CHAPTER 11
Peace, not war, in Tatarstan
Gagauz-Eri: constitutional settlement in Moldova
The Karakalpak model?
Cultural autonomy in Estonia
Leasing arrangements: Baykonur
North Ossetian national guard
Chechnya

The Post-Soviet Environment
"Putting reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia on the agenda would be to unleash a new Chechen war. If Russia and Ukraine can rise to the level to which De Gaulle and Adenauer rose in their time to resolve the issues of Alsace and Lorraine, then we will be able to work together, help each other and overcome mistrust" [1] (Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, Russian presidential press secretary, 30 May 1997)
The chaos that has beset the former Soviet Union since its break-up, in 1991, would appear to belie the inclusion of this chapter in this part of the work. Conflict has not merely ravaged Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but other regions. We are all aware of the truly tragic and unnecessary events surrounding the Russian-Chechen war of 1995-96, but there have been other, less publicised, inflagrations. In 1991-92, Moldova was beset by crises in Transdniestria (the west bank of the Dnestr river) and Gagauzia (in the south of the country, bordering Ukraine). Tajikistan has suffered, until 'recently', from a debilitating, but 'silent', civil war (from 1992). The (North) Ossetian-Ingush conflict of November 1992 continues to smoulder (and, indeed, nearly erupted again last summer). Considering all of this and the remaining social and economic upheaval, it is a wonder that we can learn anything from this troubled region. However, within all the tragedy and despair there are a few, sobering, lessons that can assist the international community in finding permanent peaces in the 'three'.

PEACE, NOT WAR, IN TATARSTAN
During the 'heady days' of 1990-91, it was not merely the Union Republics (now internationally recognised States) that declared their state sovereignty: nearly every autonomous entity, from Autonomous Republic down to Autonomous Okrug did so [2]. None of these, however, were recognised.
One of the most vocal 'aspirants' for independence was the Republic of Tatarstan (Russian Federation). In 1992, the newly independent Russian Federation sought to freshly 'delimit' the relationship between Moscow and its republics (only) in the form of the Federation Treaty [3]. In the end, 18 out of the 20 Russian republics signed [4]: the exceptions being Tatarstan and Checheno-Ingushetia. Checheno-Ingushetia decided to avoid the issue of the Federation Treaty, entirely, by declaring its independence in March 1992 [5], while for Tatarstan the failure of the Federation Treaty to contain a right of secession, from the Federation, which it had demanded, was sufficient to avoid the possibility of their signature [6].
Although by accident rather than design, Tatarstan became subject to the terms of the Russian Constitution, adopted in a nationwide referendum, held on 12 December 1993 [7] - and which broadly levelled down the 'hierarchy' between the various aspects of the Federation [8]. The constitutional dispute between the centre and Tatarstan was not formally resolved until the signing, on 15 February 1994, of the Treaty of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan On the Demarcation of Areas of Responsibility and the Mutual Delegation of Powers Between the Organs of State Power of the Russian Federation and the Organs of State Power of the Republic of Tatarstan' [9].
The first important point to note about the Russian Federation-Tatarstan Treaty is that it established a process of, in effect, treaty relations between the two. This is something that the 'three' have long been petitioning for. Although, undoubtedly, the Treaty does not establish a horizontal relationship between the Russian centre and Tatarstan, it does suggest some form of international status for the latter in both the Preamble and Article 8. The Preamble begins:

'The plenipotentiaries of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan... taking into account that the Republic of Tatarstan as a State [note the capital "S' in the text]...'

Article 8 confirms:

"The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have plenipotentiary representatives in the cities of Moscow and Kazan'.

Other important innovations, as contained in the Treaty, include the right of the Republic of Tatarstan to establish its own 'republican' citizenship. Article 2(8) provides:

The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power and shall... (8) decide issues of the republic citizenship' [10].

Tatartan has the right to (Article 2(10)):

'establish and maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with the republics, territories, regions, autonomous districts and regions, with the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg of the Russian Federation', provided these do not contradict the Russian Constitution, the Constitution of Tatarstan, the Treaty and 'other agreements between' the two.

Tatarstan also has the right to conduct international relations. Article 2(11) states:

'The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power and shall (11) participate in international affairs, shall establish relations with foreign states and conclude treaties which shall not contradict the constitution and international obligations of the Russian Federation, the constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present treaty, shall participate in the action of corresponding international organisations'.

The Treaty does not render the Republic of Tatarstan the same rights as a, de jure, recognised international state. One should note, in Article 2( 11), the deliberate use of the phrase 'shall establish relations with foreign states'. Obviously, Tatarstan is not envisaged, in any way, to be 'foreign', and thereby separate from/to the Russian Federation. Any treaties it does sign with 'foreign' states, still, are subject to the Russian Constitution. Tatarstan's relationship with the Russian Federation provides a perfect example of a diagonal relationship between 'centre' and 'region'. In such conditions, the 'region' has solidified its relations by way of a special treaty, it enjoys extensive rights of autonomy (viz., in Tatarstan's case, regional citizenship for example) and, perhaps crucially, it may only be amended mutually. However, it is 'diagonal' rather than horizontal because the 'region' is still subject to a central instrument - in this instance, the Russian Constitution [11]. My recommendations for Georgia provide a very similar (diagonal) relationship between the centre (the 'United Republic of Georgia') and Abkhazia/South Ossetia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia would each sign separate treaties with the Georgian Republic, agreeing to establish the 'United Republic of Georgia'. It would further be agreed that the Republics of Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria, and Regions A and B would be created within the 'United Republic of Georgia' and that each of these would be entitled to adopt their own republican/regional constitution, while all being subject to a central constitution. However, crucially, the treaty would provide that the relationship between Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgia could only be altered by way of mutual agreement (treaty). As for Nagorno-Karabakh: its relationship with the Republic of Azerbaijan would be horizontal and governed by a special treaty. There would be, per se, no other unifying instrument between them.
The Russian Federation-Tatarstan Treaty 'introduces' an important alternative to the rather basic (and unconstructive) division between vertical and horizontal relations. While either of these may, still, be suitable in a number of instances, it is important that this new form of relationship is promoted as a possible alternative to 'bridge' the some times glaring divide between centre and region. Although Tatarstan is not a State, it is much more than merely a 'subject'.
(One should note that, in an appendix to the Federation Treaty, Bashkortostan was granted authority over all economic assets in the republic, exempted from the federal budgetary and tax system, permitted independent foreign economic relations and accepted legislative and judicial authority [12].)

GAGAUZERI: CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT IN MOLDOVA
On 29 December 1994, at the end of a session of Gagauzia's Supreme Soviet, Deputy Chairman of the Moldovan Parliament, Nikolay Andro-nik formally handed over Moldova's flag and the phonogram of the Moldovan national anthem (which, it should be noted, is the same as Romania's) for the first time since Moldova had achieved independence. The session had earlier pointed out that the parallel institution of state symbols (both Moldovan and Gagauzian) was the first step on the way to the implementation of the decree adopted by the Moldovan parliament only the week before [13].
On 23 December 1994, the previously low-level conflict of 1991-92 between Moldova and its southern region of Gagauzia had been resolved with the adoption, by the Moldovan Parliament, of the Law on a Special Legal Status of Gagauz-Eri. On that date, the 'territorial autonomous unit' (Article 1, para. 1) of Gagauz-Eri was formed.
While, sadly, the Gagauz case provides the only example to date in the former Soviet Union of conflict leading to constitutional settlement, the Law on a Special Legal Status provides a number of interesting lessons for any future settlement in the 'three'. According to the Law, Gagauzia has competence in the following areas (Article 12): culture, science, education, housing, health services, physical culture and sports, local budget, financial and tax activities (including the setting of its own local budget), the economy, ecology, labour relations, social protection and social insurance. According to my recommendations all the above competences would come within the jurisdiction of the 'three'. It is interesting to note, however, that on 25 December 1996, Gagauz Bashkan (means 'Chief in Turkish), Tudor Tabunschik called for a, new, follow-up document to the Law. He proclaimed: A mechanism is needed through which Gagauz-Eri would influence Moldovan foreign policy and enable the autonomy's institutions to establish direct foreign economic links' [14]. While the 'three' would enjoy the right to establish direct foreign economic relations, I feel any emerging foreign relations should be coordinated, certainly on the part of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Tbilisi, and, preferably, on the part of Nagorno-Karabakh with Baku. Note, according to Article 14 (para. 4), the Bashkan is entitled, by way of presidential decree, to be appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova. Would Nagorno-Karabakh wish for the same visa-vis Baku?
The Law on the Status of Gagauzia avoids any possible breach of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (see Chapter 9) by providing that (in Article 14 (para. 3)), 'the Gagauzi Bashkan may be a citizen of Moldova aged over 35 and knowing the Gagauzi language'. While, in practice, the inclusion of a similar-worded provision would probably have no impact on the election of an ethnic Ossetian as president in the Republic of South Ossetia or the election of an ethnic Armenian in the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, the same could not be said for Abkhazia. Knowledge of the Abkhaz language would entitle any ethnic Georgian to stand and this, coupled with the numerical inferiority of the Abkhaz people (at least vis-a-vis the ethnic Georgian population), could ensure that an ethnic Abkhazian was never elected president. Such a possibility could not be satisfactory and so, therefore, I would not favour such an 'option' being applied. I would, also, not recommend different pro visions/entitlements for South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Further to the Law, a referendum was held, on 5 March 1995, to determine the borders of Gagauz-Eri. Article 5 provided that in those localities where at least 50% of the population were ethnic Gagauz, the referendum would be conducted without the need for any 'active' consent. However, in those localities where the Gagauz population constituted less than 50%, the referendum would be held only in the event of the signature of one-third of the residents. In the region, 27 villages/towns satisfied the basic requirement, with another 15 requiring support. In the end, 36 population centres participated and 30 of these voted to join the territorial formation [15]. This provision reminds me of my recommendations on Georgia, whereby, in Gali District, a referendum would be allowed to take place in those localities which, according to the last Soviet census in 1989, had an ethnic Abkhazian population of at least 50%- Gali District was 93.8% ethnic Georgian in 1989 [16]. Of course, it is tempting to recommend the use of referenda to determine boundaries in South Ossetia, Karabakh and other rayons in Abkhazia. Why not have a similar referendum in Shusha (Karabakh), for example? I would not recommend this. I feel that Gali District is a case apart: perhaps with the possible exception of the predominantly Georgian-populated Znauri District in South Ossetia. It is only because Gali District was so overwhelmingly ethnic Georgian, with, I understand, the sole Abkhazian village right on the administrative border with Ochamchire District that, I believe, necessitates some form of consultation. Karabakh is not remotely as geographically amenable to such a possibility. Many (former) Azeri populated towns/villages are not, for example, on the periphery of the former Autonomous Oblast's boundaries. In truth, I consider the Law on Status a little over-'democratic'. I do not think it was necessary to conduct a referendum to determine Gagauzia's future capital (as per Article 26) [17]. Komrat, as opposed to its nearest rival, Chaydr-Lunga, already contained all the important local administrative offices and, of course, the university.

THE KARAKALPAK MODEL?
While the very size of the Russian Federation, apart from the Soviet legacy, necessitates the existence of autonomous formations other than Gagauz-Eri, there currently only exist two other regions, in the remaining 14 former republics, that enjoy constitutionally-defined autonomy: the Gornyy Badakhshan Autonomous Region (in Tajikistan) and the Republic of Karakalpakstan (in Uzbekistan). What is perhaps most fascinating is the relationship between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan. Article 75 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan (8 December 1992) provides:

'Relations between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan, within the framework of the constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, shall be regulated by treaties and agreements concluded by the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan' [18].

While the sovereignty of Karakalpakstan is, undoubtedly, 'clipped' with the proviso, in Article 72, that 'The Laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be binding on the territory of the Republic of Karakalpakstan', their relationship is, without question, at the very least, of a 'diagonal' type. For beyond the regulation of their relationship by way of 'treaties and agreements', Article 75 continues:

'Any disputes between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan shall be settled by the way of reconciliation' (compare with Article 6 of the Russian-Tatarstan Treaty) [19].

Further, irrespective of whatever one might say about its 'Leninist inspiration' (viz. the events of 1990-91), Article 74 of the Uzbek Constitution does state:

'The Republic of Karakalpakstan shall have the right to secede from the Republic of Uzbekistan on the basis of a nation-wide referendum held by the people of Karakalpakstan'.

I do not believe one should make too much of the 'right to secede' provision in Article 74 of the Uzbek Constitution. Without wanting to negate the sovereignty of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, it is a largely symbolic provision: as Article 70 continues, it is a sovereignty that 'shall be protected by the Republic of Uzbekistan'. Besides, international practice demonstrates that constitutional provisions are not necessary to attempt to exercise such a 'right'(?). What, I believe, is significant is the parallel relationship that the Uzbek Constitution provides for Karakalpakstan (see Article 75, above), particularly since the formulation of such a relationship was not, itself, the product of any dispute. Where trust and good faith are ventured it is remarkable what can be agreed and sustained. For it should be noted that the Republic of Karakalpakstan adopted its own Constitution, on 10 April 1993 [20], its provisions were not challenged by Tashkent, and there has been no movement, whatsoever, for secession in the Republic since.

CULTURAL AUTONOMY IN ESTONIA
I appreciate that there are a significant number of officials/scholars in both Tbilisi and Baku who would prefer to grant, 'simply', cultural autonomy for the 'three'. Of course, there is nothing remotely unconscionable about cultural autonomy as a method, but, realistically, there is absolutely no prospect that any of the 'three' would ever sign any document, 'merely', providing such.
In truth, cultural autonomy works best in those conditions where the possibility of territorial autonomy 'does not exist'. The only, present, example of a 'functioning' Cultural Autonomy Law in what was (in the case of the Baltic States, at least) de facto the former Soviet Union [21], is in Estonia [22]. Here, there is absolutely no possibility that the Estonian government would introduce 'full' autonomy to the (mainly) Russian-speaking population of north-east Estonia. In this sense, although ethnic Russians do not necessarily qualify [23], the possibility of exercising the rights that flow from the establishment of cultural autonomy can certainly be viewed as some kind of 'substitute'.
If cultural autonomy is not suitable for the 'three', can it have any relevance to them? I suppose there is no reason why the Armenians of Karabakh couldn't offer the returning Azerbaijanis of Karabakh the possibility of exercising their 'rights' to cultural autonomy. Yet, as innocuous as this may sound, it would be, without question, problematic. Cultural autonomy once exercised, according to the Estonian 'version', entitles the registered membership (see Articles 7-9) of that 'national minority' to establish a 'cultural council' (Article 11(1)). This 'cultural council' may have up to 60 members (Article 18(1)). There is a very real danger that any such council could, very quickly, assume the role of a parallel (semi-'officiaP), undoubtedly 'dissident', 'assembly'. I fear that such, in Karabakh, could lead to an Azeri boycott of the (central) Assembly and, perhaps, even local government. Such a situation would not be sustainable. The very same could occur in Abkhazia and South Ossetia if cultural autonomy were offered to the local ethnic Georgian population. Indeed, I doubt whether the Abkhazian people could sustain (they are so numerically weak) any form of cultural autonomy, even for the ethnic Russians or Armenians - and, of course, such could not be offered to them without granting a higher form of autonomy to the ethnic Georgian population.
Consider the entitlements and institutions of cultural autonomy. Article 4 of the Estonian law, regarding entitlements, states:
'Members of a national minority shall have the right:
(1) to form and support cultural and educational institutions and religious congregations;
(2) to form ethnic organisations;
(3) to practise cultural traditions and religious customs if this does not endanger public order, health and morals;
(4) to use their mother tongue in dealings within the limits established by the Language Law;
(5) to publish ethnic language publications;
(6) to conclude agreements of cooperation between ethnic, cultural and educational institutions and religious congregations'.
There is nothing inherently 'dangerous' in any of these. All are perfectly reasonable and equitable aspirations for which the matter of loyalty need not arise. Beyond the 'cultural council', however, what makes the concept of cultural autonomy extremely problematic in the 'three' is the 'prevalence' of institutions of cultural autonomy as defined in Article 24. It states:
'Institutions of cultural autonomy shall be:
(1) educational institutions providing intensive instruction in the ethnic language or ethnic culture (pre-school institutions and schools);
(2) ethnic cultural institutions;
(3) ethnic cultural enterprises;
(4) ethnic social care institutions'.
First, there is no reason why educational institutions would need to be managed, in any of the 'three', beyond the confines of their relevant Education Ministries. Second, 'ethnic cultural enterprises' need be autonomous only in the sense that they are managed semi-privately. There is no need for them to be managed 'externally'.
Where broken relationships are being reconstructed, processes of 'externalisation', a crucial 'aspect' of all processes of cultural autonomy, could not be recommendable. Naturally, it will be necessary for the ethnic Azeris of Karabakh (for example) to maintain their own museums and cultural monuments, but I believe that this would be better managed internally, as an aspect of the normal, in this case republican, governmental process. So far, no 'national' minority has exercised its right to cultural autonomy [24].

LEASING ARRANGEMENTS: BAYKONUR
Perhaps the possibility of leasing, 'indefinitely', the Lachin Corridor to the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is not so novel after all, for a specific model of a leasing arrangement on the territory of the former Soviet Union, within the territory of Kazakstan, has already been provided.
The dormitory town to the 'Russian' space centre at Baykonur [25], Leninsk, is a Russian 'oasis' in the heart of the Kazak steppe. In a 20-year agreement on the status of the town, initialled by Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Aleksey Bolshakov and his Kazak opposite number, Nigmetz-han Isingarin, on 16 June 1995, it was provided that Leninsk would be placed under Russia's jurisdiction and financed as 'an out-of-limits special city' - all taxes on juridicial persons going to the city budget. According to the agreement, both currencies (including, therefore, the Kazak tenge) would be in circulation, with wages being paid in roubles. Russian would be the 'official correspondence language', while tuition at secondary schools would be in both Russian and Kazak [26].

NORTH OSSETIAN NATIONAL GUARD
Although Baku has, on more than one occasion, stated its unwillingness to sign any agreement that maintains the armed forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (see Chapter 5), they should bear in mind that; despite the continuing difficulties in relations between North Ossetia and Ingushetia; North Ossetia possesses its own national guard. This national guard is entirely separate from the (various) armed forces of the Russian Federation and under the command of Vladikavkaz. The existence of the national guard appears to have made absolutely no difference to regional security/the security framework and enjoys the blessing of Moscow.

CHECHNYA
There is much one can say about Chechnya, but, despite intensive negotiations, agreement has not been reached on the future constitutional status of the breakaway north Caucasian republic. I will dwell, therefore, only on what I regard to be the two significant events so far.
The joint declaration (of peace), signed by (former) Russian Security Council Secretary, Aleksandr Lebed and (then) Chechen commander, Asian Maskhadov on the night of the 30/31 August 1996, provided:

'The agreement on the basis of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, determined in accordance with the universally recognised principles and norms of international law. must be reached by 31 December 2001' [27].

It is, I feel, too easy to draw a comparison between this declaration and any possible equivalent (step-by-step or otherwise) for the 'three'. In the case of Chechnya, the question of withdrawal from occupied lands (as in Karabakh) did not arise. Further, the matter of the return of 'refugees' (in this case Russians) was not addressed: undoubtedly, an important aspect of any settlement in the 'three'. Of course, there are always dangers with 'step-by-step' approaches such as that agreed to for Chechnya. As events have demonstrated there since, one cannot rule out a resumption of the conflict (even inter-Chechen 'civil war') in the event of an unsatisfactory agreement, and what if the deadline passes without one? These are potentially salutary lessons for the 'three'.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the only one of the 'three' which lacks a peace treaty 'ruling out' the possibility of the resumption of conflict [28]. On 11 May 1997, a Russian-Chechen Treaty on Peace and the Principles of Cooperation was signed. What sets this Treaty apart from its Abkhazian and Ossetian equivalents is (not just its brevity, but) its commitment to 'reject forever' any possible(/actual) 'use of force' between the two, longstanding, protaganists. The Treaty states:

The High Contracting Parties, desirous of ending centuries of confrontation and striving to establish sound and mutually beneficial relations as equals, have agreed to: reject forever resort to or threat offeree to resolve any difference;
build their relations in accordance with the generally accepted principles and standards of international law; in this respect the Parties shall work together on the basis of specific and definite agreements.
This Treaty shall be the basis for the conclusion of further accords and agreements across the entire spectrum of mutual relations' [29].

Peace treaties, in themselves, aren't 'watertight' guarantees, but they do at least facilitate a level of commitment that, naturally, any ceasefire can never provide. Breaches of any ceasefire are far more difficult for politicians to justify when there is no internationally brokered treaty standing in its way. The only question remains whether peace treaties facilitate a settlement. Here I have my doubts: in truth, I suspect they make very little difference.

NOTES
[1] Sergey Yastrzhembskiy was speaking on the eve of the signing of the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation; in preparation since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but constantly delayed by disagreement concerning the division of the Black Sea Fleet (based in Crimea); which recognised, in Article 3, the territorial integrity of Ukraine (as well as that of Russia). (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 1600 gmt, 30 May 1997) (SU/2934 SI/14, 2 June 1997).
[2] The USSR Constitution of 1977 subdivided the Union into Union Republics, Autonomous Republics (Articles 82-85), Autonomous Regions (Articles 86-87) and Autonomous Areas [Okrugs] (Article 88). see, for example (Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow, in Russian, 18 May 1991) (SU/1088 B/1, 3 Jun. 1991):'Review of regional sovereignty declarations'.
[3] For text see (ITAR-TASS World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 1456 gmt, 14 March 1992) (SU/1331 C3/1, 17 March 1992).
[4] Rather perversely, although they were not subjects of the Treaty, all of the Regions, Oblasts and Autonomous Okrugs, as well as the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, also signed it.
[5] With the adoption of the Chechen Constitution, on 17 March 1992. Article 1 states: 'The Chechen Republic is a sovereign democratic legal state as a result of the self-determination of the Chechen people. It has the supreme right concerning the territory and national riches, independently determines external and internal policy, adopts the constitution and laws, having leadership in its territory. The state sovereignty of the Chechen Republic is indivisible'. For text see: <http://www.host. gu.se/crees/www/staff/patrix/constitution.php>
[6] see (Combined Reports) (SU/1338 B/3, 25 March 1992): 'Shaymiyev claims referendum result will revive Russia'.
[7] The Constitution was approved with 58.4% in favor. The turnout was 54.8%. In Tatarstan, however, it 'failed' with a turnout of only 13.8% (74% in favour, 25% against). (FBIS, Central Eurasia, 14 Dec. 1993, pp. 5, 10). Article 135(3) of the Russian Constitution stipulated: '... The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall be considered adopted during such poll if more than half of its participants have voted for it, provided more than half of the electorate have taken part in the poll'.
[8] Article 5(1) provides: 'The Russian Federation shall be made up of republics, territories, regions, cities with federal status, the autonomous region and autonomous areas, all of which are equal members of the Russian Federation'. Article 5(4) continues: 'All members of the Russian Federation shall be equal in their relations with federal bodies of state authority'. The only 'superior' right enjoyed by the republics is their right to institute their own state languages. Article 68(2) states: 'The republics shall have the right to establish their own state languages. In the bodies of state authority, bodies of local self-government and the state institutions of the republics they shall be used alongside the state language of the Russian Federation'.
There are many sources for the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993). Here is one: <http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/ constit.phpl >
[9] For text see: <http://mirror-ken..unece.org/tatarstan/treaty.php>
[10] Recently, controversy has arisen over the draft Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Tatarstan. The initial draft included a provision whereby a 'citizen' of Tatarstan had the right to renounce his/her Russian citizenship. This, offending, provision had, however, been removed by the time the draft was adopted at first reading, on 15 April 1998. see (Moscow, Radio Rossii Network, in Russian, 1700 gmt, 15 April 1998) (FBIS-SOV-98-105, 17 April 1998): 'Tatarstan approves modified Citizenship Law at first stage'; and (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1235 gmt, 20 April 1998) (FBIS-SOV-110, 21 April 1998): 'Tatar President comments on legality of Citizenship Law'.
[11] Even here, though, the 'region' has a certain status. Article 6 (para. 3) provides: 'Disputes on the execution of authority in the sphere of common competence [see Article 3] of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be settled in accordance with the procedure agreed to between the Parties'.
One cannot be clear as to the procedure to be applied when there is a dispute between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation in the execution of their respective competences (see Articles 2 and 4), as opposed to those exercised jointly. Article 6 (1st and 2nd paragraphs), merely, states: '[1st para.] The State Bodies of the Russian Federation as well as the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have no rights to issue any legal acts on issues, which do not relate to their area of responsibility. [2nd para.] The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan as well as the Federal State Bodies shall have the right to protest against the acts of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan where they infringe upon the present Treaty'.
[12] See (FBIS, Central Eurasia, 12 Feb. 1992, p. 47).
[13] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1836 gmt, 29 Dec. 1994) (FBIS-SOV-94-251).
[14] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1415 gmt, 25 Dec. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-249).
[15] (Moscow, Interfax, in English, 1703 gmt, 6 March 1995) (FBIS-SOV-95-044).
[16] The Abkhazian population was 0.8%.
[17] In the referendum, conducted on 28 May 1995, 55% of voters favoured Komrat to 'continue' as capital of Gagauz-Eri. (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 0902 gmt, 29 May 1995) (SU/2316 D/3, 30 May 1995).
[18] For text see Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 8 December 1992 (Tashkent, 1992). Copy obtained courtesy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Research Department.
[19] Article 6 states: '(para. 3) Disputes on the execution of authority in the sphere of common competence of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be settled in accordance with the procedure agreed to between the Parties'.
[20] See (ITAR-TASS World Service, Moscow, in English, 1214 gmt, 10 April 1993) (SU/1664 B/16, 16 April 1993): 'Karakalpakia adopts new constitution'.
[21] The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) claim that they were illegally incorporated by the Soviet Union, on 6 August 1940, and, in consequence, de jure, never formed a part of it. The Baltic States had earlier become part of the USSR's 'sphere of influence' according to the Hitler-Stalin Pact's secret protocol, signed on 23 August 1939.
[22] For text of the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy (adopted on 16 November 1993), see: <http://www.einst.ee/society/cultural_autonomy_theJaw.php>
[23] Apart from the customary requirements for establishing cultural autonomy (particularly, here, the compilation of a national register (Articles 7-9), and its effects (Article 16(1)), the 'Russian' minority in Estonia is severely hampered from establishing such on account of restrictions on citizenship and naturalisation which largely affect them: see Chapter 2 of the Estonian Law on Citizenship (1938, as amended on 26 April 1993). For text see: <http://www.humanrights.ee/eng/ legislation/law/citizenship.phpl>
[24] It should be noted, however, that on 6 April 1998, it was reported that the Estonian Association of Ingermanland Finns was to apply for cultural autonomy. The association has nearly 4000 members in twelve affiliated societies. Estonian Review, vol. 8, no. 15,5-11 April 1998.
[25] The treaty on leasing the Baykonur launch site was signed in Moscow, on 10 December 1994, and ratified by the Kazak President, on 17 April 1995, and by the Russian Federal Assembly, on 17 May 1995. (Kazak TV, Almaty, in Russian, 1500 gmt, 25 Sept. 1995) (SU/2419 G/l, 27 Sept. 1995).
[26] (RIA news agency, Moscow, in English, 1449 gmt, 16 June 1995) and (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1235 gmt, 16 June 1995) both (SU/2333 G/3, 19 June 1995).
[27] (Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian, 1600 gmt, 1 Sept. 1996) (SU/2707 B/2 3 Sept. 1996).
[28] Paragraph 3 of the 'Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict' (Moscow, 4 April 1994) states: 'By signing this declaration, the parties hereby commit themselves to a strict formal ceasefire from this date and also reaffirm their commitment to the non-use of force or threat of the use of force against each other as expressed in their Communique of 13 January 1994'. For text see: <http://www.unpo.org/reports/0404geor.php> Paragraph 1 of the 'Memorandum on Measures to Provide Security and Strengthen Mutual Trust Between Sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict' (Tskhinvali, 17 April 1996), states: 'Sides of the conflict refuse to use force or the threat offeree, to exert political, economic or any other form of pressure on each other'. For text see: < http: / /www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/georosse.php >
[29] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 1249 gmt, 12 May 1997) (SU/2917 B/ 4, 13 May 1997).

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