CHAPTER 10
Commonality of purpose
Failure to establish joint institutions
The problem of 'refugees'
The permanence of peacekeepers
The failure of law-enforcement
Brcko - the need for corridors
Eastern Slavonia and the 'Sarajevo' effect

The Post-Dayton Environment
"A clear mandate would have to exist if German soldiers are to participate - and a clear peace plan and a credible military concept. We must also know how long such an operation will last and how much it will cost. This must be clarified in advance. We do not want a second Cyprus in the Caucasus" [1] (General Klaus Naumann, Bundeswehr Inspector, answering a question about the possibility of the deployment of German 'blue helmets' in Nagorno-Karabakh)

It is one thing to talk, in rather abstract terms, about the prospects for a constitutional settlement in Georgia or Azerbaijan through consideration of the Ghali Set of Ideas, existing 'autonomies' and, of course, the Dayton accord. It is another, however, to be able to identify the potential 'pitfalls'/difficulties that will arise upon the signing of any agreement. In order, therefore, to minimise these it is essential to consider the post-Dayton environment and, crucially, examine the lessons that can be drawn from it. It should be borne in mind, at all times, that the mere signing of a political accord is not a sure sign of success. Peaces can break down following such agreements, in the same way as ceasefires break down before any peace is reached. The conflicts between the Abkhaz/ Ossetians and Georgians and the Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno-Karabakh have been no less intense or 'awful' than that experienced in the former Yugoslavia and for any peace to be secured, practical and workable peaces will have to be found. Failure to achieve this might have worse consequences than the failure to secure agreement (viz. Cyprus?).

COMMONALITY OF PURPOSE
The application of the Dayton Peace Accord has, without doubt, been weakened by the 'grudging' acceptance of it among the key political actors. Dayton has proved to be a perfect testament of the inability of the international community to bind together 'peoples' (or should I say leaders) who appear not to want to live together. Undoubtedly there are lessons here for the 'three'.
The legacy of Dayton makes me wonder whether the international community, although acting in good faith, is today interfering with the laws of nature as acted out in war. The boundaries of many nation states are the product of previous conflict: sometimes fierce, continuing over many centuries and, in some cases, not yet (I suspect) complete. Tragically, for mankind this has proved to be an interminable process. I am sure that, ultimately, the conflict in Bosnia (and in the former Yugoslavia) would have resolved the battle of the maps. Instead, man intervened to 'contrive' what will probably prove to be artificial boundaries. I am extremely doubtful as to the sustainability of such.
All peoples require some form of home, and when this is not easily identifiable (or competed for) shocks will inevitably occur. During a visit to Bosnia just before Christmas 1997, US President Bill Clinton stressed that a lasting peace was possible in Bosnia and charged those who suggested that its main ethnic groups could not live together as being ignorant of Bosnian history. He also warned against partitioning the republic between the Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Partition, he said, would 'sanction the horrors of ethnic cleansing and send the wrong signals to extremists everywhere. At best, partition would require a peacekeeping force to patrol a volatile border for years to come. More likely it would set the stage also for renewed conflict' [2]. While his prescription for the 'future' of Bosnia, upon partition, is undoubtedly true, when he speaks of the legacy of history I am minded of not only its (constant) manipulation (again), but of the 'legacy' of the former Soviet Union also. Just as Tito's Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union encaged people. The use and convenience of history and the construction of artificial 'friendships', in the end, proved to be one of its main downfalls. Party bosses were shocked by the speed and intensity of the movement that arose in the spring of 1988 when Armenia took up the mantle for the 're'-unification of Nagorno-Karabakh. Their arrogance had 'shut-out' from their minds the deep resentment, anger and frustration that had been left to fester for over 60 years. It is imperative, therefore, in this post-Dayton world, not to allow similar resentment, anger and frustration to 'simmer' in Bosnia. Equally, if a solution is to be found to the conflicts in the 'three' it is essential that Abkhazians, Ossetians and Armenians are given sufficient 'space' to be able to bind their wounds and rebuild broken relationships. The same is true for Georgians and Azeris. If these peoples do not want a Caucasian equivalent of the Muslim and Croat Federation why should they be expected to form one? The danger for the South Caucasus is that if its peoples are re-integrated too quickly and absolutely, the very real, long-term, possibility of broken relationships being rebuilt may be lost forever.
There can be little doubt that President Tudjman of Croatia and (the Bosnian Serb) 'President' Momcilo Krajisnik of Bosnia have aspired to the formation of a Greater Croatia and a Greater Serbia. President Franjo Tudjman, in an interview with the Italian media, in December
1997. was reported as having said that he continues to believe that Islam presents a threat to Europe [3]. Speaking at the convention of the ruling Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), in Zagreb, on 21 February
1998. he called, once again, for the partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines [4]. In June 1996, he had told NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana that the Dayton accord was only temporary and that Bosnia would not survive as a single state, ultimately being divided between Serbs and Croats [5]. It has been extensively reported that President Tudjman, along with 'Serb' President, Slobodan Milosevic agreed, in 1991, to the partitioning of Bosnia [6]. Momcilo Krajisnik has gone even further than President Tudjman, claiming, on 6 September 1996, that Bosnia did not even exist as a state [7], and (in Kotor Varos, on 8 September) promising to lead Bosnian Serbs into a union of Serbian states [8]. Even at best, the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina looks bleak.

FAILURE TO ESTABLISH JOINT INSTITUTIONS
While matters such as 'commonality of purpose' may not appear, in themselves, particularly legalistic or directly relevant to the application of the Dayton accord at first glance, when it comes to consideration of building a common framework for a common Bosnia and Herzegovina, they are, quite simply, essential. It has been this lack of commonality that has frustrated the, real, development of joint institutions, rendering much of what has been created over recent months artificial.
I understand that it is too simple to merely criticise the architects and 'carpenters' that have 'framed' and made Dayton inhabitable. Theirs has been a superhuman effort, so far achieved against considerable odds. However, can it be a 'happy event' when a construct has been shaped such that the possibility of international 'disengagement' appears, ever, increasingly distant and, perhaps, inconceivable? One should question whether a country is really a country when it depends, for its own survival, upon the continued presence of, quite literally, thousands of peacekeepers and requires (as I will outline below) an international representative (appointee?) to play the role of de facto head of state. There are enormous implications here for the South Caucasus: the world's lesser known Balkans. If the 'three' are to avoid the same fate as Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia), I rather fear that very hard decisions will have to be discussed and reached at the first instance.
Speaking in Brussels, on 24 November 1997, after a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, the international community's chief representative in Bosnia, Carlos Westendorp proclaimed that Bosnia was making progress and would not need an 'international protectorate7 to manage its affairs [9]. Yet, on 10 December 1997, at the Bonn Conference to review the implementation of Dayton, Carlos Westendorp, arising most particularly from the failure of the joint institutions to agree on a common currency, citizenship, ambassadors and flag (by no means an exhaustive list) was invested with expanded powers to impose agreements upon the three sides. Further, he would be able to punish individuals who boycotted sessions of joint institutions or who violated the Accord. Westendorp called the change 'a turning point' [10].
The decision at the Bonn Conference was the product of a consistent and protracted failure on the part of the parties to reach even the smallest consensus on some seemingly basic issues.
1996 was hampered by the 'failure' to agree on a joint government and, even, for some considerable time, the failure of the joint presidency to convene. For a period, Croatian representative to the joint presidency, Kresimir Zubak engaged in a process of 'shuttle diplomacy' between his Muslim and Serbian counterparts merely to prepare the groundwork for a joint meeting of the presidency. Following one round, in the September, matters reached an absurd state, when they couldn't even agree on a location. Serbian representative, Momcilo Krajisnik, 'fearing for his safety', refused to have it convene in Sarajevo, offering Serb-nationalist (and Karadzic [11]) stronghold Pale as an alternative. This was unacceptable to Zubak and Muslim representative, Alija Izetbegovic. The Muslims further rejected an alternative proposal for the demarcation line, alleging it would merely underscore the division rather than the unity of the country [12]. After talks finally began, they failed, for a long time, to reach agreement on the composition of the central government. While the Muslims and Croats preferred a government made up of 5 ministers and a premier, the Serbs insisted on a, 'much-weaker', premier and 2 ministers structure [13]. Ultimately, after two and a half months of wrangling, it was agreed, at the end of November, that the Council of Ministers would be headed by co-Chairmen, one Muslim and one Serbian, who would function as co-premiers. It was agreed that a further, single, vice-Chairman would be Croatian. Three ministers were agreed: a minister for foreign affairs (who would be a Croat), a minister for civil affairs and communications (a Serb), and a minister for foreign trade and economic relations (a Muslim). Each minister would have two deputies from the other ethnic communities [14]. A rare success.
1997 proved even more problematic. First, it took until the 8 May for
the joint Cabinet to adopt a budget, 'after months of haggling' [15]. Second, on 29 May, 'agreement' was only reached, among the members of the joint presidency, on a currency when the Croat and Muslim representatives granted the Serbs the right to continue using the Yugoslav dinar on their own territory [16], rather than the earlier agreed (15 April) convertible mark [17]. However, when Bosnia's Central Bank began operations, on the llth August 1997, Serge Robert, the French banker and Bank's head, noted that until the three sides could agree on a design for a common currency, transactions of the convertible mark would be 'electronic only' [18]. Third, the Muslims and the Serbs failed to agree on a 'common' citizenship. The Serbs argued that citizenship in the two 'entities' should have more weight than that in the common state. The Muslims, for their part, insisted that common citizenship should prevail [19]. Fourth, agreement could not be reached on the ethnic allocation of ambassadorships in the joint Bosnian foreign ministry. While the Serbs and Croats complained at the domination, usually in key capitals, of Muslims (although the ambassador in Washington was a Jew), the Serbs remained content to exercise their own independent foreign policy [20]. By the 25 October, deputy to Carlos Westendorp, Jacques Klein was threatening to 'lock up in the National Museum' the leaders of the three communities in order to 'force them to conclude long overdue agreements' [21].
Since the Bonn conference, Bosnia's High Representative, Carlos Westendorp has had to exercise his new powers to impose agreement upon the three sides on 5 occasions. As 'early' as the 16 December 1997, in Sarajevo, Westendorp announced that, upon his instruction, a proposed law on Bosnian citizenship would go into force on 1 January 1998 [22]. Only the previous day (the 15), Serb legislators in the joint Bosnian parliament had refused to accept the proposed law as the text failed to include any reference to the agreement between Pale and Belgrade on dual citizenship [23]. The Croats and Muslims had charged that the agreement was invalid because they had played no part in its formulation, nor had they consented to it. This was the first occasion in which Carlos Westendorp exercised his Bonn powers. He noted that he had taken the measure reluctantly [24]. Following the failure of the joint presidency to agree on the design for the new joint currency (the convertible mark), Carlos Westendorp, announced, on 20 January 1998, that he had decided on a design for them, which contained no nationalist symbols [25]. On 4 February, Westendorp imposed a joint flag following the failure, on 3 February, of the joint parliament to agree on one of three designs [26]. The flag made its public debut at the opening ceremony of the Nagano Winter Olympics on the 7 February. Most recently, on 22 July 1998, Bosnia's High Representative enforced his office's prepared Law on Privatisation (Banks and Enterprises Privatisation Act), it having been rejected by the joint Bosnian parliament earlier that day [27].
On 15 April 1998, speaking in Sarajevo, Bosnia's High Representative stated, 'it is for the institutions of this country, for the authorities of this country to take decisions that are permanent decisions. But for the time being, if they are not capable of doing that, then somebody has to take the responsibility - and if the authorities prefer that I take this responsibility, I do it voluntarily' [28].
The design of a flag, coins and the nature and relationship (of) between citizens and citizenship may appear unimportant, but they are important symbols of statehood. It is tempting to breathe a collective sigh of relief each time the High Representative imposes agreement upon the respective sides, but do such agreements have any value? I think there are very important lessons to be drawn here for the 'three'. On the matter of flags. Why impose a 'joint' (in its absolute sense) flag upon Karabakh or Azerbaijan, South Ossetia/Abkhazia (for example) or Georgia? For the 'three', at least, history and conflict have provided them each with a flag with which they identify. The question should not be one of flags but of portrayal and it is the importance of ensuring the democratic portrayal of such that should be the prime concern. For notes and coinage, while, of course, it may be particularly preferable for these not to bear nationalist 'trademarks', they should avoid being so 'unnationalistic' that they end up bearing the same anodyne characteristics as those of the European Currency Unit (ECU). The introduction of 'parallel' citizenship for Bosnia and Herzegovina was a desperate error.
When one considers the absolute failure of the joint institutions, particularly in this case the joint presidency and government, to agree on a conception for a joint foreign policy, without even mentioning the question of ambassadorships, one cannot help feeling a sense of vindication for my recommendations for the 'three' to be able to open their own separate missions and conduct their own independent foreign policy. For the 'United Republic of Georgia', the State Council would prove the crucial forum for common foreign policy approaches to be built. For Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan bilateral communication (at first) if not (in the longer term) similar bodies.
It is inconceivable, after years of war, to construct, in an instant, not only commonality of purpose but the desire and willingness to act 'bilaterally' on the international stage. The international community has failed to appreciate, in the case of Bosnia, the legacy of their conflict and
their need for space. I am afraid insistence and 'bullying', in the end, just does not work. The Bonn mechanism has merely created a situation where the purpose and principle behind joint institutions has been rendered meaningless. Joint institutions have no function (or future) when they are unable not to reach agreement [29].
In truth, the experience of the mainly Muslim and Croat Federation has been little better. Earlier problems in establishing joint institutions and a joint army [30] have, if only partially, given way to a very real threat to the legitimacy of the Federation itself. This has, particularly, manifested itself through the continued operation of the parallel, and illegal, para-state of Herceg-Bosna in (Croatian) nationalist Herzegovina [31]. Supposedly 'dismantled' on 17 December 1996 [32], the extent of its activity today has, effectively, split the Federation in 'two': at any one time, two budgets, one adopted (legitimately) in Sarajevo, the other in Mostar operate entirely autonomously of each other. Cantonisation of the Federation (there are only two 'mixed' cantons: Middle Bosnia and the Neretva canton) has compartmentalised the entity to such an extent that municipalities with a majority population different to that of the (majority in the) canton in which it is contained, have the right, effectively, to observe statutes adopted in another canton. This is provided in the Agreement on the Establishment of Eight Cantons, signed in Vienna, on 11 May 1994 [33]. The most notable illustration of this is the (Croat) municipality of Usora in the (Muslim-dominated) Zenica-Doboj canton, which, according to the Sarajevo newspaper, Ljiljan (published 1 April 1998), 'is interested only in those approaches that are in place in Herceg-Bosna, or rather in the cantons with a majority Croat population. Thus, in practice, even the smallest localities in the Federation inhabited by Bosnian Croats can be functionally joined' [34]. In fact, some localities have gone even further than this. According to UN spokesman, Aleksandr Ivanko Eivno canton has been 'completely integrated into the system of the Republic of Croatia' [35].

THE PROBLEM OF 'REFUGEES'
Sadly, if there is one thing that war (/conflict) can, usually, guarantee, it is the presence (/preponderance) of refugees/displaced persons. Peace treaties and constitutional settlements may be able to resolve the legal disputes surrounding a particular 'crisis', but they can do little, ‘de facto’ to alleviate the burden of those individuals/families who are, perhaps, war's greatest victims. The Dayton Peace Accord says much, in Annex 7 (Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons), about the legal conditions/entitlements for their return, but, ultimately, experience has shown that the barrel of a shotgun or a hail of stones will always prove to be more determining. The legacy of post-Dayton in respect of the return of refugees/displaced persons does not fill one with confidence for the situation that will probably emerge following any settlement in any of the 'three'.
Article 1(1) of Annex 7, entitled the 'Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons', states:
'All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return of such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been accorded temporary protection by third countries'.

Article 1, paragraph (2), continues:

'The Parties shall ensure that refugees and displaced persons are permitted to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief or political opinion'.

While the international community has, undoubtedly, been able to facilitate the return of a reasonable share of the 'refugees' from Bosnia and Herzegovina, regrettably the overwhelming majority of these have been from districts which changed control (from one 'Entity' to another) following Dayton, or where the town/village, at the time of Dayton, had managed to remain/revert back to the control of the specific ethnic group to which the 'refugee' formed a part [36]. For those 'refugees' whose former homes are now under the control of another ethnic group, the international community has been unsuccessful, in the main, in facilitating a return (and even among those that have tried, a lasting return) [37]. This is ominous for the 'three', because it would appear almost certain, under any model, that, upon reaching a final settlement, administration would be placed under the broad control of an ethnic group other than the one from which the 'refugee' belongs. In truth, one cannot dispute the honesty of an unnamed IFOR spokesman, on 1 February 1996 (very soon after the signing of Dayton), who commented, in the context of the return of Muslim 'refugees' to Srebrenica, 'we can't compel the Serbs to let these people in' [38].
Perhaps the matter at hand goes beyond this: one cannot compel the 'refugees' to return. What is done cannot be undone. Whether we like it or not, each community, both in the former Yugoslavia (by no means only in Bosnia) and in the South Caucasus, has been demonised by its 'antagonist'. Territory maintained, particularly after a settlement, is territory that must be not only maintained, at all costs, but, if necessary, continued to be cleansed. For example, on 4 May 1998, Serb-member of the Bosnian joint presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik, while refusing to recognise the permanent loss of some Bosnian towns and cities once inhabited by Serbs, confirmed that he saw no purpose in making 'great efforts to enable Serbs to return to their homes there, only to make way for Muslims and Croats to enter Serb-controlled areas' [39]. This is the experience of post-Dayton and I fear will be the experience of the 'three'. While the international community, in the form of the UNHCR, may, publicly, be committed to programmes such as that adopted in Brussels, on 17 December 1997, to repatriate 50000 'refugees' to homes in areas now controlled by an ethnic group other than their own [40], I fear that, privately at least, the reality (which, remember, always speaks louder than words) will prevail and, in the words of one UNHCR official accompanying the High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, in Bosnia, on 12 May 1996, as many as two-thirds of Bosnian 'refugees' may never go back to their homes: T'm afraid that at a certain point, if no progress is made, the international community will just throw in the towel' [41].
No one side has been guilty of solidifying ethnic cleansing in Bosnia: all sides have, broadly equally, either directly or more often indirectly been engaged in such. The past two and a half years have provided a catalogue of instances of intimidation, in all its various forms. Muslims who have remained in Republika Srpska, have been expelled from Teslic [42], Banja Luka [43] and Bosanska Gradiska [44] - all too often, to make way for displaced Serbs from other parts of Bosnia. Muslims have been prevented from visiting their homes in Koraj [45] and even in Prijedor, when attempting to convey a gesture of peace [46]. Muslim property has been 'bulldozed' in Kajvaci [47]. Regrettably, the Serbs have suffered much the same, particularly in the west Bosnian town of Drvar, and surrounding villages, at the hands of Croats [48]. Over a long period, an organised campaign of intimidation and destruction has been wielded against anyone wanting to resettle there. What is perhaps most tragic has been the experience within the Federation. Conflict, at the prospect of resettlement, has not merely been an inter-Entity manifestation, it has also been felt within an Entity, between Muslim and Croats. Muslims were prevented from visiting their homes in the Croat-controlled town of Pocitelj [49]. They were expelled from Croat-dominated western Mostar (Croats were expelled from east Mostar by Muslims [50]), to the Muslim-dominated eastern part of the town ('across the bridge') - Serbs included [51]. Two Croats were murdered by a Muslim gang in Travnik [52] and, perhaps most 'tragic' of all, even an agreed (pilot) programme of Muslim return to certain specified towns/villages was hampered, particularly around Stolac, by continued violence and intimidation [53].
It is, to be fair, perhaps too simple merely to catalogue those regions in Bosnia where the process of return has, for whatever reason (but invariably ill), been stymied. Lessons need to be learned from the 'experience' of the past two and a half years. For the sake of the 'three', it should be recognised that the process of return will not be easy. While many 'refugees' have returned (sometimes left and returned again: on more than one occasion) to the Gali District of Abkhazia, thousands still wait (ever frustrated) to be resettled in Abkhazia's remaining districts. While district boundary changes may have facilitated a, partial, return of ethnic Georgians to Znauri District (formerly part of South Ossetia), 'refugees' still remain to be resettled in Tskhinvali. Of course, in Karabakh and surrounding (occupied) rayons (districts), the situation is even more desperate. A probably incalculable number of 'refugees' remain waiting to return to towns such as Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan (none of these within the boundaries of the former NKAO). So what lessons can be learnt? First I believe, following any settlement, the relevant agencies (most likely the UNHCR) should draw up an initial (perhaps for the first nine months) limited programme of resettlement. This process should be particularly to those districts where there is least likely to be resistance to a return. For example, in Abkhazia, Gali District; in Karabakh, those occupied rayons (districts) particularly to the east of the region. Restoration (usually of property), as well as rehabilitation, should be effected on a more 'pinpointed' and systematic level, and it should be completed before the next stage is begun. Sadly, in my opinion, in Bosnia the relevant agencies have been too swift to take an ad hoc approach. The whole country has been seen as an 'arena' for return, to this day programmes are still too unfocused and as a result (at least concerning return to another Entity) relatively little has been achieved. An excellent testament to the UNHCR's relative failure in Bosnia has been their determination in setting vague and, seemingly, uncorrelated/uncorroborated targets. For example, on 8 March 1996, the UNHCR presented a plan for the repatriation of 2 million 'refugees' to Bosnia, in three phases, to be completed by November 1997 [54]. Sadly, nothing more was ever heard of even the three stages.
Other lessons need to be learnt. (Second) The matter of returnees finding their homes occupied by 'refugees' needs to be addressed. For instance, the process of return of Serbs to Sarajevo has been hampered by their former (often) flats having been occupied by Muslim 'refugees', mainly from Srebrenica and Zepa [55]. First, before the returnees are allowed home, temporary, safe, accommodation should be found for the 'displaced' occupants - even if this means temporary settlement in 'alternative' homes of 'refugees'. Too often this scenario has been used by the respective authorities as a means to halt any return. Occupation of a particular flat/house should not be treated as a barrier, as if the occupant has a superior title over the property; it should be regarded, instead, as merely a temporary 'provision', prior to return, that may, itself, be followed by subsequent alternative 'occupations'. If the 'displaced' individual/family is unwilling to return to their original home, alternative, permanent, accommodation nearby (if they prefer) should be found. (Third) Further, unhelpful 'local' legislation that could be seen as a barrier to a return should be removed. On 12 March 1998, for example, the mainly Muslim and Croat federal parliament adopted the Law on Temporary Housing Solutions and Standards, repealing the, war-time, Law on Abandoned Apartments (1991) which had stipulated that the flats of people who fled their homes after April 1991 were confiscated [56]. As Article l(3)(a) of Annex 7 states:
'the Parties shall take immediately the following confidence building measures: (a) the repeal of domestic legislation and administrative practices with discriminatory intent or effect'.
(Fourth) Basic errors should, also, be avoided. Perhaps the classic example of such was the matter of the P-2 option. Local elections scheduled for the 14 September 1996 had to be postponed, for twelve months, on account of widespread (particularly among Bosnian Serbs) registration fraud. The P-2 option allowed 'refugees' to register in any locality where they, merely, claimed they had an intention to live: without the need to prove any connection with that locality. This led to massive fraud with the Bosnian Serb authorities 'forcing' voters to register in strategic towns to ensure the election of Serbian-dominated authorities [57].

THE PERMANENCE OF PEACEKEEPERS
No one would doubt the importance of a peacekeeping force in a country such as Bosnia. I do wonder, however, whether the international community has been, as demonstrated by the former Yugoslavia, 'over-zealous' in its attempts to construct, perhaps out of nothing, peaces which are so fragile that it seems inconceivable that the withdrawal of peacekeepers will ever be facilitated.
On 18 November 1996, NATO ambassadors in Brussels agreed to replace the existing I FOR (Implementation Force) peacekeeping force with its successor SFOR, or Stabilisation Force [58]. Its mandate was approved by the United Nations Security Council, on 12 December 1996 (Resolution 1088 (1996), para. 18), to take over from IFOR on the 20 December, upon the expiry of its mandate, with a force of 30 000 troops (approximately half the number of IFOR at its peak) [59]. Today, its present strength of approximately 35 000 troops is due to be reduced after the September 1998 general elections to a strength of about 20-25000. What is crucial, however, is the fact that the NATO Council, on 18 February 1998, determined that SFOR's new mandate would not have a formal cut-off date, but that, instead, sponsoring countries would review the peacekeepers' role periodically [60].
Perhaps OSCE envoy, Robert Frowick summed up the situation when, on 14 September 1997, he said that the international community might have to maintain a civilian and military presence indefinitely in Bosnia [61]. In truth, the role and numbers of peacekeepers required, in any post-agreement environment, provide an excellent litmus test, I would surmise, as to the sustainability of any peace. The 'three' and Georgia and Azerbaijan should, therefore, be guarded against any 'shotgun' settlement.

THE FAILURE OF LAW-ENFORCEMENT
Whether it is in Bosnia or in any of the 'three', law-enforcement is an essential aspect of any post-settlement environment. Law-enforcement, as events since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord have proved, cannot always be relied upon for its 'democracy', even-handedness and objectivity.
Article 1(1) of Annex 11 (Agreement on International Police Task Force) states:

'As provided in Article III(2)(c) of the Constitution agreed as Annex 4 to the general Framework Agreement, the Parties shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking such other measures as appropriate'.
Perhaps it is disingenuous to pick out individual 'events', but the record of law-enforcement in Bosnia, since Dayton, has not been encouraging. All too frequently when the threat of an incident has arisen, not only have the local law-enforcement bodies failed to maintain law and order, but they have also taken an active role as one of the main protagonists. The most famous example of this occurred on 10 February 1997, when Croat police were filmed firing at a crowd of Muslims who had 'crossed-over' into west Mostar to visit the graves of their dead relatives at a local cemetery. One person was killed and over 30 injured [62]. Three Croat police officers were later suspended for their involvement [63]. Regrettably, Mostar has not proved to be the only incident. In the former (mainly) Serbian town of Drvar (currently under Croat control), in May 1997, local police stood by as 'unidentified persons' torched 25 empty Serbian houses [64]. In three villages near Jajce, on 3 August 1997, (itself previously one of the few towns in Bosnia where refugees had been able to go home to areas governed by authorities of a different nationality) returning Muslim 'refugees' fled their homes after two days of violence in which Croat gangs, assisted by the local police, had been attacked [65]. Earlier, in May/June 1996, Bosnian Serb police proceeded to prevent the operation of a bus-service linking the Serb-held Sarajevo suburb of Lukavica with the rest of the city, by threatening the life of the driver. It was only when the UN threatened to bring in its own buses and drivers that the police relented [66].
The fact that such incidents have been, fortunately, relatively rare is, in the main, a product of the deep ethnic separation that prevails in Bosnia even today. Incidents such as these have been 'kept' to a minimum only because the opportunities (other than at election times) for the various communities to 'meet' each other have, themselves, been minimal. However, despite this, the undoubted value of the involvement of a specialist, trained Force with a clear and workable mandate has been demonstrated, recently, in the disputed town of Brcko. On 13 October
1997. Robert Farrand, the international community's chief administrator in the town, ordered that Muslims and Croats be included in the Serb-run police force. The move provoked an outcry among local Serb officials, who described Farrand's order as 'drastic' and difficult to implement [67]. Representatives of the IPTF were sent to the town and, on 3 January
1998. a 230-strong force consisting of Serbs, Croats and Muslims took up its duties [68]. So far, there have been no reported incidents of any clashes.

BRCKO - THE NEED FOR CORRIDORS
Article 5 of Annex 2 (Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues) states:

'(1) The Parties agree to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line in the Brcko area ...'

Dayton, which provided a (revolutionary, new) framework for so much, left one matter undecided: the future status of the town of Brcko.
Brcko is a strategically important town in northern Bosnia linking the western half of the Republika Srpska, centred around Banja Luka, with its eastern half, centred on Pale. It is of vital importance to the Serbs. Indeed, Serbian co-president, Momcilo Krajisnik, on 8 September 1996, described it as the 'alpha and omega' of the Republika Srpska [69]. Ominously, Republika Srpska President, Biljana Plavsic noted, on 6 January 1998, that the Dayton agreement would be 'dead' if the 'international community' did not award them the town [70]. Sadly, however, the Muslims and the Croats have made its future status a political issue by insisting on its inclusion in the mainly Muslim and Croat Federation (Muslims and Croats constituted the pre-war majority), asserting that any other outcome would be tantamount to justifying ethnic cleansing. Such an outcome, however, would cut Republika Srpska into two.
International arbitration has, undoubtedly, been hampered by an unwillingness on the part of the Bosnian Serbs to play an active role in its facilitation. At first, they were even unwilling to participate in it [71]. Even when the talks did begin, it was not long before the Serbs withdrew (on 1 December 1996), scuppering the whole process for twelve months, by asserting that they would not recognise their outcome [72]. Consequently, the aspiration, as per Article 5(5), that the arbitrators would issue their decision 'no later than one year from the entry into force of this Agreement', was not met. I believe the maintenance of peace in Bosnia is partly necessitated on an 'equitable' outcome to the Brcko problem. I am disappointed by the bad faith that the Muslims and Croats have demonstrated over its future. They have made an issue out of the fate of Brcko, as if it is only there that Muslims and Croats have been displaced. The Republika Srpska, as enshrined in Dayton, is dependent upon the corridor that Brcko provides. Without it, Republika Srpska becomes an enclave of itself. Regrettably, I have experienced the same from the Azerbaijani side in respect of the future status of Lachin. The narrow corridor that is necessary to ensure some semblance of security for the Karabakh Armenians (a vein, if not an artery) has been, all too frequently, spoken of as if Azerbaijani statehood rested upon its 'shoulders' (see Chapter 5). To resolve the status of Brcko is not necessarily to maintain the status quo, any more than in Lachin. Brcko could be granted a special status, perhaps coming under some form of UN protection. Naturally, the same is true for Lachin and, even, Gali District. Accommodations can always be found.
On 15 March 1998, Robert Owens, the chief international administrator in Brcko, announced that he would not decide on the town's future until some point between the Bosnian (presidential) general elections in September and the beginning of 1999 [73]. Bosnian President Chairman, Alija Izetbegovic's response was, at the very least, ungenerous. In an interview with the Sarajevo daily, Dnevni Avaz, published on 18 March, he said a careful reading of chief arbitrator, Robert Owen's decision disclosed 'many important messages'. Of these, he said, the most interesting was that Bosnian Serb Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik should allow the return of Muslims and Croats to Brcko, establish a multinational authority, eliminate war criminals from the town and create a free-trade zone. Fine, nothing remotely wrong with any of that. However, he concluded, sardonically, that considering the fact that Dodik would be unable to comply fully with these 'demands', 'the final outcome will see Brcko in the Croat-Muslim Federation or Brcko as a state district' [74].

EASTERN SLAVONIA AND THE 'SARAJEVO' EFFECT
On 15 January 1998, the chief UN administrator in Eastern Slavonia, William Walker presented a UN flag to Krvoje Sarinic, an aide to Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman in the former front-line village of Borovo Naselje. The ceremony marked the return of Eastern Slavonia to full Croatian control, for the first time since the beginning of the Yugoslav war in 1991 [75].
Transfers of authority are always problematic. The transfer of authority in Eastern Slavonia itself is very much the product of the sustained diplomatic work undertaken by the United Nations since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. However, it is not without its risks. At this very moment, as the transfer 'continues', enormous dangers remain. Local Serb confidence in their 'new' 'Croatian' administrators is very precarious and there is a very real danger of the 'Sarajevo effect' being repeated and a mass exodus of Serbs from the region taking place.
When the remaining districts of Sarajevo came under Bosnian government control in the winter of 1996, thousands of Serbs demonstrated, graphically, their unwillingness to live under Bosnian (read Muslim, in their interpretation) rule by packing their belongings and, before leaving the city (often to strategically important Brcko [76]), torching their homes [77]. By the time Sarajevo became a reunited city (with the transfer of the last district of Grbavica), on 19 March 1996, barely more than 2000, almost entirely elderly, Serbs remained [78]. There is a very real danger that unless an acceptable settlement is reached, at least in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, a similar mass exodus could occur. Indeed, the Karabakhis have already alluded to such a possibility [79]. Sadly for the Abkhaz, they have no other 'homeland' to go to and so, therefore, the possibility of any exodus for them is extremely 'limited'.
The process of 'restoration' in Eastern Slavonia has not occurred overnight. It has been a process that has been planned and delayed since Dayton. For returning (mainly) Croats (approximately 80 000, but some ethnic Hungarians also) there has been the problem of finding one's home (/flat) either occupied by displaced Serbs (usually from Krajina and western Slavonia) or destroyed (for example, about 10000 flats [80]). Such not only has held up the process of return, but it has also threatened (naturally) the process of 'reintegration'.
The process of administrative reintegration has had to proceed, very much, on a stage-by-stage basis. First, on 19 May 1997, Croatia's currency, the Kuna, went into circulation in Eastern Slavonia. This was followed, almost immediately, by the effecting of power-sharing agreements in the local authorities of Osijek-Baranja, Vukovar-Srijem and Beli Manastir [81]. Second, on 23 July 1997, agreement was reached on a transition plan to integrate Serbian staff at the Vukovar hospital into the Croatian health system [82]. This was followed (third), on 7 August 1997, by an agreement to regulate the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia's schools into the Croatian education system by the September [83]. Then (fourth) an agreement, on 30 September 1997, on conditions for the reintegration of Croatia's judicial system in Eastern Slavonia [84] and, finally (fifth), the existing (Serb-dominated) police force coming under Croatian control, on 15 December [85]. Without these, the transfer of 13 January 1998 could not have been effected.
Despite these successes, a UN spokesman noted. I think realistically, on 18 November 1997, that while the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia was 'well under way', it could still take, at least 10 years for the region's various nationalities 'to learn to live together again' [86]. As I have said earlier, if there is to be lasting peace in the South Caucasus, a considerable degree of patience will be required. This will have to be reflected in both the management of administrative transfer (where necessary) or change and, of course, in the return of 'refugees'. The fragility of such societies, as Bosnia (and much of the former Yugoslavia) has demonstrated, proves that the prospects for a lasting peace cannot accommodate many mistakes or much negligence. Progressive and systematic programmes of restoration and rehabilitation will have to be
effected. Thus, in Nagorno-Karabakh, re-settlement of displaced Azeris to such towns as Khodjaly should proceed before the more delicate matter of their return to Shusha. Sadly, a holistic approach will not succeed.

NOTES
[I] (Hamburg. Stern, in German, 8 Dec. 1994, pp. 170-172) (FBIS-WEU-94-238).
[2] (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 Dec. 1997).
[3] (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Dec. 1997).
[4] (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 Feb. 1998).
[5] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 19 June 1996).
[6] The Croatian newspaper (from Split). Feral Tribune, on 13 October 1997. published what it called new evidence of the plan between the two (RFE/RL Newsline, 15 Oct. 1997).
[7] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 6 Sept. 1996).
[8] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 8 Sept. 1996). 
[9] (RFE/RL Newsline. 25 Nov. 1997).
[10] (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 Dec. 1997).
[11] Radovan Karadzic was leader of the Bosnian Serbs during the 1991-95 war. Since 24 July 1995 he has been indicted to appear before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, in The Hague.
[12] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace. 19 Sept. 1996).
[13] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace. 12 Nov. 1996).
[14] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace. 30 Nov. 1996).
[15] (RFE/RL Newsline, 9 May 1997).
[16] (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 May 1997).
[17] It had been agreed, on 15 April 1997, that the new common Bosnian currency would be called the convertible mark and would be pegged to the Deutschmark on a one-to-one basis. US and Bosnian officials announced in Sarajevo, that day, that the currency would be 'supported' by hard currency reserves. Bank notes printed in the Croatian-Muslim Federation and in the Republika Srpska would have different designs. However, all bank notes would be devoid of nationalist symbols and be valid throughout Bosnia. (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 April 1997).
[18] (RFE/RL "Newsline, 12 Aug. 1997) It was not until 22 June 1998 that the convertible mark went into circulation throughout Bosnia. (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 June 1998).
[19] (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 August 1997).
[20] (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 August 1997).
[21] (RFE/RL Newsline, 27 Oct. 1997).
[22] (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 Dec. 1997).
[23] (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 Dec. 1997) Granting all Bosnian citizens the right to hold Yugoslav citizenship: surely an aspiration, only, of Bosnian Serbs. The agreement was signed by Yugoslav Foreign Minister. Milan Milutinovic and Bosnian Serb member of the joint presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik. in Belgrade, on 13 December 1997. (RFE/RL Newsline, 15 Dec. 1997).
[24] (RFE/RL Newsline. 17 Dec. 1997).
[25] (RFE/RL Newsline. 21 Jan. 1998).
[26] The flag did not meet with the approval of a number of local and foreign critics, claiming that the design (blue, yellow and white) looked more like a television test pattern than a flag. (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 Feb. 1998).
[27] (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 July 1998).
[28] Carlos Westendorp dismissed Drago Tokmakcija, the deputy mayor of Croat-controlled Drvar, on 17 April 1998. following the murder (on the 16) of a Bosnian Serb couple (the town had a Serbian majority before the war). The two had recently returned to the town within the framework of a programme sponsored by the international community. This dismissal was followed, on 21 April, with the firing of Barisa Letica, the local interior minister and the town's police chief, Ivan Jurisic. These dismissals were justified on the basis that the individuals concerned had failed to provide a safe environment for returnees. Speaking on 17 April, Westendorp said: 'hardliners ... will not stop the return process and we will not tolerate any obstructions or violence'. (RFE/RL Newslines 17 20 and April 1998).
[29] Martin Raguz, a senior aide to the Croatian member of the joint presidency, Kresimir Zubak, has blamed the political composition of the country for the failure of Bosnia's joint institutions. Speaking on 23 April 1998, Raguz claimed that the composition of Bosnia as prescribed by the Dayton agreement, 'one country, two entities, three nationalities', blocked 'every function of the government'. To 'rectify' this he recommended that the Muslim-Croat Federation be divided into (separate) Muslim and Croat territories that would be equal in status to the Republika Srpska. (RFE/RL Newsline, 24 April 1998).
[30] See, for example: (OMRI Daily Digest, 27 Jan. 1997).
[31] Herceg-Bosna had been established, on 24 August 1993. following the failure of the Muslims to support the Owen/Stoltenberg 'Constitutional Agreement of the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina'. The Serbs and Croats had accepted the plan. In consequence, the Croats withdrew all their representatives from the institutions of the still recognised Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and proclaimed their own republic of Herceg-Bosna.
[32] Upon the (mainly Muslim) Bosnian republic government, in Sarajevo, transferring its functions to the federation: also on the 17. (OMRI Daily Digest, 20 Dec. 1996).
[33] The municipalities the majority population of which is not the majority population of the canton as a whole will have a special status in accordance with the constitution of the Federation'. Quoted in: (Zagreb, Vjesnik, in Serbo-Croat 18 April 1998, p. 3)(FBIS-EEU-98-116, 28 April 1998).
[34] (Sarajevo, Ljiljan, in Serbo-Croat, 1-8 April 1998, p. 19) (FBIS-EEU-98-119, 1 May 1998).
[35] (Belgrade, Tanjug Domestic Service, in Serbo-Croat, 0923 gmt 28 April 1998) (FBIS-EEU-98-118, 30 April 1998).
[36] To facilitate this return, the European Commission announced, simultaneously, that it had approved a $34 m aid package to provide housing and jobs for returning 'refugees'. Further, in Belgrade, UNHCR officials announced, on 17 December, that Mrkonjic Grad was the first 'open city' to be designated for refugee return on Bosnian Serb territory. (RFE/RL Newsline, 18 Dec. 1997).
[37] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported on 15 August 1998, citing UNHCR figures, that only 15,045 Bosnian 'refugees' had returned to regions where they constituted an 'ethnic minority'. (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 August 1998).
[38] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 1 Feb. 1996).
[39] (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 May 1998) Ironically, on 16 June 1998, the Republika Srpska parliament elected a Muslim, Safet Bico, deputy speaker. (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 June 1998).
[40] (RFE/RL Newsline, 18 Dec. 1997).
[41] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 12 May 1996).
[42] Reuters reported, on 29 May 1996, that 100 Muslims had been expelled from Teslic in what, at that time, UNHCR spokesman, Kris Jankovski described as the 'worst wave of attacks on Muslims since the Dayton agreement was signed'. (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 29 May 1996) The expulsions were, ostensibly, to 'make room' for Serbian refugees. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 26 May 1996).
[43] 30 Muslims were evicted from their homes in Banja Luka, on 22-23 June 1996. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 24 June 1996).
[44] 30 Muslims driven from their homes in the Bosanska Gradiska area during the autumn of 1996. A Human Rights Watch report noted that Serbian paramilitaries were involved in the expulsions which the local authorities did nothing to stop. Their property was taken by Serbs whose former homes, in Donji Vakuf. are now under Federation control. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 3 Dec. 1996).
[45] An 'anti-Muslim orgy', in the words of Kris Jankovski, occurs at Koraj. Some 100 Bosnian Serbs prevent Muslims and UN representatives from visiting the town. They chant anti-Muslim insults and, in cars, chase UN vehicles. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace. 9 June 1996).
[46] Some 44 Muslim and Croat 'refugees' attempting to enter Bosnian Serb territory near Prijedor are blocked by 250 Serbian civilians armed with sticks and stones. Ironically, the refugees had planned to plant a 'peace tree' at the site of a former concentration camp. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace. 26 May 1996).
[47] 12 houses are destroyed, in November 1996. in the village of Kajvaci in northeastern Bosnia. The former Muslim village in Republika Srpska is in an area where Muslim 'refugees' have been attempting to go home. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 20 Nov. 1996).
[48] Croat acts to prevent the Serbs from returning to Drvar have continued over a long period. On 13 October 1996, Bosnian Croats prevent 350 Bosnian Serbs from visiting their homes and force them to return to Banja Luka. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 13 Oct. 1996) Despite an earlier agreement, by the local Croat authorities, Serb homes were systematically burnt in Drvar, in early May 1997. (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 May 1997) On 7 October 1997. Canadian troops of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) were deployed in the village of Martin Brod, near Drvar, after the return of 27 Serbs, who had fled at the end of the Bosnian war. Croat workmen, claiming to have received orders to repair the homes of the Serbs, forced their way in and proceeded to throw out their belongings, sending the returnees fleeing to a single building in the village. (RFE/RL Newsline, 9 Oct. 1997) A UN police spokesman announces in Sarajevo, on 18 February 1998, that 12 homes belonging to Serbs have been burned down that month in Drvar. (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 Feb. 1998) Serbs from Drvar had been among a very few voices calling, in Republika Srpska, for the return of all 'refugees' to their homes.
[49] A 'Croatian mob' throws stones at buses carrying some 200 Muslim 'refugees' trying to visit their former homes in Pocitelj. south of Mostar. Croatian police look on. (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 22 June 1996). [50] See, for example: (OMRI Daily Digest, 18 Feb. 1997).
[51] The latest (on 9 December 1996) in more than 70 evictions of Muslims and Serbs from the Croat-held western part of Mostar is carried out only hours after NATO warned Bosnian Croat army units to stop such evictions. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 9 Dec. 1996).
[52] Despite the 'pledge' by the, Muslim, Travnik authorities that the town was ready to receive 18000 returning Croats and the earlier pilot programme (which included the town), 2 Croat returnees are murdered, on 30 August 1997. An obviously shocked Alija Izetbegovic states, on the 31. that any crime against returning "refugees' is a crime against the Dayton peace agreement. (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 11 May 1996) and (RFE/RL Newsline, 1 Sept. 1997).
[53] On 17 August 1997, local Croats stone buses carrying Muslims back to their prewar homes. (RFE/RL Newsline, 18 August 1997) After continued attacks on Muslim returnees and despite the repeated warnings of Harms Schumacher. a deputy to Carlos Westendorp, calling upon the local Mayor of Stolac. Pero Raguz to attend to the matter, he is sacked, on 5 March 1998. (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 Feb. 1998) and (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 Mar. 1998).
[54] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 8 March 1996).
[55] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 20 May 1996).
[56] (RFE/RL Newsline, 13 March 1998).
[57] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace. 14 Dec. 1996).
[58] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 18 Nov. 1996).
[59] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 12 Dec.).
[60] (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 Feb. 1998).
[61] (RFE/RL Newsline. 15 Sept. 1997).
[62] (OMRI Daily Digest, 11 Feb. 1997).
[63] West Mostar Police Chief, Marko Radic was also suspended for obstructing the investigation. (OMRI Daily Digest, 6 March 1997).
[64] (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 May 1997).
[65] (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 August 1997).
[66] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace. 23 May 1996) and (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 5 June 1996).
[67] (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 Oct. 1997).
[68] (RFE/RL Newsline, 6 Jan. 1998).
[69] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 8 Sept. 1996).
[70] (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 Jan. 1998) Bosnian Serb leaders have warned that the war could re-ignite if the town is awarded to the Muslim-Croat Federation, see: (RFE/ RL Newsline, 10 Jan. 1997).
[71] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 22 May 1996).
[72] (OMRI, Pursuing Balkan Peace, 1 Dec. 1996).
[73] (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 March 1998).
He had previously, on 14 February 1997, put off the decision to this date (15 March 1998). His interim solution, inter alia guaranteeing freedom of movement and the right of "refugees' to return home, was but the confirmation of provisions already universalised in Dayton. (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 Feb. 1997) Upon Owen's recommendation, an international supervisor (US diplomat, Robert W. Farrand) was appointed to ensure that the local Serb authorities did not obstruct the return. (RFE/RL Newsline, 10 March 1997).
[74] (RFE/RL Newsline, 18 March 1998).
[75] (RFE/RL Newsline. 16 Jan. 1998).
[76] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 20 Feb. 1996).
[77] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 8 March 1996).
[78] (OMRI. Pursuing Balkan Peace, 19 March 1996).
[79] Consider the comment of Aleksan Harutyunyan, Karabakh representative to Armenia, in January 1996. He told Noyan Tapan that the 'foisting' by the international community of any resolution reminiscent of that adopted in Bosnia would be not only impossible but dangerous: 'The best lessons that Karabakh may learn from the Bosnian case is the situation in Sarajevo, where 100000 Serbs burnt their houses and left the city despite multiple guarantees from the international community. What guarantees will the international community be able to ensure for Karabakh people, if Karabakh will be made subordinate to Azerbaijan?' (Yerevan. Noyan Tapan. in English. 1730 gmt. 23 Jan. 1996) (FBIS-SOV-96-017. 29 Jan. 1996).
[80] (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 July 1997).
[81] For example, representatives of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) and the Independent Democratic Serbian Party agreed that the mayor of Vukovar would be a Croat and the council president a Serb. Further, in Beli Manastir, the mayor would be a Serb and the president of the council a Croat. (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 May 1997) and (RFE/RL Newsline. 29 May 1997).
[82] (RFE/RL Newsline, 24 July 1997).
[83] This process has not been without its difficulties. On 10 November 1997. Serbian parents prevented their children from attending 18 out of the 22 primary and secondary schools in Eastern Slavonia to protest at the introduction of Croatian textbooks, as part of the gradual reintegration of the region. Croatian Education Minister, Liljana Vokic met with Serb representatives and agreed that teachers could use the Cyrillic alphabet and the Serb variant of Serbo-Croat in their teaching. She also pledged to respect a previously agreed five-year moratorium on the teaching of the history of the former Yugoslavia since 1990. (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 Nov. 1997).
[84] The agreement was signed by UN Transitional Administrator (in Eastern Slavonia, UNTAES), William Walker and Croatian Justice Minister, Miroslav Separovic. (RFE/RL Newsline. 1 Oct. 1997).
[85] (RFE/RL Newsline. 16 Dec. 1997).
[86] (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 Nov. 1997).

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