 'rules of the game', maybe even adjust the existing ones where necessary, in order to devise some form of logic and consistency (if such were ever possible) to the 'process'.
History shows us that there are certain defining moments in any century. The 'shifting plates', nation States, that are the 'concoction' of human beings, organs of government and man's own, sometimes individual/sometimes collective, interpretation of the state of nature, ensure that the 'sands' that are inter-communal relationships will never cease their journey. Today the 'dish of the day' is subsidiarity, but tomorrow it might be centralism.

THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION (AGAIN)
As with self-determination, international lawyers have failed to come to any agreement on a 'stable' workable definition for autonomy. (Maybe this is the beauty of international law, scholarship renders so much of it undefinable.) Like self-determination it escapes definition because it is impossible to concretise its scope. It is a loose and disparate concept that contains many threads, but no single strand. Although not entirely, autonomy is, somehow, masterfully divergent.
Yoram Dinstein has associated autonomy with 'self-government' [2]. This 'association' between the two derives etymologically from the Greek: auto meaning self, nomos law or rule. Further, in more contemporary form, from Article 73 of the UN Charter. Here self-government was compared to the condition of non self-governing territories. Under Article 73, 'Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government ...' were obliged (in paragraph (b) of that article) 'to develop self- government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement'. (I will consider the association between 'self-government' and autonomy in Chapter 9.)
Hannum and Lillich are right to associate autonomy with 'independence of action on the internal/domestic level' [3]. Hannum and Lillich have, quite correctly, 'failed' to spatially delimit (or 'constrain') the concept. The key words here are 'independence of action'. It doesn't matter, therefore, what manner or form this 'independent action' assumes, its key feature is its independence.
In theory, of course, everything that has 'free expression' is autonomous, we cannot suggest that the word has, after all, only one meaning. In international law terms, however, it should be understood as the means whereby an authority, subject to another superior authority, has the opportunity to determine, separately from that authority, specific functions entrusted upon it, by that authority, for the general welfare of those to whom it is responsible. In this regard, my own definition comes closest to that presented by Harhoff, who described autonomy in the following way: 'the constitutional legal core of local autonomy is the authority to decide by oneself (within the transferred fields of jurisdiction) the law of the region differently and separately from the State/ federal legislation covering the rest of the country' [4]. The key phrases here are: 'decide by oneself, 'transferred fields of jurisdiction' and 'separately'. It is these dual elements of positive construction and division that mark out autonomy from, merely, another aspect of government.
Nordquist's definition of autonomy is too exclusivist. He states: 'An autonomous region is ... an intra-state territory, which has a constitutionally based self-government that is wider than any comparable region in the state. This definition excludes federal states or states consisting of many regions with varying degrees of autonomy, such as Spain. Also ... it does not include regionalised federations, such as Russia' [5]. I hope I am not being unfair when I say that it seems to know more what it isn't than what it is. 'Self-government' is 'casually' used again. A more iticlusivist definition could be Rehof s. An autonomy is a legal regime whereby powers of self-government, including legislative competence concerning one or more specified areas, are conferred on a distinct group of individuals, within the overall constitutional make-up of the state in question [6]. This group, for example, could be defined by their ethnic origin or language. The powers conferred may be restricted to certain or all aspects of personal jurisdiction or may be extended to territorial jurisdiction.
' It is often wrongly assumed that the subject of autonomy is always an ethnic group: be it a minority, an indigenous people(/s) or a people(s). The recent experience of Hong Kong, however, would suggest otherwise. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region now enjoys a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs, and is vested with executive, legislative and judicial powers including the power of final adjudication. As China is engaged in establishing the same for Macau, we may find that autonomies assume an increasingly economic function. These, often highly developed, 'fiefdoms' may, in time, become the precursors of a less ethnic, and thereby social, world, to a more dispassionate, utilitarian one.

TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY
Autonomy may be necessitated by territorial influences: the geographical remoteness of a region, the special relationship of the local population to their land and its resources, the region's particular historical or cultural development or the existence of indigenous peoples who survived colonisation [7]. Other than the experience of Hong Kong and Macau, territorial autonomies are usually introduced for the benefit of a specific ethnic group. As Ruth Lapidoth has recognised: 'A territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting a certain degree of self-determination to a group, that differs from the majority of the population in the State, and yet constitutes the majority in a specific region' [8], Whatever the basis for their inspiration, they almost always share the following, common, characteristics: their own legislative, executive and judicial organs (to varying degrees independent from the centre), and competences (unique to them, or sometimes, also, shared) in specific fields of administration. These will be concretised in a constitution (or statute) which outlines the nature/scope (and procedures) of their entitlements, and the means/processes by which they may be altered. They will also, invariably, possess their own (separate) flag, anthem and local symbols.
There are a number of territorial autonomies in the world 'today' (those relevant to the 'three' are considered in Chapter 9), but for the purposes of this chapter I shall outline the background and nature of, perhaps, the most famous (one could say even classical) example: the Aland Islands in Finland.

THE ALAND ISLANDS
The Aland Islands form an autonomous, demilitarised and unilingually Swedish province of Finland. They consist of more than 6500 islands and skerries, 6400 of which are larger than 3000 square metres. The largest island is 'Fasta Aland' (the Main Island), where 90% of the population live. While the population has grown to (approximately) 25000, fewer islands are inhabited (65) than at the turn of the century (when the figure was 150). Slightly over 40% of the total population live in the only town, Mariehamn. As far as it is known, the Alanders have always been Swedish-speaking. The Aland Islands belonged to the Kingdom of Sweden, with a fairly independent administration, until the 1808-1809 war, when Sweden was forced to relinquish Finland and Aland to Russia. Aland then became part of the Grand Duchy of Finland.
In August 1917, a meeting was held at the Aland Folk High School. Secret discussions between representatives of all the Aland districts resolved to work for reunion with Sweden. This was conveyed to the King and Government of Sweden by Aland representatives, being supported by a mass petition signed by an overwhelming majority of the resident adult population.
On 6 December 1917, Finland gained independence from Russia - by virtue of their own exercise of 'national self-determination' the Alanders reciprocated, in support of reunion with Sweden. Finland, unprepared to comply with the latter's demand, expressed a willingness only to grant 
them a certain form of internal self-government. On 7 May 1920, this was reflected in the Parliament of Finland's adoption of a Law on Autonomy ('Guarantee Law'). However, this was not accepted by the Aland Islands.
The Aland Islands question was finally referred to the newly-formed League of Nations and on 24 June 1921 the Council of the League decided that Finland should maintain sovereignty over the Islands (para. 1) [9]. In turn, Finland undertook, however, to guarantee the Alanders their Swedish language, culture and customs (para. 1 of the agreement between Finland and Sweden on guarantees for the Aland Islands) [10]. The decision was supplemented by a treaty between Finland and Sweden, at a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on 27 June 1921, on how the guarantees were to be effected [11], At the same time, the League of Nations, in its resolution of the 24 June, had resolved that a treaty should be drawn up on Aland's demilitarisation and neutralisation (para. 5) [12]. Thus, Sweden received guarantees that Aland would not constitute a military threat to it. Stipulations concerning voting rights and the acquisition of land were added to the Law on Autonomy and, in 1922, the first election to the Aland Parliament was held. The Landsting (the previous name of the Lagting, Aland's Parliament) assembled for its first plenary session on 9 June 1922, today celebrated as Aland's Autonomy Day. Since then the Autonomy Act has been completely revised twice, on 28 December 1951 and 16 August 1991. The latter, Act on the Autonomy of Aland, entered into force on 1 January 1993 [13].
The Alanders possess the right to pass laws concerning their internal matters and to exercise budgetary powers. The Aland Legislative Assembly, the Lagting, appoints the Landskapsstyrelse, Aland's Government. Rules on the autonomy are contained in the Act of Autonomy, which can only be altered (s. 69) by the Parliament of Finland, by constitutional order, and with the consent of the Lagting.
The Autonomy Act specifies the spheres in which the Lagting has the right to adopt laws. The principal areas are (s. 18): education and culture, health and medical services, promotion of industry, internal communications, local district administration, the police service, the postal service, and radio and television. The following, however, lie, inter alia, within the exclusive competence of the authorities in Helsinki (s. 27): administration of foreign affairs, most aspects of civil law, courts of justice and the penal code, customs and monetary services. To enable the interests of Aland to be safeguarded in these matters, Aland has its own representative in the Parliament of Finland (s. 68).
Besides passing laws, the main duty of the Lagting is to adopt the budget of Aland (s. 44). The Landskapsstyrelse is served by its 'Civil Service', known as the Administrative Board. It consists of the Central Board with its six departments. It has charge of those fields where the Aland Islands have competence. The Finnish authorities, in Helsinki, deal with such matters as the judicial system, collection of taxes, customs and land surveying.
The Government of Finland is represented in Aland by the Governor (s. 4), who is (s. 52) appointed by the President upon agreement with the Speaker of the Lasting. Special duties of the Governor include being Chairman of the Aland Delegation (s. 5) [14] and opening and closing parliament (s. 14, should the 'President of the Republic1 not be in attendance).
Aland has extensive autonomy in the sphere of education. The only matters within the competence of the authorities in Helsinki are the requirements, which a school should fulfil, to enable its pupils to qualify for tertiary education. The language of instruction in all schools on the Aland Islands is Swedish (s. 40). The nine-year comprehensive school, for which the local districts are responsible, provides a general basic education. The English language is a compulsory subject, while the Finnish language is optional. Pupils completing their schooling may sit for either the State Matriculation examination or the special Aland leaving examination in which Finnish is not a compulsory subject (see s.41)
A peculiar feature of the Aland Islands1 autonomy is its regional citizenship (see sections 6 and 7 on the right of domicile). Regional citizenship is acquired by a child at birth if one of its parents possess the right of domicile in Aland. Persons who have lived in Aland for five years (s. 7(2)) and have a satisfactory knowledge of Swedish (s. 7(3)) can obtain Aland citizenship upon application. Only Finnish citizens may acquire regional citizenship (s. 7). It is necessary to possess regional citizenship in order to vote and stand for election in Aland parliamentary and local elections (s. 9); own and hold real estate in Aland (s. 10); and carry on business in Aland (s. 11). Restrictions upon the right of voting and holding of real estate have been imposed with a view to piescrving land in the possession of the Alanders - although exceptions may be granted in individual cases (see s. 11 on the right of trade). Persons who have been resident outside Aland for longer than 5 years lose their regional citizenship.
Aland is demilitarised. This means that no armed forces may be stationed and no fortifications may be built there. A natural consequence of its demilitarised status is that possessors of Aland regional citizenship are exempted from military service (see s. 12 Autonomy Act 1991).
Since 1970, Aland has had its own representation in the Nordic Council. The Lagting elect two of its members to be members of the Council. Together with the representatives appointed by the Landkaps-styrelse, they form the delegation to the Nordic Council. The Land-kapsstyrelse also participates in the work of the Nordic Council of Ministers.

PERSONAL AUTONOMY: FUNCTIONAL/CULTURAL
Personal autonomy is, fundamentally, separated from territorial autonomy by the territorial factor. With personal autonomy there is no identifiable area of group settlement. Personal autonomy is reflected in a public body established to represent the relevant group in relation to the State and having the competence to govern specific minority affairs itself entrusted upon it by the central authorities. These competences can encapsulate such things as culture, language and education. Once 'again' the, predominant, subjects of autonomy are the members of ethnic groups [15].
Personal autonomy is not a modern notion. Historically it was manifested in the ability of non-dominant faiths to practice their religion autonomously and independent of 'majesterial' control. During the middle ages, Jews were sometimes permitted by European rulers to administer their affairs according to their own laws and traditions [16]. The millet system of the Ottoman Empire entitled non-Muslims (Orthodox Christian, Armenian, Jewish and Roman Catholic, and, in the 19th century, Protestant) to freedom of worship and, crucially, freedom to govern that worship, provided the members of the millet paid the required tributes to the sultans (cash or infantry) and were loyal to the Ottoman government [17].
If this laid the foundation, then it was Karl Renner who provided personal autonomy with much of its intellectual roots. Renner developed a theory intended to solve the minorities problem in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Suggesting the accepted 'atomistisch-centralistische Schule' (atomistic-centralist school) notion; which considers the State to be the sum of its individual residents; be discarded, he proposed that the State be conceived as a federation of nations not identified to specific regions, a 'nationalitatenbundesstaaf (multi-national federal state) [18]. Instead of being a 'Territorialverband' (territorial federation) and hence a 'Gebietkorperschaff (regional corporation), the nation should be regarded as a 'Personalverband' (personal federation) and hence a Terso-nalkorperschaft' (personal corporation) [19]. The latter entities, whose status would be embodied in constitutional law, would have a dual role: having been established by the State as persons of public law, they would be free to pursue their interests in certain areas (e.g. education, arts and literature) without interference from the State, thus constituting 'States within the State1 ('Staaten im Staate') [20]. In addition, Renner's innovation, the autonomous national entities would also have a say in areas reserved for the centre (eg. foreign affairs and security). The entities as such would thus participate in the exercise of the powers of the centre, as well as within their own local communities.
There are two types of personal autonomy: functional and cultural. In reality, there is little that separates functional autonomy from cultural autonomy. The competences enjoyed are broadly the same and as with cultural autonomy there is an assumption (albeit not a given) that the centre will financially-support the organisations (of whatever type) established. The (I would venture) three, subtle, differences are in no way denned: 1) The processes of cultural autonomy are more regulatory, systematic and procedural than functional autonomy; 2) cultural autonomy today prevails over functional autonomy when governments seek methods to ease tensions among a group(/s) that could develop into conflict (be it social/political or, even, armed); 3) the rights enjoyed in aspects of cultural autonomy tend to be more 'substantive' than those in functional autonomy. In essence, the 'differences' are more ones of 'style' than substance. It is not inconceivable that functional autonomy could become subsumed, entirely, by cultural autonomy. Indeed, this may have already occurred. The minority arrangements in Germany and Denmark, pertaining to their respective Danish and German minorities, are often cited as the best examples of functioning functional autonomy. These rights are reflected in the Copenhagen-Bonn Declarations of March 1955 [21].
Heintze has described cultural autonomy as the 'autonomous self-government of cultural affairs by the group or minority1. Ultimately, he adds, 'the aim is the free cultural development of the group1 [22], The two major expressions of cultural autonomy at present relate to the Sami of Finland and arise from the Law on Cultural Autonomy of Estonia (see Chapter 11).

THE SAMI
The Sami are the indigenous population of northern Fennoscandia [23]. In Finland there are approximately 6500 Sami, and, since 1 January 1996, they have enjoyed the right to cultural autonomy, as per section 51a of the Finnish Constitution (originally adopted on 17 July 1919, as amended on 22 December 1995). Section 51 a states: (Sami Minority) The Sami as an indigenous people shall, in accordance with what is prescribed in the law, be guaranteed cultural autonomy in respect to their language and culture within the Sami Homeland' [24].
The cultural autonomy of the Sami is governed by an elected and representative Sami body, the Sami Parliament (which replaced the earlier Sami Parliament, founded in 1973). Its function is to protect the Sami language and culture and attend to matters relating to the status of the Sami as an indigenous people. In areas within its 'competence', it may take initiatives, make proposals and issue statements to the authorities. The authorities are under an obligation to negotiate with the Sami Parliament in all far-reaching and important measures which directly affect the status of the Sami as an indigenous people or concern matters in the Sami Homeland. These include: a) community planning; b) the management, use, leasing and assignment of state lands, conservation areas and wilderness areas; c) applications for licences to stake mineral mine claims or file mining patents; d) legislative or administrative changes in the occupations bellonging to the Sami form of culture; e) the development of teaching of and in the Sami language in schools, as well as social and health services; f) any other matters affecting the Sami language and culture or the status of the Sami as an indigenous people.
The obligation to negotiate with the Sami Parliament concerns all authorities: central, regional and local. Section 16 of the Procedure of Parliament Act (adopted on 19 December 1971), for example, states: 'A committee [of Parliament] may hear expert opinions and entitle them to participate in a debate. When considering a legislative proposal or another matter which especially concerns the Sami, a committee shall, unless specific reasons otherwise warrant, give the representatives of the Sami an opportunity to be heard' [25].
The authority of the Sami Parliament is restricted primarily to the Sami Homeland, which includes the geographical areas of the municipalities of Enontekio, Inari and Utsjoki and the area of the Reindeer Owners' Association of Lapland in the municipality of Sodankyla. It should be noted that the Sami only constitute a majority in the municipality of Utsjoki, where they account for (approximately) 52% of the population.
Today there are six special boards within the Sami Parliament: the Board for Economic and Legal Affairs, the Board for Education and Teaching Materials, the Board for Cultural Affairs, the Board for the Sami Language, the Board for Social and Health Affairs and the Election Board. It is anticipated that the functions of the Sami Parliament will increase over the coming years.

AUTONOMY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Autonomy is not a modern concept. Its 'legislative' roots derive back to the treaties placed under the League of Nations system after the First World War. Under Article 10 of the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye (1919: Treaty Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia), 'Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to constitute the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians within frontiers delimited by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as an autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State, and to accord to it the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State'. Article 11 stipulated that the Ruthene territory would be provided with a Special Diet with 'powers of legislation in all linguistic, scholastic and religious questions, in matters of local administration, and in other questions which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak State may assign to it'. However, the direct relationship between the territory and the centre was not severed. Article 13 guaranteed the Ruthenes 'equitable representation' in the Czecho-Slovak Assembly, although the deputies would not have the right to vote on legislative matters of the same type as those assigned to its Diet [26], The Treaty of Paris (1919: Treaty Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Rumania (Protection of Minorities)), promised (Article 11) 'local autonomy in regard to scholastic and religious matters' for the Saxons and Czecklers of Transylvania [27]. The Treaty of Sevres (1920: Peace Treaty Between the Allied Powers and Turkey), in Articles 62-64, provided a scheme of local autonomy for predominantly Kurdish areas [28]. Greece also, in the Treaty of Sevres (Treaty on the Protection of Minorities in Greece), undertook to recognise and maintain (Article 13) 'the traditional rights and liberties enjoyed by the non-Greek monastic communities of Mount Athos [29], as well as (Article 12) provide the Valachs of Pindus 'local autonomy ... in regard to religious, charitable or scholastic matters' [30].
Despite these, perhaps the most notable achievement of the League of Nations in the sphere of autonomy was the successful regulation of the, at that time disputed, Aland Islands. By way of the Guarantee Law (1920), Finland had granted autonomy to the Alanders against their will. The Commission of Jurists, in their report of 5 September 1920, did not recognise the Alanders' right to external self-determination but treated it as a minority community, calling, instead, for the strengthening of its autonomy [31]. However, the second commission, the Commission of Rapporteurs (report undated), dido not discount the possibility that if Finland neglected the rights of the Alanders, they would have the right to a referendum which could result in their secession [32]. What is most interesting (and relevant) about the League of Nations settlement is the international guarantees that it provided for the Alanders. Section 6 of the Autonomy Act of 1922, supplementing its Finnish equivalent (of 1920), contained provisions whereupon the parliament of the Aland Islands might present complaints or notes about the implementation of the Autonomy Act. In such an event, the Government of Finland would have been entitled to present their own observations and pass on the issue to the Council of the League for supervision: where the matter was judicial, a judgment could be obtained from the Permanent Court of International Justice. Although this entitlement was never utilised, it is noteworthy that its possible function did not expire with the League itself. It was only eliminated from Finnish legislation in 1951, when a new Autonomy Act replaced the one of 1922. Tore Modeen has noted that there were plans, recorded in committee work and in a government bill to the Finnish Parliament, in 1946, to establish a similar procedure under the UN, but it was not adopted [33].

AUTONOMY 'REVISITED': A 'RIGHT' TO AUTONOMY?
The post-war international system, with its undoubted emphasis on individual rather than collective rights (compare with the League system), gravely affected the development of any 'right' to autonomy. In the over 40 year span from the adoption of the UN Charter to the Charter of Paris, in 1990, the concept 'rested' in desuetude. Although the Charter did, in the end, albeit 'passingly', refer to the right of self-determination (equated with self-government at the 1945 UN Conference on International Organisation, in San Francisco [34]), I believe it would be disingenuous to suggest that this was, in any way, intended to sanction a right to autonomy.
Matters only became 'envigorated' following the end of the Cold War. Paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document (CSCE, 1990) states:
The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create conditions for (he promotion of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain minorities by establishing as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned' [35].
While the contents of the Copenhagen Document, in their own right, 'create' only soft law, aspects of it are, increasingly, being regarded as providing the foundation for the clarification of customary law. I would not suggest that such applies here in respect of autonomy.
In a subsequent meeting of Experts on National Minorities, held in Geneva in July 1991, pursuant to Part II of the Supplementary Document to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) and with the expressed intention of considering 'new measures aimed at improving the implementation of (CSCE) commitments', the representatives of the participating States adopted the Report of the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities. In part IV of this Report, the participating States, undoubtedly expanding (or, at the very least, elucidating) on the 'meaning' (/possible application) of para. 35, noted that:
'... positive results have'been obtained by some of them in an appropriate democratic manner by inter alia:
- local and autonomous administrations as well as autonomies on a territorial basis, including the existence of consultative, legislative and executive bodies chosen through free and periodic elections;
- self-administration by a national minority of aspects; concerning its identity in situations where autonomy on a territorial basis does not apply;
- decentralised or local forms of government' [36].
Again pursuant to Part II of the Supplementary Document to the Charter of Paris, a Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions (under the aegis of the CSCE) was held in Oslo, in November 1991. While the report of the Oslo Seminar expressly states that it 'does not purport to express any commitments on the part of the participating States', it is nevertheless interesting to note that the experts endorsed decentralisation as a useful tool, especially in response to the needs of national minorities. It states:
'In the context of constitutional reform, reference was made to the utility of vertical decentralisation and division of the functions of government on a federal, regional and local basis for a wide range of purposes. Numerous forms were available to take account of historical, regional, linguistic or ethnic distinctions. Administrative decentralisation, development of governmental functions on a regional basis, and reinforcement and reform of local government institutions might in varying ways respond to the needs of groups, including national minorities' [37],
Although the word autonomy is not used, a key equivalent, 'vertical decentralisation', is mentioned. The use of the phrase, 'on a federal, regional and local basis' 'guarantees' that the Experts were referring to more than merely 'local government': 'reform of local government institutions1 is here expressed as but one possible application of this method. The notion was 'developed' somewhat in, what turned out to be the highly controversial, Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Article 11 stated:
'In the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the State'.
It should be noted that Recommendation 1201 was a 'recommendation' for an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which was never, subsequently, introduced. Work on the protocol was suspended in January 1996 [38]. Article 11 caused such a furore it led to its consideration by the Venice Commission, who concluded that the ('offending') article did not mandate the 'acceptance of an organised ethnic entity within their (i.e. States') territories1 [39], While the phrase 'contains a guarantee that a legal framework will exist for the exercise of the right1, the Venice Commission confirmed that it 'is the state that prescribes the legal framework within which the right may be exercised' [40].
Article 11 has, undoubtedly, had an effect on the development of any 'right' to autonomy. According to Horn, when the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or Einguistic Minorities was under preparation, the 'proposal to have some mention of self-government in the form of autonomy or similar was clearly rejected, although it was put forward simply as an alternative for participation on decision-making1 [41].

A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATION (MERELY)?
While it would appear that there may not be, in the light of the above, an . emerging right to autonomy, it is apparent that there is (I would surmise) an 'emerged' right to participation. The Venice Commission, rather ambiguously, 'recognised' it when it noted (per 1201), 'participation in public affairs is above all a question of personal autonomy, not of local autonomy' [42]. It has since been 'left' to Asbj0rn Eide and the government of Australia to help 'solidify' it further. First, in his report entitled 'Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities' (1993), Asbjorn Eide recommended the following ways in which minorities can participate politically: '(a) Advisory and decision-making bodies in which minorities are represented, in particular with regard to education, culture and religion; (b) elected bodies and assemblies ('parliaments') of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities; (c) self-administration (functional autonomy, cultural autonomy) on a non-territorial basis by a minority of matters which are essential to its particular identity, such as the development of its language or religious rites; (d) decentralised or local forms of government or autonomous arrangements on a territorial and democratic basis, including consultative, legislative and executive bodies chosen through free and periodic elections without discrimination' [43]. Second, Australia 'admitted', as part of the drafting group for the proposed UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (that it) 'considers that self-determination encompasses the continuing right of peoples to decide how they should be governed, the right to participate fully in the political process and the right of distinct peoples within a State to participate in decisions on, and to administer, their own affairs ... sovereign independence is not feasible for every self-defined 'people' ... A concept of self-determination within existing State boundaries, involving the full observance of individual and group rights, holds out a better hope of ensuring stability, human development and human security' [44]. Australia and Eide have, thus, managed to 'assert' a territorial dimension to the right to participation that the Venice Commission, post-1201 (perhaps), were wary to 'proclaim'.

AUTONOMY'S POTENTIAL
International lawyers [45], if not States, are increasingly coming to realise the potential for 'autonomy' to assist in conflict resolution. It would appear that the nature of conflict is increasingly assuming an intra-State (as opposed to inter-State) basis. The clash that the fall of the Soviet bloc has engendered between peoples and States has placed an enormous strain upon self-determination. Thankfully, any possibility that the principle could become 'hijacked' by secession has been 'stemmed' by the promotion of the possibilities that are contained within the notion internal self-determination. Autonomy provides a fundamental aspect of this ('new') 'umbrella'. Regrettably, States, not scholars, continue to stymie its development. As the Venice Commission (again) noted: 'States seem in fact to be afraid that the right to have appropriate local or autonomous authorities, combined with the right to transfrontier contacts ..., may promote secessionist tendencies. Even those States which, while adhering to the principle of unitarity have granted a large degree of regional autonomy hesitate to accept binding international instruments on the right of minorities to a certain autonomy' [46].
In truth, there is more that States fear than merely secession. Scrape away the surface and what, fundamentally, lies beneath this apparent contradiction is the majority-minority dichotomy. Most States are but the expression of majoritariness. There are few States in this world that do not 'possess' one titular people, and those that don't (viz. Rwanda) do not have a very successful (including recent) history (Belgium apart?). There is the real fear that territorially-based autonomous arrangements will create 'new' minorities (the titular people of the State) and that, in turn, as part of the autonomous entity, (to whatever degree) they will suffer discrimination, or even exclusion. As Shelton has recognised: 'Decentralisation in favour of small political units with substantial autonomy permits greater protection against abuse by national authorities, but also may permit abuse of other groups within the minority-dominated area' [47]. This is often not an idle fear, as it is highly likely that 'new' autonomies, predominantly in Eastern Europe, will themselves be the product of conflict (/, sometimes, historical antipathy). Indeed, on occasions, the very anticipation of autonomy has provoked disturbance (viz. the Vance-Owen plan of 4 January 1993, entitled 'Constitutional Framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina') [48]. Even where non territorially-based arrangements are under consideration, there is the fear, in the 'centre', that functional/cultural autonomy, for instance, may lead to new forms of ethnic separation/segregation. Increasingly, these fears will have to be addressed and remedied.
One of the beauties of autonomy is its inherent flexibility. Although I have attempted to provide a definition for the term, paradoxically, I am not sure that I would recommend its use. International law seems to develop best under circumstances where it is not 'imprisoned' by 'legislative' certainty. Maybe it is better that we can't really pinpoint it. Hannum and Lillich have quite correctly identified it as a 'relative term' [49]. Its relativity, as Suksi has suggested, can assume 'internal' proportions [50]. Not only does it, externally, develop in a non-particularist way (making it difficult, in its own right, to define anyway), but, internally, it has been 'shown' to have an amorphous quality that the continuing processes that are the laws of nature, only, can determine. Suksi cites Greenland and the Faroe Islands as examples of autonomies developing 'over time according to both the changing needs and also to the abilities of the communities' who are its beneficiaries [51].
Patrick Thornberry has not welcomed such (relative) legal inexactitude. He has stated: 'The matter is not always clarified by multiple usage of autonomy ... One possibility may be that, even in an over-narrowed political/legal sense, autonomy is a somewhat stretched notion, coming apart at the seams, lacking a definite shape'. He continues, later in the same article: 'while this may imply that 'autonomy1 is a flexible negotiating tool, perhaps the term should, for clarity, be reserved for the territorial variety' [52]. Why should everything always be 'clear'? What is actually achieved by it? I am not suggesting that international law should be rendered into some kind of 'law of the spiv', but surely the only beneficiaries of such (in my opinion artificial) positive constructionism would be States. Autonomy is not intended (surely) to be but a state mechanism and where does this leave functional/cultural autonomy. I am afraid I am not persuaded by this (newly) scientificised process of natural selection (by decree).
If there is to be a 'definition', I would (much) sooner follow the lead of Suksi. He states: 'the proper place for a definition of autonomy is probably at the level of constitutional law: the forms for the realisation of the distinct 'self should be created in the context where the practical and legal circumstances primarily arise' [53]. This should not be seen as a barrier to international law, but, perhaps, as its best 'cover'. Matters such as these are not assisted when over-'mechanised'.
If there is such a thing as a 'right' to autonomy it can be best 'demonstrated' by constitutional practice's 'periodic' (ad hoc] operation of it. It has been suggested by Heintze that any 'right' of autonomy flows from customary law through its 'frequent occurrence' [54], The question has to be addressed, therefore, whether, what at heart is a constitutional law principle (and application) can be rendered into a tenet of international law by 'osmosis'. I think we have to be careful here. Undoubted frequent practice in constitutional law should not render what could in international law terms be considered an 'emerging' right into a given. This is juridicial cheating. As Heintze himself admits, in the next sentence, at present no right of autonomy has been enshrined in any international treaty. If this is the case, for the reasons given above, then it cannot be appropriate to place it among what surely are the most fundamental principles of international law (yet).

AUTONOMY'S FUTURE
Perhaps we are being a bit impatient. I have no doubt that the concept, within an international law framework, will continue to develop. When one considers the extent to which group rights have 'flowered' during the last decade alone, comparing this with the 'wasteland' that prevailed for nearly forty years before it, it would be absurd to suggest that the future of the principle hinges on the jurisprudence of the (very) closing years of the 20th century. There is a future to the concept in international law and this is surely best illustrated by Article 31 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This states:
'Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in mailers relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture, religion, educalion, information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources management, environmenl and enlry by non-members, as well as ways and means for financing these autonomous institutions' [55],
Not only, 'at last', is the 'right to autonomy' expressly enunciated in a (n), draft, international treaty, but a whole checklist of (possible) spheres of application are (almost exhaustively) cited.
That autonomy has a future therefore in international law one surely cannot doubt. To my mind, Article 31 of the Indigenous Peoples draft declaration is the 'precursor' to its more general application in non-'interest' group treaties. As States increasingly become 'vulnerable' to the internal pressures that lie within them, so, I am sure, they will increasingly employ (/be forced to employ) the 'right' on a more general level - if only, sadly, as last resort. When this day comes, surely international law will have turned full circle.

NOTES
[1] Quoted in P. Thornberry's, 'Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective
Rights in International Inslruments on the Rights of Minorities', in M. Suksi (ed.),
Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International,
1998, pp.'97-124 al 114. 
[2] Y. Dinslein, 'Autonomy1, in Y. Dinstein (ed.), Models of Autonomy, New Brunswick,
New Jersey, Transaction Books, 1981, pp. 291-303 at 291. 
[3] H. Hannum and R. Lillich, 'The Concept of Autonomy in International Law',
American Journal of International Law, 74 (1980) pp. 858-889 at 858. 
[4] F. Harhoff, 'Institutions of Autonomy1, Nordic Journal of International Law, 55
(1986) pp. 31-40 al 31. 
[5] K-A. Nordquist, 'Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism - An Overview', in
M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 1998, pp. 59-77 at 59. 
[6] See L.A. Rehof, 'Human Rights and Self-Governmenl for Indigenous Peoples',
Nordic Journal of International Law, 61/62 (1994) 19-41. 
[7] Of course, one cannot dispute the conclusion of Markku Suksi when he writes: 'the
concentration on terrilory is a fallacy, because territory itself is nothing without the
people living in it'. M. Suksi, 'Concluding Remarks', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy:
Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998. pp.
357-363 at 359.
[8] R. Lapidoth, 'Autonomy: Potential and Limitations', InternationalJournal on Group Rights, 1 (1994) pp. 269-290 at 277.
[9] For text see: H. Hannum (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 141-142.
[10] For text, Ibid, pp. 142-143.
[11] Agreement between Finland and Sweden, Relating to Guarantees in the Law of 7 May 1920 on the Autonomy of the Aland Islands, League of Nations Official Journal, supplement 5, Resolutions Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at Its Thirteenth Session (1921) at 24. For text see: H. Hannum (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 141-143.
[12] Paragraph 5 provided: 'An international agreement in respect of the non-fortification and the neutralisation of the Archipelago should guarantee, to the Swedish people and to all the countries concerned, that the Aland Islands will never become a source of danger from the military point of view. With this object, the Convention of 1856 should be replaced by a broader agreement, placed under the guarantee of all the Powers concerned, including Sweden. The Council is of opinion that this agreement should conform, in its main lines, with the Swedish draft Convention for the neutralisation of the Islands. The Council instructs the Secretary-General to ask the Governments concerned to appoint duly accredited Representatives to discuss and conclude the proposed Treaty'. Ibid, p. 142.
The 'proposed treaty' was to become the Convention on the Non-fortification and Neutralisation of the Aland Islands, of 10 October 1921. Article 3 confirmed: 'No military or naval establishment or base of operations, no military aircraft establishment or base of operations, and no other installation used for war purposes shall be maintained or set up in ... [Aland]' The Convention was ratified by ten States: 'the British Empire', Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Poland, Latvia and Estonia. For text see: M.O. Hudson (ed.), International Legislation (A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest), vol. 1 (1919-1921), Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1970, pp. 7o44-751 at 747-748.
Aland had previously been demilitarised further to the 'Convention between Great Britain, France and Russia respecting the Aland Islands' (30 March 1856). This Convention had been annexed to the Treaty of Paris (of the same date), which concluded the Crimean War. Article 1 provided that Aland 'shall not be fortified, and that no Military or Naval Establishment shall be maintained or created there'. For text see: E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. II (1828-1863), London, Butterworths, 1875, pp. 1272-1273 at 1273.
[13] For text see: H. Hannum (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, at pp. 117-140.
[14] A'Joint Organ of Aland and the State' (s. 5). For duties of the Aland Delegation, see s. 56.
[15] Personal autonomy has been complicated by the suggestion that its membership, among the individual members of the ethnic group to whom it pertains, is compulsory [see, for example, H-J. Heintze, 'On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 7-32 at 23.] To resolve the matter, Pernthaler has suggested the separation of legal membership in the body from the actual acceptance (or not) of belonging to the group. (P. Pernthaler, Land, Volk und Heimat als Kategorin des Osterreichischen Verfassungs Rechts Wien, Braumuller, 1975, p. 24 et seq.) In reality, I regard the whole conception as a positivist 'redherring'. A person who does not, (at least) subjectively, accept his belonging to the group concerned cannot be forced to do so. Personal autonomy, in this sense, cannot be so personal.
[16] See, for example, L. Finkelstein, Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages, Westport, Conneticut, Greenwood Press, 1924, reprinted 1972; Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 3, Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 921-931; K. Stillschweig, 'Nationalism and Autonomy Among Eastern European Jewry', Historica Judaica, 6 (1944) pp. 27-68.
[17] See, for example, K. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East', in M.J. Esman and I. Rabinovich (eds.), Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 35-53; K. Karpat, An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations, Center for International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph no. 39, July 1973.
[18] K. Renner, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf Osterreich, Leipzig and Vienna, Franz Deuticke, 1918, pp. 41 and 149.
[19] Ibid, p. 43.
[20] Ibid, p. 69.
[21] For text see: <http://www.ecmi.de/about/bonn.copenhagen-declarations.php>
[22] H.J. Heintze, 'On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 7-32 at 21.
[23] Fennoscandia includes the Scandinavian Peninsula (Sweden and Norway), Finland,
the Kola Peninsula and a part of the Russian Federation northwest of a line running from the Gulf of Finland through Lakes Ladoga and Onega to Onega Bay, on the White Sea.
[24] For text of the Constitution of Finland see internet site: <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/fi01000_html >(from the beginning).
[25] For text of Act see internet site: <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ fi03000..phpl>
[26] Treaty signed at Saint Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919. For text see: M.O. Hudson (ed.), International Legislation (A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest), vol. 1 (1919-1921), Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1970, pp. 298-312 at 304-305.
[27] Treaty signed at Paris, 9 December 1919. For text see: Ibid, pp. 426-436 at 432.
[28] Treaty signed at Sevres, 10 August 1920. For text see: F. L. Israel (ed.), Major Peace Treaties of Modern History (1648-1967), vol. 3, New York, Chelsea House Publishers, 1967, pp. 2055-2213 at 2077-2078.
[29] For text see: M.O. Hudson (ed.), International Legislation (A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest), vol. 1 (1919-1921), Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1970, pp. 489-500 at 496.
[30] Ibid, p. 495.
[31] Report of the International Commission of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the legal aspects of the Aaland Islands question, League of Nations Official Journal, special supplement no. 3 (Oct. 1920), pp. 1-19. see also, P.M. Brown, 'The Aaland Islands Question', American Journal of International Law, 15 (1921) pp. 268-272.
[32] 'We have only to examine if there are adequate reasons and sufficiently weighty considerations for the modification of this situation and for granting the Aalanders the plebiscite which they ask'. Quoted in C.N. Gregory's, 'The Neutralization of the Aaland Islands', American Journal of International Law, 17 (1923) pp. 63-76 at 69 For text see: League of Nations, The Aaland Islands Question; report submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs (Document du Conseil B.7.21 /68/106, Geneve, le 16 avril 1921).
[33] T. Modeen, De Folkratsliga Garantierna for Bevarandet av Alandsoarnes Nationella Karaktar (Abo, Abo Akademi, 1973), pp. 61-76.
[34] See Documents of the UN Conference on International Organisation, vol. 6, New York/London, UN Information Organisation, 1945, p. 296.
[35] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (29 June 1990), International Legal Materials, 29 (1990), pp. 1305-1321 at 1319.
[36] Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, in A. Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Analysis and Basic Documents 1972-1993, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, pp. 593-604 at 598.
[37] Report to the CSCE Council from the CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, Oslo (15 November 1991), reprinted in A. Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Analysis and Basic Documents 1972-1993, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, pp. 631-644 at 635.
[38] Ad Hoc Commission for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe), CAHMIN (95) 22 Addendum, 24 Jan. 1996.
[39] Opinion by the Venice Commission, Doc. CDL-INF (96) 4, 22 March 1996, p. 5.
[40] Ibid, p. 9.
[41] F. Horn, 'Recent Attempts to Elaborate Standards on Minority Rights', in O. Bring and S. Mahmoudi (eds.), Current International Law Issues - Nordic Perspectives, Essays in Honour ofJerzy Stucki, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp. 81-108 at 104.
[42] Opinion by the Venice Commission, Doc. CDL-INF (96) 4, 22 March 1996, p. 4.
[43] UN Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4, p. 4, para. 17.
[44] P. Thornberry, 'Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights in International Instruments on the Rights of Minorities', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 97-124 at 121.
[45] H-J. Heintze, 'On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 7-32 at 11.
[46] Opinion by the Venice Commission, Doc. CDL-INF (96) 4, 22 March 1996, p. 5.
[47] D. Shelton, 'Subsidiarity, Democracy and Human Rights', in D. Gomien (ed.), Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press, 1993, pp. 43-54 at 54.
[48] Having been 'awarded' land not previously asked for, the Croats proceeded to attack Muslim forces in order to consolidate their control over these territories. For text of the plan, see: ICFY/WG.II/3, 4 Jan. 1993.
[49] H. Hannum and R. Lillich, 'The Concept of Autonomy in International Law', American Journal of International Law, 74 (1980) pp. 858-889 at 858.
[50] M. Suksi, 'Concluding Remarks', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 357-363 at 363.
[51] Ibid, p. 361.
[52] P. Thornberry, 'Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights in International Instruments on the Rights of Minorities', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 97-124 at 98 and 122.
[53] M. Suksi, 'Concluding Remarks', in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and
Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 357-363 at 363. [54] H-J. Heintze, 'On the Legal Understandings of Autonomy', in M. Suksi (ed.),
Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International
1998, pp. 7-32 at 13. [55] UN Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29/Annex I. For text see:
< http: / /www.hookele.com/netwarriors/dec-En.phpl >

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