CHAPTER 13
The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation
The Additional Protocol
Transfrontier cooperation in the context of the 'three'
Prospects and possibilities
Conclusion

Transfrontier Cooperation in the Caucasus
"Under a new British/Irish Agreement dealing with the totality of relationships, and related legislation at Westminster and in the Oireachtas, a NorthlSouth Ministerial Council to be established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland - including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis - on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South" [1] (Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Strand Two, para. 1)
The break-up of the Soviet Union has caused an enormous amount of economic and social dislocation. A political and economic system federal in 'theory', but, in practice, highly centralised was always bound to engender enormous upheaval upon its collapse. While, on the economic level, raw materials went 'untreated' and factories stood idly waiting to be 'fed', on the social side, even if they could afford to, peoples never previously divided were now divided by visa requirements, blockade and conflict.
To restore broken ties, even in the social sense, will require mechanisms even more localised than the Council of Caucasian Mountain Peoples (as described in the previous chapter). Whatever the final settlements, Nagorno-Karabakh will still 'insist' on close and effective ties with Armenia; South Ossetia the same with North Ossetia. International organisations/conferences for the Caucasus can only provide a regional framework. On occasions, these 'two' will want far more local, specific and private contacts that such cannot provide. It will be at this juncture that the matter of transfrontier cooperation will arise.

THE EUROPEAN OUTLINE CONVENTION ON TRANSFRONTIER COOPERATION
The European ministers responsible for Local Government recommended, in 1975, the preparation of a European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation. On 21 May 1980, the 'European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities' was opened for signature [2].
Transfrontier cooperation' was defined in Article 2(1) as,

'any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement necessary for this purpose'.

'Territorial communities or authorities' were defined, in Article 2(2), as,

'communities, authorities or bodies exercising local and regional functions and regarded as such under the domestic law of each State'.

The Convention subjects all 'agreements and arrangements' to relevant State supervision and control for ensuring observance of the principle of State sovereignty, Article 3(4), and with an optional framework in which to formalise the concrete undertakings: Article 5 states:

'The Contracting Parties shall consider the advisability of granting to territorial communities or authorities engaging in transfrontier cooperation in accordance with the provisions of this Convention the same facilities as if they were cooperating at national level'.

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) [3] pointed to shortcomings in this Convention, in its Resolution 227 (1991), 'On the External Relations of Local and Regional Authorities'. In this Resolution, the CLRAE expressed its awareness of the fact that 'the major obstacles to the effective application of the Convention is that the acts accomplished in this way by local and regional authorities have no legal value within their respective States'. Articles 2(2) and 3(2) 'subjected' the process ('may' in 2(2), '[i]f... deem it necessary ...' in 3(2)) to prior authorisation by the Contracting Party (ie. the member State) [4]. To address this deficiency, the CLRAE recommended that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe draw up an additional Protocol broadening the scope of the Outline Convention and recognising: 1) the right of local and regional authorities to conduct transfrontier relations; 2) the legal corporate identity in national law of transfrontier cooperation bodies; and 3) the legal validity in national law of the acts of these bodies. The CLRAE repeated this call, in Resolution 230 (1991), 'On the 5th European Conference of Frontier Regions', once again requesting the Committee of Ministers to undertake work on such [5].

THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
In a memorandum dated 21 December 1992, the Secretariat of the Council of Europe observed (in para. 9) that, 'some ten years after signature of the Outline Convention, the situation as regards both the legal nature of transfrontier cooperation bodies, and the legal validity of acts accomplished by them, is unclear'. (Para. 4) 'According to the findings of a survey conducted on the initiative of the Select Committee on Transfrontier Cooperation, it would appear that there are two legal obstacles to the effective implementation of the Outline Convention:
a) recognition of the right to set up legal institutions through the intermediary of transfrontier cooperation agreements; and
b) the legal validity in national law of the acts accomplished by transfrontier cooperation bodies'. (Para. 9, again) 'It would have been preferable to recognise, explicitly, the right to conclude such agreements and stipulate that the consequences of such competence should be clearly regulated in national law'. Three possible solutions were proposed:
a) (para. 22) governmental approval simply by means of an express declaration;
b) (para. 23) if governmental approval were not given within a specific term, it could be taken for granted; or,
c) overcoming the drawbacks of the Outline Convention through the adoption of an Additional Protocol [6].
The draft text of an Additional Protocol was appended to the Secretariat's Memorandum. However, it was not until the 9 November 1995, in the spirit of the Vienna Declaration of 9 October 1993 [7], that the finally agreed text of the Additional Protocol was opened for signature [8]. Article 1(1) granted the 'territorial communities or authorities' of the Contracting Parties the right

'to conclude transfrontier cooperation agreements with territorial communities or authorities of other States in equivalent fields of responsibility, in accordance with the procedures laid down in their statutes, in conformity with national law and in so far as such agreements are in keeping with the Party's international commitment'.

Article 1, thus, finally enshrined the right of territorial communities or authorities to conclude transfrontier cooperation agreements. Beyond the caveat (Article 2) that decisions taken remain 'in conformity with their national law', the right is solidified in Article 9: 'No reservations to the provisions of this Protocol shall be allowed'. Consequently, State parties to the protocol would not have the possibility of conditioning the exercise of the rights granted in the Additional Protocol to the previous conclusion of an inter-state agreement or limiting the 'communities, bodies or authorities' so entitled, as had previously been provided in the Outline Convention (Articles 2(2) and 3(2)).
The problem of the legal status of the cooperation bodies to be established by the territorial communities or authorities was addressed in Article 3 of the Additional Protocol. This Article opens the possibility for public authorities to establish, within the framework of a transfrontier cooperation agreement, cooperation bodies whose legal personality must be recognised in the States, to which the territorial authorities form a part, that are parties to the agreement. Articles 3 states:

'A transfrontier cooperation agreement concluded by territorial communities or authorities may set up a transfrontier cooperation body, which may or may not have legal personality. The agreement shall specify whether the body, regard being had to the responsibilities assigned to it and to the provisions of national law, is to be considered a public or private law entity within the national legal systems to which the territorial communities or authorities concluding the agreement belong'.

Article 5(1) also addresses the problem of the validity, in national law, of the acts accomplished by transfrontier cooperation bodies. It establishes:

'The Contracting Parties may, if their national law allows it, decide that the transfrontier cooperation body is to be a public law entity and that, for the purposes of each Contracting Party's legal system, any measures which it takes are to have the same legal force and effects as if they had been taken by the territorial communities or authorities which concluded the agreement'.

With regard to the legal value of the acts accomplished by the territorial communities or authorities under a transfrontier cooperation agreement, these acts (Article 2), 'shall be regarded as having the same legal force and effects as measures taken by those communities or authorities under their national legal system'; and, Article 6(1), 'shall be subject to the same supervision as the law each Contracting Party prescribes in respect of any measure taken by the territorial communities or authorities concluding the agreement'. Responsibility for the implementation of decisions taken lies solely with the territorial communities or authorities participating in the agreement, Article 1 (2).

TRANSFRONTIER COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 'THREE'
There are numerous instances of 'transfrontier cooperation' between and among the member states of the Council of Europe. The overwhelming majority of these have not gained their inspiration from the Outline Convention (nor the Additional Protocol) and thus are not subject to its terms, are bilateral in nature and, often, longstanding. In this sense, transfrontier cooperation has not proved to be dependent on formalisation.
If the Outline Convention/Additional Protocol, therefore, provide anything, it is the possibility that its standards can be applied in regions, particularly (although by no means exclusively), which are in the process of establishing a new form of constitutional development; i.e. the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is interesting to note that the three most recent signatories to the Outline Convention have all been countries from this region: Latvia (also the Additional Protocol), Bulgaria and the Czech Republic [9]. Up until now, however, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have not had the opportunity to 'reciprocate' (see Chapter 12).
The temptation to bypass 'rigidity' when introducing methods of transfrontier cooperation may, at least to the local actors, be hard to resist. Much of its manifestation is 'spontaneous'. Besides, in the Transcaucasus, waiting for ratification may prove inadequate - as too may be the 'possibilities' that transfrontier cooperation can provide. Despite these obstacles and the fact that, necessarily, the cooperation may not be on a par, I feel it would still be to the enormous advantage of the Transcaucasus states if they, perhaps collectively, (signed and) ratified both the Outline Convention and the Additional Protocol upon admittance to the Council of Europe.
The question of formalisation, or not, need not always be the sole factor. Irrespective of the Outline Convention and the Additional Protocol, relations between the government (/parliament) of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (see Chapter 5) will remain bilateral; the same will be true for South Ossetia in relation to North Ossetia. What is never discussed, however, is the possibility of participation at rayon level. In August 1993, the (Polish-dominated) town of Poprad, in Slovakia, and the Polish town of Zakopane signed an agreement on the development of joint cultural and sports events, as well as economic and technical cooperation. The (French-speaking) Autonomous Region of the Aosta Valley, in Italy, is engaged in processes of partnership with the Mont Blanc area cities of Chamonix and Martigny, in France, on the level of cultural, sports and folklore events as well as contacts with educational institutions like the Universities of Besan9on and Grenoble (France). In this sense, there is no reason why similar, local, instances of cooperation could not be effected in the Transcaucasus and, crucially, involving the 'territorial communities or authorities' in the 'three'.
Fortunately, beyond the local context, the extent of the term 'territorial communities or authorities' (as per Article 2(2) of the Outline Convention) is not limited. It has a regional function as well. The Explanatory report on the Outline Convention states (in relation to Article 2(2)): This paragraph specifies the Convention's scope regarding, first of all, the bodies concerned by transfrontier cooperation at local and regional level…
... [new paragraph] The term 'territorial' has a geographical connotation, denoting powers covering a smaller area than those of the State. It should not be interpreted as referring only to 'territorial communities', a precise concept in the law of some member States which is too narrow for the Convention's purposes. It is intended to embrace the diversity of systems of administrative organisation at local and regional level in the States concerned' [10].
This 'explanation' is of considerable importance to the two Ossetias. There would be no reason why the Russian Federation and the 'United Republic of Georgia' could not utilise the Outline Convention and the Additional Protocol for the purposes of not only formalising, but bolstering (beyond the scope of existing/potential instances of bilateral 'transfrontier cooperation' between South and North Ossetia) cooperation between the Ossetias. Consider, for example, the Land of Tirol (Austria) and the, overwhelmingly German-speaking, population of South Tyrol (Italy). Joint sessions of the regional assemblies of Tyrol and Bolzano-Bozen (one of the two Provinces that form South Tyrol), cultural and artistic exchange and cooperation and the holding of sports events are regular occurrences. The same could, quite 'simply', be translated to the Caucasus.
With relations among the Transcaucasus states being so tentative (apart, even, from hostile) since independence, it is highly likely that the meaning and effect of transfrontier cooperation (as per the Outline Convention and Additional Protocol) between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia may have little function (at least for the time being). It would, perhaps, be to 'put the cart before the horse' to expect sub-State cooperation before inter-State cooperation has been introduced/emboldened. Even if only on the macro level, therefore, the Council of Europe sponsored 'Colloquy on the Promotion of Transfrontier Cooperation Between Regions, Provinces and Municipalities in the Caucasian Area'; attended by representatives from Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Turkey (and held in Trabzon, Turkey, between 23-24 June 1997); was very important in this regard. On the other hand, the Colloquy did, very successfully, manage to configure much of the debate around 'local and regional possibilities'. The Preamble to the 'Recommendation on Decentralised Transfrontier Cooperation' aspires, quite clearly:

'[Wishing] to strengthen cooperation between local and regional authorities [note: the term 'territorial communities or authorities' is not used throughout the Recommendation] in the Caucasian area in a spirit of neighbourliness, openness and solidarity in order to promote mutual understanding and improve the living conditions of frontier populations'.

The body of the Recommendation continues much in the same vain, '[Recommend] to the national governments', in paragraph 5:

To facilitate and foster transfrontier cooperation between local and regional authorities especially in the fields of culture, archaeology, tourism, scientific research, trade and environment, and to encourage such cooperation to be regular and formal'.

Addressing 'the local and regional authorities at the frontier', it provides, inter alia, in paragraph 1:
'To establish transfrontier contacts between local authorities so as to organise cultural days and cultural exhibitions, to encourage the formation of transfrontier youth camps and to promote sporting events' [11].

PROSPECTS AND POSSIBILITIES 
Processes of transfrontier cooperation may not be at the forefront of attention in respect of the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, but this is not to negate their potential 'conflict settling' effects. Perhaps, as far as these 'two' are concerned, they have/are already in the process of, and would anyway (whatever the conditions), 'informally' establish their own forms of transfrontier cooperation. In principle, of course, this need not be problematic. However, despite my own recommendations permitting them to sign international agreements, I do feel that, at least in the more significant areas (such as, for example, cooperation between legislatures) it is to be preferred that the process itself be, if only on paper, formalised. A right for South Ossetia, for example, to sign all the agreements it desires with North Ossetia is one thing, but it can only be preferable if Russia and Georgia (whatever constitutional form it finally takes) can play a partial role in the development of their cooperation.
Whether transfrontier cooperation in the Transcaucasus, ultimately, is reflected more on the regional level, than on the local level is perhaps not important. What is important is the recognition, among all sides, that active participation/involvement in such need not be an impediment and can, I believe, in all ways, only promote a level of trust, understanding and friendship, even solidarity, that could contribute to the Transcaucasus (and not just the 'three') becoming a region that disappears from the world's attention, for once, for all the right reasons.

NOTES
[1] The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement was signed, in Belfast, on 10 April 1998. The Annex to Strand Two notes: 'Areas for North-South co-operation and implementation may include the following: (1) Agriculture - animal and plant health. (2) Education - teacher qualifications and exchanges. (3) Transport -strategic transport planning. (4) Environment - environmental protection, pollution, water quality, and waste management. (5) Waterways - inland waterways. (6) Social Security/Social Welfare - entitlements of cross-border workers and fraud control. (7) Tourism - promotion, marketing, research, and product development. (8) Relevant EU Programmes such as SPPR, INTERREG, Leader II and their successors. (9) Inland Fisheries. (10) Aquaculture and marine matters. (11) Health: accident and emergency services and other related cross-border issues. (12) Urban and rural development. Others to be considered by the shadow North/South Council'. For text of the Agreement see: http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.php
[2] The Outline Convention has, to date, received 20 ratifications and been signed by 7 other States. It is, therefore, in force (Article 9(2)): 'The Convention shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, provided that at least two of the States having carried out this formality possess a common frontier'. The 20 to have ratified are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine. The 7 to have signed are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. For text of the Outline Convention see: http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/ 106e.php 
[3] The CLRAE is a semi-parliamentary body, within the organisational structure of the Council of Europe, consisting of national delegations of local and regional elected representatives, with the aim of encouraging these representatives to pool their experience and express their views and interests regarding European cooperation.
[4] Article 2(2) provides: '... However, each Contracting Party may, at the time of signing this Convention or by subsequent notification to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, name the communities, authorities or bodies, subjects and forms to which it intends to confine the scope of the Convention or which it intends to exclude from its scope'.
Article 3(2) provides: 'If the Contracting Parties deem it necessary to conclude inter-state agreements, these may inter alia establish the context, forms and limits within which territorial communities and authorities concerned with transfrontier cooperation may act. Each agreement may also stipulate the authorities or bodies to which it applies'.
[5] This resolution was adopted on the basis of the results of the 5th European Conference of Frontier Regions organised by the CLRAE, together with the Parliamentary Assembly (of the Council of Europe) and the Nordic Council, from 18-20 June 1991.
[6] This memorandum was presented to the Steering Committee on Local and Regional Activities (CDLR) in document CDLR (93) 1.
[7] This was the concluding document to the Vienna Summit of 8-9 October 1993. The Summit was the first time the Council of Europe's Heads of State and Government had convened for a summit meeting.
The Preamble to the Declaration states, inter alia: 'The creation of a tolerant and prosperous Europe does not depend only on cooperation between States. It also requires transfrontier cooperation between local and regional authorities, without prejudice to the constitution and the territorial integrity of each State. We urge the organisation to pursue its work in this field' For text of the Vienna Declaration see: http://www.coe.fr/eng/std/viennad.php
[8] The Additional Protocol has, to date, received 3 ratifications and been signed by 8 other States (all of whom, further to Article 10(1), 'have signed the Outline Convention'). On account of the requirement that 'four member States of the Council of Europe' must 'have expressed their consent to be bound by the Protocol', the Additional Protocol has not yet come into force. The 3 to have ratified are: Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. The 8 to have signed are: Belgium, France, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Switzerland. For text of the Additional Protocol see: http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/ 159e.php 
[9] Latvia on 28 May 1998, Bulgaria on 2 June and the Czech Republic on 24 June 1998.
[10] Explanatory report on the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1980), p. 12.
[11] Courtesy of Ms Aygen Becquart (Division of Territorial Authorities, Transfrontier Cooperation and Regional Planning, Council of Europe, Strasbourg).

CONCLUSION
Most, if not all, of the republics of the former Soviet Union in different ways and to varying degrees appear, presently, exhausted by upheaval. The current financial crisis in Russia, and the governmental and popular reaction to it, are a perfect illustration of this. In the Transcaucasus there is a yearning for peace, but, perhaps, a lack of willingness to facilitate it. Under such conditions, the present can be transformed into an almost permanent future.
The challenge during the next (principally) 24 months will be for the international community to re-invigorate a process that, already, appears lost. In my opinion too much time has been wasted discussing matters not really germane to the fundamental issues at hand. The product has become a psychological impediment so deep-rooted that it may be impossible to rectify. This is most graphically demonstrated by the present state of the negotiations on South Ossetia.
In reality, there is more that binds these, so-called, antagonists than divides them. They all seek a prosperous future, they all seek to trade freely and they all seek to restore broken relations (if friendships is, perhaps, too strong a term). Of course, there is much at stake for all of them, but there is no reason why settlement should not be the product of mutual compromise. Sadly, as is too frequently the case, Caucasian pride (more deep-rooted than most) frustrates this.
I have attempted throughout this work to make it clear that 'restoration' should be gradual. To construct constitutional settlements in each of the 'three' is not to discount the possibility of future enhanced cooperation. The legacy of Dayton proves that, after bitter conflict, the relevant parties need time to get to know/trust each other once again. Perhaps the most destructive aspect of war is not so much human loss (although this should in no way be negated), but a loss of confidence which can prevail for generations. There are too many nations in this world that harbour antipathies towards other nations or peoples on account of events that, sometimes, occurred centuries ago. Injudicious peaces, I believe, have played an important role in this.
The opportunity for peace exists already. Indeed, it has existed for some time. It is now imperative that the respective sides gain confidence in each other by getting into the habit of signing agreements on matters that they can agree to. While any settlement such as the one I have provided for in Chapter 9 maybe slightly premature, work should begin now on solidifying a process towards such an end product: even if that end product is entirely different to the one I have suggested.
Two models can be applied: either to work towards settlement now, or put it off. The latter, while always tempting, does not, ultimately, resolve anything. What is Chechnya's constitutional status today? What has changed since 1991? What was the point of all that death and destruction? The victims of that appalling war, on both sides, deserve nothing less than agreement. This limbo that Chechnya currently 'enjoys' provides an unhealthy precedent that can only encourage, not discourage, conflict.
Chechnya is a classic illustration of mankind's desire to sweep problems 'under the carpet': by putting it in a drawer and hoping that it will go away. Sadly, these problems, though, don't. I am extremely worried at the moment that the international community, tired of trying, and Russia, pre-occupied by internal distraction, may choose, tacitly, if not publicly, to follow such a course with the 'three'. This cannot be in the best interests of the Transcaucasus or any of the said; yet I wonder to what extent such a policy may have already been implemented.
When searching for constitutional settlements, the international community has, too frequently, demonstrated an unoriginality of thought that is most concerning. The negotiations so far have concentrated, too much, on existing models. While one side asserts its preference for the Andorra example, the other asserts that of the Aland Islands. It never seems to occur to anyone that no existing model is ever necessarily equivalent to the needs of a new situation. That is not to suggest that aspects of some cannot be applied, but the exigencies of the Transcaucasus may not be amenable to the compartmentalisation that the international community, rather lazily, seeks to enshrine for it. In essence, all the existing models of autonomy are, in their own right, individual. Therefore, why should that individuality stop there? For the Aland Islands of today could be the Abkhazia of tomorrow. The relevant sides should consider, first of all, their own respective needs and a settlement should be adjusted accordingly, rather than the other way round.
International law has an important role to play in all of this. However, the present dominance of international law, in this environment, should not be at the expense of constitutional law. In reality there is a very great possibility of the two functioning, to the advantage of all, in tandem here. Yet, I sometimes feel that international lawyers are overly dismissive of more municipal constructs, preferring, in their place, the more general and abstract fundamentals of their own discipline.
I believe the international/constitutional law dichotomy is presently reflected in the clash within the notion of autonomy. While constitutional law has demonstrated that such can be a highly useful mechanism for conflict settlement and human binding, international law, perhaps under international pressure, is wary if not dismissive towards its functional possibilities.
Autonomy, while not a panacea, can assist enormously in the process towards a settlement in the 'three'. In truth, I do not believe the international community disputes this. However, it interrupts itself upon the consideration that such may, to varying degrees, impede the sanctity of the 'territorial integrity/state sovereignty' of the nation state. The apparent incompatibility of the 'two' notions is too often exemplified at the expense of the opportunity for peace.
These notions need not be incompatible. Indeed, I believe, in the coming decades, that it will prove to be autonomy (or some other very similar construct, perhaps given another name) that will prove to be the saviour of the modern nation state concept.
The operation of mankind, like the natural world, is constant: it is never static. When I think of human society and the way it has developed over the past three thousand years, it appears to me, as the continental plates, ever shifting. The 20th century development of international law demonstrates this: its unceasing circularity is manifested. From the First World War promotion of the concept, self-determination, from the post-imperial construct, minority rights, flowed, upon its loss of legitimacy, the triumph of the nation state following the Second World War. Yet, the primacy of the nation state (or apotheosis of 'blocism') garnered nationalisms that were first to be reflected in the deconstruction of empire in the 1950s/60s to the deconstruction of the nation state ideal, following the collapse of Marxism-Leninism. The product during the past ten years has been, at least in the Old World, Balkanisation. The dominance of the nation state concept has proved the basis for its own potential destruction. The 'necessity' to break free, the only alternative, has, ironically, rendered secession into nothing more than 'territorial integrity/state sovereignty's' shadow.
As the market, silently, is transforming the nation state concept into an unnecessary distraction, so, by a process of stealth, the possibilities inherent within internal self-determination are becoming more apparent. Minorities now have the opportunity to enjoy a whole raft of rights fitting their own particular needs, and that, if promoted rather than crushed, could(/will) maintain meaning for the nation state. The various aspects of autonomy are a fundamental part of this.
Secession is not a solution. It is not in the best interests of the 'three', I do not recommend it. However, this is not to discount the possibility for their broadly autonomous existence within Azerbaijan and Georgia. Baku and Tbilisi have been slow to understand (they are by no means the only ones) that 'unitarianism' has little or no purpose today. The desire to defeat is an old, tried and unsuccessful notion. If Baku and Tbilisi realise that varying degrees of self-government can actually bind, rather than separate, the existing de facto separation(/secession) that currently prevails need not remain.
The Caucasus as a whole has, on account of its ethnic diversity (alone), such an opportunity to promote diversity. Abkhaz should not be separated from Chechen, Chechen should not be separated from Georgian and Georgian should not be separated from Adyghe. Armenian and Turk should, finally, accept the occurrence of previous tragedy, if not placing a burden of responsibility upon present and future generations. Azeris and Iranians should not be suspicious of each other, for fear of the other's motivations. The Caucasus, the ultimate crossroads of civilisations, should not remain the play thing for regional powers (although I fear it will). Its multitude of peoples should assert their, very considerable, commonality, while recognising their very different traditions. Peace in the 'three' need not be at the expense of 'Peace in the Caucasus'.
In my opinion, it is difficult to construct a conclusion to a work such as this, because so much remains to be clarified. The conflicts in the 'three' have come during an important period of transition, the effects and outcomes of which will, I am certain, have a lasting impact upon the lives of my (and the next) generation. The decisions that we reach will not be permanent, for nothing is ever permanent, but they will have a future bearing on the way in which this world develops.
Although I arrived late, I will not be sorry to leave the 20th century. It has surely been the most destructive ever. One can only look forward to a new, 21st, century that will finally reflect before it acts, discuss before it fires and signs before it betrays. The future of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while presently uncertain need not remain so indefinitely. Yet, whether, ultimately, it does so or not will depend, almost entirely, on whether reason triumphs over selfishness.
There is no end to man's 'quest' for his own suffering, his appetite for it, after all, is insatiable. Yet, whether he chooses to be humble, finally, or bombastic is up to only him. I have attempted in this work to enshrine reason before prejudice, attempted to be just and not partial. Whether anyone will listen to me, however, remains to be seen.

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