The First World War

• The Armenians during the War

• The relocation decision and its implementation

• The partition of the Ottoman Empire

• The elimination of the eastern front

• Armistice and hunting of offenders

• The Treaty of Sevres

The First World War

1. The Armenians during the war

Nearly three-quarters of a century has passed since 1914, and the question whether the Ottoman Empire could have avoided entering the war is still being discussed today. As no one at that time knew with certainty why the Empire entered the war, and no discussion took place when the decision was made, it is not clear why it is being discussed today. The subject is outside our topic of discussion, and we shall not dwell on it. We only wish to mention a point which most people are still unaware of, owing to the erroneous explanations made intentionally by those who were largely responsible for entering the war, to defend themselves.

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire was pursuing an agreement with any one of the Triple Entente or the Triple Alliance. There were very few prominent members of the government who supported Germany’s groups, that is the Triple Alliance. In fact, Enver Pasha was probably the only one. Jemal Pasha, Talat Pasha and Javit Bey were supporters of the Triple Entente. They made many unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement with France or England. Then they turned to Germany. Contrary to what is generally known, Turkey made the request to Germany, rather than Germany to Turkey. At that time, Germany was convinced that Turkey would only be an impediment to its allies.

On 23 July, Enver Pasha courteously asked the German Ambassador whether an agreement could be reached with Germany. The First World War was about to begin. We do not find it necessary to include it here, but the telegram sent by Wangenheim to Berlin concerning this meeting is worth reading (telegram dated 22 July 1914).

1 Upon instructions given by the Kaiser himself, in the belief that even one more rifle would be useful in the coming war, it was decided to make an alliance with Turkey, and this agreement was signed on 2 August. The First World War had already begun on the 1st. This agreement was not the decisive reason why the Ottoman Empire entered the war, for the agreement was drafted as a defensive alliance against Russia. The war began with Germany declaring war on Russia, so Turkey was not under any obligation to enter the war.

In spite of this, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on 31 October. In order to explain the attitude of the Armenians during this period, we must refer to an incident which occurred in 1909. After the event of 31 March and the Adana rebellion, an agreement was made between the Party of Union and Progress and the Istanbul delegation of the Dashnak Committee. We quote this agreement, which was published on 3 September 1909 in the Tanin newspaper, from Esat Uras’ book.

In order to ensure the independence of the country, to protect till the end its integrity and policy, to eradicate the evil thoughts appearing in various individuals, and to establish good relations between Ottoman subjects, total agreement has been reached between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Armenian Dashnaksutyun Committee on the following points.

1. The two said committees shall work without sparing any sacrifices, and to the utmost of their ability, to strengthen the constitutional government and to maintain the cultural education of the people on solid principles.

2. They shall act in a determined and specific direction within the limits of legal conditions, against the possibility of any reactionary movements.

3. Because the only aim of the activities of the two committees is to spare the sacred Ottoman country from any partition and separation, attempts will be made to eradicate the rumors that Armenians are leaning towards independence, rumors present in public opinion and which have remained from the period of despotism.

4. Both committees agree on (extending the authority of the provinces) necessary for the country’s progress and development.

5. The Committee of Union and Progress and the Dashnaksutyun Committee consider the incident of 31 March and the Adana disaster as a warning, and have decided to work hand in hand for the implementation of the above principles. We have been unable to find a document to the effect that the Dashnak Central Committee approved this agreement made by the delegation responsible for Istanbul. It is known that the Dashnak Committee held a congress at Erzurum in June 1914. Because, at that time, an agreement had been reached with Russia concerning the eastern provinces, and the inspector-generals had even been designated, Erzurum had become a place where the Dashnaks could speak freely on any topic. Esat Uras reports the decision which was taken during this Congress:

“The Dashnaksutyun Congress, bearing in mind the contradictory economic, social, and administrative policy implemented for a long time by the Government of Union and Progress in regard to the Christian communities, and especially to the Armenians, has decided to remain in opposition to the Government of Union and Progress, to criticize its political program, and to engage in a fierce struggle against it and its organization”.

H. Bayur has included this decision in his book, quoting from Esat Uras. However, Esat Uras gives no reference for this decision, and we have not found it in any other source. On the other hand, it is reported in all the sources that representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress took part in this congress. Esat Uras denies this, asserting that there is no document to support it, and that this was a claim made by the Dashnaks in a book published in 1920 in Istanbul. We do not think that it was entirely impossible for the representatives of the Party of Union and Progress to have taken part in this Congress. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to establish what they suggested, if they did take part.

Clair Price wrote as follows on this subject:

“The Armenian bloc in the Parliament at Constantinople was holding its 1914 congress at Erzurum in the eastern provinces when the Enver Government entered the war. Government emissaries visited them there and laid before them the Pan-Turanian project whose immediate object was to throw Russia back. A partition of Russian Trans-Caucasia was proposed, the conquered territory to be divided between Armenians, Georgians and Tartars each to be accorded autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty. The Armenian bloc replied that if war proved necessary they would do their duty as Ottoman subjects but they advised the Government to remain neutral”.

Toynbee’s memorandum, which we referred to earlier, says:

“... In the fall of 1914 Turks came to the Armenians’ national congress in Erzurum, and offered them an autonomous Armenia (on Turkey’s and Russia s lands if they would actively help Turkey during the war”. The Armenians refused this offer. Papazian states:

“When the world war broke out in Europe, the Turks began feverish preparations for joining hands with the Germans. In August 1914 the young Turks asked the Dashnag Convention, then in session in Erzurum, to carry out their old agreement of 1907, and start an uprising among the Armenians of the Caucasus against the Russian government. The Dashnaksutun refused to do this, and gave assurance that in the event of war between Russia and Turkey, they would support Turkey as loyal citizens. On the other hand, they could not be held responsible for the Russian Armenians... The fact remains, however, that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnaksutun did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war. The Dashnaksutun in the Caucasus had the upper hand. They were swayed in their actions by the interests of the Russian government, and disregarded, entirely, the political dangers that the war had created for the Armenians in Turkey. Prudence was thrown to the winds; even the decision of their own convention of Erzerum was forgotten, and a call was sent for Armenian volunteers to fight the Turks on the Caucasian front.

Kachaznuni wrote:

“In the beginning of fall 1914, when Turkey had not yet entered the war, but was preparing to, Armenian volunteer groups began to be organized with greatzeal and pomp in Trans-Caucasia. In spite of the decision taken a few weeks before at the General Committee in Erzurum, the Dashnaksutun actively helped the organization of the aforementioned groups, and especially arming them, against Turkey... There is no point in asking today whether our volunteers should have been in the foreground. Historical events have logic of their own. In the fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer groups were formed and fought against the Turks. The opposite could not have happened, because for approximately twenty years the Armenian community was fed a certain and inevitable psychology. This state of mind had to manifest itself, and it happened”.

Kachaznuni was one of the prominent leaders of the Dashnak Party, and had been Prime Minister of the independent Armenian Republic. Consequently the information he gives is not based on hearsay, but carried his personal responsibility. His book, in fact, is his speech which was read in 1923 at the Party Council, and was not approved because it criticized the Party. He later published this speech, together with a letter written to a friend of his, named N.N. Towards the conclusion of the letter we read the following sentences:

“You say ‘As we were unable to prevent the communication being read, I hope that it is forgotten as soon as possible’. I find it dangerous and useless that this subject too, causes arguments...  For me the publication of this communication was a moral obligation on behalf of the Armenian cause. If I had not written, I would have committed a great sin. Because the General Council was unable to meet, I submitted my communication to the Advisory Council and I was told to "shut up". (This may be the reason why it is not possible to find this book in the world libraries.)

These sources we have quoted indicate the possibility that representatives of the Committee of Union and Progress went to the Erzurum congress. However, the Armenians may also have discussed among themselves the kind of action to be taken during the war. Various dates are given as to when the congress was held. It seems logical that the date should be August or later. It also appears that it was decided during the congress that in the event of a Russo-Ottoman War, the Armenians in Turkey would not oppose the Government. But we are also informed by authorized Armenians that this decision was not followed.

It is apparent that the volunteers mentioned in all these sources were Armenians of Turkey. It is natural that the Armenians of the Caucasus were recruited and took part in the war, as they were Russian subjects. When the Ottoman Government decreed mobilization, the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin sent a letter to Vorontsov-Dachkov, the Governor-General of the Caucasus, on 5 August 1914, and received a reply on 2 September. We quote a passage from the Catholicos’ letter:

“Based on the information I have received from the Istanbul Patriachate and the Armenian Assembly, I am convinced that any reform to be implemented by the Government which today rules Turkey, for the improvement of the condition of the Armenians, will not survive long, as long as it is not based on particular and solid engagements... I request from Your Highness that you present to His Majesty the Emperor, the devotion of his faithful subjects on my behalf and on behalf of my congregation in Russia, the sincere loyalty and attachment of t he Armenians of Turkey, and at the same time that you defend to the Czar the hopes of the Armenians of Turkey…”.

This passage clearly indicates cooperation between the Istanbul Patriarchate and Etchmiadzin, and that the Catholicos could speak on behalf of the Armenians of Turkey. We shall now quote a few statements from Vorontsov-Dachkov’s reply:

“I wish that the actions of the Armenians here, as well as those on the other side of the border, be now in accordance with my instructions. I request that you use your authority over your congregation, and ensure that our Armenians and those who reside in the border regions implement the duties and services which I will ask them to carry out in the future, in the event of a Russo-Turkish war, as in the situation of Turkey today.

The text of these letters was included in Gr. Tchalkouchian’s work entitled The Red Book which was published in Armenian in Paris in 1919. The second letter, in particular, indicates clearly the kind of instructions the Armenians of Turkey would be given in the event of a war. The quotation we have given from various sources show that they did indeed receive these instructions when the day arrived. There is another document which few people remember today. When the Ottoman Empire had not yet entered the war, but as soon as it declared mobilization, Turkish Armenians living in Marseilles held a large meeting on 5 August 1914, and drew up a declaration which was published in various newspapers. We quote below a few passages from this declaration which was published over Aram Turabian’s signature.

The Russian Armenians, in the ranks of the Muscovite army, will do their duty, to revenge the insult made on our brothers’ corpses; as for us, the Armenians under the domination of Turkey, no Armenian rifle must be turned towards the friends and allies of France, our second land.

Turkey is mobilizing, she calls us on active service, without telling us against whom. Against Russia? Surely not! We shall not go and fight against our own brothers of Caucasus, against the Balkan States, for which we have nothing but sympathy, never! Gentlemen, you came to the wrong address; let us not forget the past, without being certain of the future yet. Armenians, Turkey calls you to fight without telling you against whom: join as volunteers the ranks of the French Army and of her allies, to help destroy the army of Wilhelm II, whose railway is built on the corpses of our 300,000 brothers…

In this book, an alphabetical list of 400 individuals who enlisted as volunteers, complying with this summons, is included. In fact, we find in almost every source that the Armenians cooperated with the Russians when war broke out. Let us give a few examples. Rafael de Nogales writes:

“After hostilities had actually commenced, the Deputy to the Assembly for Erzurum, Garo Pasdermichan, passed over with almost all the Armenian troops and officers of the Third Army to the Russians; to return with them soon after, burning hamlets and mercilessly putting to t he knife all of the peaceful Muslim villagers that fell into their hands. These bloody excesses had as their necessary corollary the immediate disarmament by the Ottoman authorities of the gendarmes and other Armenian soldiers who still remained in the army (probably because they had been unable to escape) and the utilization of their labor in the construction of highways and in carrying provisions back and forth across the mountains. The altogether unjustifiable desertion of the Armenian troops, united to the outrages they committed afterwards, on their return, in the sectors of Bash -Kaleh, Serail, and Bayacet, did not fail to alarm the Turks and rouse their fear lest the rest of the Armenian population in the frontier provinces of Van and Erzurum revolt likewise, and attack them with the sword. This indeed is precisely what happened a few weeks after my coming, when the Armenians of the vilayet of Van rose en masse against our expeditionary army in Persia; thus giving rise to bloody and terrible occurrences which, under the circumstances, might have been foreseen”.

Let us now turn to Philips Price: ‘When war broke out the Armenians of these regions (the Eastern provinces) made secret contact with the Russian authorities in the Caucasus, and an underground network was created which enabled recruits to be gotten from these Turkish provinces for the Russian Army.

Philippe de Zara, who is not well known, writes:

“After having accomplished the minimum of their duty as Ottoman citizens, the Armenians began to encourage the activities of the enemy. Their ambiguous attitude had certainly little to do with loyalty. But which Westerner would have the right to accuse them, when a tradition taught by Europe made the insubordination of the Sultan’s Christian subjects the most sacred of obligations? An insubordination which was often sanctioned by granting autonomy, if not sovereignty. Nevertheless, how can anyone deny that, in the opinion of the Turks, according to the law of all the states, the conduct of the Armenians, facilitating during the war the task of the adversary, can be recognized as anything but a crime of high treason? ... The committees, divided among themselves for internal issues, were often in agreement to facilitate the advance of Russian armies: they were attempting to obstruct the retreat of Turkish troops, to stop the convoys of provisions, to form bands of gunmen.

Mass desertions took place in the Eastern provinces: Armenians thus formed many troops officered by Russian officers. Here and there local revolts occurred. The leaders were setting the examples: two Armenian deputies fled to Russia. A literature of hatred was recalled: ‘Let the Turkish mothers cry... Let’s make the Turk taste a little grief’. The culpability of Armenians leaves no doubt”.

Clair Price, too, has focused on the subject of cooperation with Russia:

“Under the 1908 Constitution, the Enver Government had a right to mobilize Armenians of military age as well as Turks, but armed opposition broke out at once, notably at Zeitun... Along the eastern frontier, Armenians began deserting to the Russian Armies and the Enver Government, distrusting the loyalty of those who remained, removed them from the combatant force and formed them into labor gangs...

In April, Lord Bryce and the ‘Friends of Armenia’ in London appealed for funds to equip these volunteers, and Russia also was presumably not uninterested in them... These volunteer bands finally captured Van, one of the eastern provincial capitals, late in April and, having massacred the Turkish population, they surrendered what remained of the city to the Russian Armies in June. The news from Van affected the Turks precisely as the news from Smyrna affected them when the Greeks landed there in May,1919.

The rumor immediately ran through Asia Minor that the Armenians had risen. By this time, the military situation had turned sharply against the Enver Government. The Russian victory at Sarykamish was developing and streams of Turkish refugees were pouring westward into central Asia Minor. The British had launched their Dardanelles campaign at the very gates of Constantinople, and Bulgaria had not yet come in. It does not seem reasonable to assume that this moment, of all moments, would have been chosen by the Enver Government to take widespread measures against its Armenians unless it was believed that such measures were immediately necessary. Measures were taken”.

Felix Valyi has written:

“In April the Armenian revolutionaries seized the town of Van, established an Armenian ‘General Staff’ there under the command of Aram and Vardan, which delivered up the town to the Russian troops on the 6th of May, after having ‘freed’ the district of Van from Mohammedans...

Amongst the most notorious of the Armenian chiefs was Karakin Pastermadjian (nicknamed ‘Garo’), a former member of the Turkish Parliament, who put himself at the head of the Armenian volunteers at the time of the opening of hostilities between Turkey and Russia, and the Turks accuse him of having set fire to all the Muslim villages he found on his way and of massacring their inhabitants. It is known that the attempts made by Turkey to win the support of the ‘Dashnaksutun’ party against Russia at the beginning of the War were repulsed in the month of September, 1914, by the Armenian Congress at Erzurum, which declared itself ‘neutral’. Nevertheless the thousands of Russian bombs and muskets which were found in the hands of its members prove what this neutrality meant. And indeed the Turks attribute the Russian invasion of the north of Asia Minor to the behavior of the Armenian bands whose attitude made the defense of the country exceedingly difficult”.

It must not be assumed that these authors we have quoted are friendly to the Turks and hostile to the Armenians. Rather, most of them are Armenian sympathizers. The passages we have quoted from them indicate the grounds for the relocation decision. Actually, if we had continued quoting, we would have arrived at passages referring to this decision. However, it was necessary, in our opinion, to examine first the developments within the borders of the Ottoman Empire through concrete incidents rather than by making general statements. We shall do this now, based on the Ottoman documents.

The Ottoman Government decreed mobilization on 3 August. The Armenians of Zeitun did not want to be under the Ottoman flag, and wished to protect their region by forming a volunteer regiment of Zeitun led by their own officers. As their request was naturally denied, they rebelled on 30 August.l5 As a result of the pursuit, approximately sixty rebels were caught with their weapons, and although tranquility was established for a while, in December the Zeitunites began to attack civil servants and gendarmes.

In February 1915, it was necessary to send soldiers and ammunition to Zeitun from Marash. (It must not be forgotten that the country was at war.) The Armenians who attacked the troops guarding the ammunition killed six gendarmes, wounded two, and then escaped, and in the meantime cut communication links with Marash by breaking the telegraph lines. Almost all of those who had been enlisted from the area deserted.

The rebellion of Halep (Aleppo)

Zeitunites continued until the implementation of the relocation decision. The brigands who had not been caught left the region when there was no place left to hide, and order was restored. In the pursuits which took place during the rebellion, 713 rifles, 21 shotguns, and 12 “mauser” guns were found, and 61 brigands, including their priests who had led them, were arrested. We want to mention here a report sent by the American Consulate in Aleppo to its Ministry concerning these incidents which occurred in Zeitun during the war. The Consul included in his report a letter written by a Protestant priest, John E. Merill, an American missionary of the region. We quote a few passages from this letter:

“Before a confrontation occurred in Zeitun, a Committee formed by Herr Blank, a Protestant missionary, and two Gregorians, went to Zeitun with the approval of the Government to obtain, if possible, a friendly agreement. As they met the inhabitants of Zeitun, they were told by the Zeitunites that they had attempted everything in order to persuade the outlaws to surrender, but that they were unable to persuade them. Naturally the Committee was not successful. The outlaws number around thirty, and hide in the hills between Zeitun and Marash. They have water, food, and ammunition, and the only road that leads to their hide -out is a path large enough for one person… later the Zeitunites were persuaded to hand over these outlaws, and in return they have stipulated that their villages be not harmed... But later some of the villagers were transferred to Marash... The inhabitants of Zeitun have been duped by the Government. . To force the educated and competent Christian community of the Marash region to migrate is a direct blow to the interests of the American missionaries. The results of more than 50 years’ work and thousands of dollars are being threatened”.

This report is quite amazing. Missionaries are attempting to reach an agreement with outlaws in a country at war (these are deserters), and they consider the deportation to Marash of certain families who feed and hide them a blow to the missionaries’ interests. If these outlaws are killed in an armed confrontation, this is considered a massacre.

One of the main reasons for the misfortunes of the Armenians is this missionary mentality, and the uproar made by those who believe their claims. A report sent on 30 August 1914 by the Eleshkirt Border Battalion Command to the 3rd Army Command stated that the Russians searching houses in the villages near the border gave the arms they found to the Armenians, and that the Armenians of the region were engaged in propaganda to escape to Russia.

A message sent by the Supreme Military Command to the 3rd Army Command on 6 Septemberls stated that information had been received to the effect that the Armenians of Van were in contact with the Russians. On 13 September 1914, the Governor of Erzurum sent a memorandum to the 3^rd Army Command, stating that he had been informed that the Russians were attempting to bring the Armenians to their side and were preparing to engineer a rebellion in the eastern Anatolian provinces whenever they wanted; that an individual named Aramayis, who had been exiled to Siberia after having been sentenced to one hundred and one years, had been freed by the Russians, and that he was now organizing bands in Kars; that a band had arrived at the village of Pasinler and was engaged in propaganda, telling the villagers to rebel when the Ottomans entered the war, and to desert if they were enlisted.

On 18 September 1914, the Governor of Bitlis, Mustafa Bey, sent a similar message to the 3rd Army Commander, and stated: ‘According to the recent decisions and suggestions of prominent Armenians, if there is a war, the Armenian soldiers in the Army will desert with their arms to the enemy. If the Ottoman Army advances, they will remain calm, if it retreats, bands will be formed to prevent passage to and from the front’.

A message dated 25 September sent by the Supreme Military Command to the 3^rd Army Command, stated that ‘The Armenian Dashnaksutun and the Hunchak Committees in the Caucasus have agreed with Russia to incite the Armenians of Turkey to revolt in the event of a war’.

The Governor of Trabzon, Jemal Azmi Bey, in a message he sent to the Ministry of the Interior on 8 October 1914, stated:

“A band of 800 people comprising the Ottoman and Russian Armenians in Russia, has been armed by the Russians, and sent to the vicinity of Artvin. We have been informed that they will spread out between Artvin and Ardanuch, that their number will be increased to 7,000, and that they will be used to disturb security within the Ottoman country”.

On 11 October 1914, the 3^rd Army Commander sent the following message to the Supreme Military Command:

“It has been established that the Russians are forming bands in the Caucasus by arming Russian and Ottoman Armenians and Greeks that they will send them here and enlarge the bands in our territory. The Armenian desertions from our detachment are increasing. On 13 October 1914, the Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division informed the 3rd Army Commander that the Russians were distributing arms to the Armenians of Narman”.

On 14 October 1914, the Governor of the sanjak of Beyazit sent the following message to the Ministry of the Interior: ‘We have been informed that on September 26th, Sehpat of the Armenian revolutionaries in Russia came to Hoy with 600 Armenian volunteers, and that they went to Selmas. Most of these Armenians are Ottoman citizens and are inhabitants of Van, Mush, Bitlis, Kars, and Gumru. It has been established that they are waiting for the arrival of their commander Antranik. We have been informed that pharmacist Rupen Migirdichian living in Erjish in the region of Van, along with Toros Karakashian and Portakalian, and Surin, who is doing business in Beyazit, are thinking of going to Selmas with the force they have gathered in the regions of Ighdir and Revan, that the individuals named Melkon and Ohannes have gone from Hoy to Van to make propaganda.

On 22 October 1914, the Commander of the 2nd Cavalry division informed the Army Commander that Armenian volunteers were gathered in the regions of Mush, Van, and Bitlis, that Armenian brigands were present near the borders, and that 30-40 brigands were present in the village of Pertos.

A report sent by the 3rd Army Command to the Supreme Military Command on 25 October 1914 stated: “Approximately 800 people, most of them Armenian deserters with Ottoman citizenship, have gathered in Kaghizman. They are armed by the Russian Government. The Armenians named Surien of Beyazit and Hachik Sirup, who have gone to Russia, have each gathered 2,000 people. We have been informed that one group will attempt to go to Mosson by way of lake Abbas, and that the other group will go to Beyazit or Iran. On 24 October, the Governor of Erzurum stated in a report that he sent to the 3rd Army Commander: ‘According to the statement made by Sitrak who is one of the brigands who a few days ago attacked the mail coach on the border of Gumushhane, and who was caught, his companions are in Bayburt and Surmene, and the head official of Bayburt has gone to arrest these individuals.

On 28 October, the Governor notified the authorities that these individuals had been arrested. In November, the Ottoman Empire was at war. The first reports concerning the planned Van rebellion came, on 29 November, from Kazim Bey (Ozalp), the Gendarmerie Division Commander. Kazim Bey stated that, according to the statements of two spies who had been caught, a rebellion would occur in Van soon, and that the enemy was gathering the weapons of the Muslims in the areas it invaded, and giving them to the Armenians, thus forming detachments. All the Armenians in the division, whose weapons had been taken, had deserted.

The following day, 30 November, the Governor of Van, Jevdet Bey, stated in his telegram: ‘I am working to prevent the Armenians from creating an incident. The Russian Forces are advancing from Kotur. I do not think that the Gendarmerie Division will be able to resist these forces for long. I will start sending families to Bitlis. It may be appropriate here to depart from the chronological order of events and to describe the Van rebellion”.

A telegram sent on 2 December from the province of Van to the Ministry of the Interior stated:

“At this point, Armenians are calm in the capital and in other areas; however, all the Armenians of the region of Selmas are working with the Russians. The person who leads the bands along the border is the notorious Antranik and his companions, who had once engineered the Taluri rebellion [the second rebellion of Sassun]. After the Hanik battle, some Armenian privates deserted and joined the ranks of the enemy. I was informed that an Armenian bishop was in contact with the Russian Commander in Gari. I had him placed under police supervision”.

A telegram sent on 15 December from the Ministry of the Interior to the Governor of Van stated that so me of the telegraph lines of Reshadiye and Karjigan had been destroyed by the Armenians, and that the superintendent of the post had reported an armed confrontation with these Armenians. Additional information was requested.

The Governor of Erzurum, Tahsin Bey, sent the following report to the Supreme Military Commander on 20 December:

“The Armenians of the districts of Kerchikan and Gevash in Van are preparing to rebel. They have cut the telegraph lines of the area and have killed a corporal. Gendarmerie and militia have been sent to the area from Bitlis, and armed confrontations have begun. Because our forces are few, and the Militias have insufficient arms, more forces are needed”.

The Governor of Bitlis sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior on 21 February 1915:

“The Armenians of the nahiye of Haksef have rebelled. In the village of Siranun under the jurisdiction of the central district of Mush, shots were fired on our detachment, and the confrontation continued for two hours. In the village of Kumes, under the jurisdiction of the bujak of Akan, shots were fired at the house where the bujak superintendent and the gendarmes were staying, and the confrontation lasted for eight hours” (33).

The same day, the governor of Bitlis, in a second telegram, stated:

“Armenians have revolted in many villages. I became suspicious when I saw that among the Armenians who opened fire in Kumes, a village in the bujak of Akan, were Rupen, the Dashnak delegate of Van, Zovin, and Eshroone of the Dashnak leaders in Mush. As a precaution, I had the delegate of Van, Papazian, be a guest of the sanjak governor, to hold him as a hostage” (34).

On 27 February, about 300 volunteer soldiers from Sürt, who were on their way from Adiljevaz to Van, wanted to spend the night in the Armenian village of Arin. The Armenians, who attempted to prevent this, opened fire and killed eight privates. Upon this a detachment was sent from Erchish to Van, but the Armenian bands escaped to Lake Van.

On 4 March 1915, the head official of the district of Mahmudi in the province of Van sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior:

“As a result of the investigation carried out after our district was taken back from the enemy, the following profile with regard to the torture and massacre which took place emerges:

Those who were killed in the village of Merkehu 41 men,14 women

Those who were killed after having been raped 4 women

Those who were killed in the village of Ishtuju 7 men, 4 women

Those who are alive among those who have been raped 5 women

The wounded 3 men, 2 women” (35).

A telegram dated 16 March sent by the Van Gendarmerie Division Command stated that in the district of Shatak of the province of Van, Armenians had attacked the gendarmerie station and the soldiers and had destroyed the telegraph lines, and that armed confrontations had occurred between the forces sent to the area and the Armenians. The incident began when a revolutionary teacher named Osep was caught with his weapon.

On 20 March, the Governor of Van stated:

“In all parts of the province armed confrontations continued until the evening and have now increased. It is thought that the rebels number more than 2,000. We are trying to crush the rebellion” (37).

The Governor, in a telegram he sent on 23 March, stated that “the inhabitants of the villages of Bayrik, Alakoy, Iblankanis, and Buganis, which are at a distance of four hours from Van, are holding the strategic points above the village of Bayrik, and have besieged the village of Kusha. The number of rebels has increased to 1,000. Forces must be sent. Following this, the rebellion spread to the entire province”.

Ali Ihsan Pasha wrote about this rebellion:

“Jevdet Bey, the governor of Van, had informed the First Army Commander and the Supreme Military Command, as early as March 1915, that the Van rebellion was about to begin, and finally the rebellion ocurred on April 17,1915 in all parts of the province. The same day, the First Army was only able to arrive at Rumiye. (This is the force of which Rafael de Nogales was a member.) After the rebellion began, it proved necessary to use the main part of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division to crush the rebellion.

If the First Army had not spent weeks in Mussul and Revandiz, we might have repelled the Russians in the vicinity of Dilman, before the Armenian rebellion occurred in Van, by using all the forces of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division. As time passed, the Armenian rebellion made it necessary to use an important part of our forces, and in mid-April, to make use of most of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division in fighting against the rebels in the rear. On the other hand, the Russians took advantage of the situation to increase the number of their forces in the vicinity of Dilman”.

In April 1915, the First Army encountered the Russians, engaged in an offensive (together with part of the Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division on the eastern border of the province of Van) against the Russians on 1 May 1915near Dilman, and retreated having suffered a great number of casualties. Because of the Armenian rebellion in Van, and the Russian forces advancing towards Van, the army was unable to free Van and was forced to retreat in the direction of Bitlis, through the mountains to the south of lake Van.

On 20 April 1915, the Governor of Van sent the following telegram to the 3^rd Army Command:

“The rebels have begun to open fire on our police stationsnear the Armenian quarters of Van, and on the Muslim houses. We are resisting and defending. In the confrontation which occurred near the village of Atalan until yesterday evening, most of the rebels have been crushed. The telegraph lines of Gevash have been repaired and opened to communication. Today the telegraph lines of Bashkale, Havasor, Memortki, Shersat have been cut. We have begun their repair. In the city, the confrontations are continuing with all their might. The insurrection is widespread. We request help and artillery”.

On 24 April, the governor sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior:

“Until now approximately 4,000 insurgent Armenians have been brought to the region from the vicinity. The rebels are engaged in highway robbery, attack the neighboring villages and burn them. It is impossible to prevent this. Now many women and children are left homeless. It is not possible nor suitable to relocate them in tribal villages in the vicinity. Would it be convenient to begin sending them to the western provinces?”

On 8 May, the Armenians began their offensive and started burning down the Muslim quarters. Upon this, the Governor, Jevdet Bey, ordered the evacuation of Van. On 17 May, the Turkish soldiers left Van, then the Armenians began to set fire to the Turkish quarters which had been evacuated. The Russians then entered Van. (The booklet entitled Zeve about the Van rebellion is worth reading.)

The Turkish forces engaged in an offensive on 22 July 1915, and repossessed Van. In August they lost it again to the Russians. The rebellion in Van had spread to Mush. The Van Mobile Gendarmerie Division was charged with crushing this rebellion, and the operation continued until 11 July 1915. On 2 May, before the fall of Van, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Enver Pasha, sent the following message to the Minister of the Interior, Talat  Bey:

“Around lake Van, and in specific areas known by the Governor of Van, Armenians are constantly gathered and prepared to continue their insurrection. I am convinced that these Armenians who have gathered must be removed from these areas, and that the rebellion’s nest must be destroyed.

According to the information provided by the 3rd Army Command, the Russians brought the Muslims within their borders into our country under wretched and miserable conditions, on 20 April 1915. In order to respond to this, as well as to reach the goal I have stated above, it is necessary to either send these Armenians and their families to Russia, or to disperse them within Anatolia. I request that the most suitable of these two alternatives be chosen and carried out. If there is no inconvenience I would prefer that the families of the rebels and the population of the region in rebellion are sent outside our borders and that the Muslim community brought into our borders from abroad are relocated to their place”.

This message is the first indication of the relocation decision. Let us continue now with the chronological account of events, which we interrupted to report the Van rebellion.

On 17 December 1914, the Commander of the l2th Army Corps in Antakya stated that it was feared the Armenians of Antakya would engage in an offensive. The Commander of the 11^th Army Corps stated in a telegram he sent on 19 February 1915 from Elazigh to the Ministry of War, that Armenians, in various villages of the region, had opened fire on the gendarmes, and that the confrontation with the rebels had been continuing for the past three days.

On 21 February, the same Army Corps sent the following telegram to the Ministry:

“Approximately 40-50 Armenian revolutionaries who were in the village of Siranun, two and a half hours away from Mush, have attacked villages, and have fought with the police and the cavalrymen who had been sent there.

On 25 February 1915, the Commander of the 11^th Army Corps informed the Supreme Military Command that they had been notified that bombs were being produced in the district of Develi, and that during the search that was carried out, bombs, guns, gunpowder etc. had been found. The 10th Army Corps notified the 3rd Army Command in a report dated 27 March that the Armenians of the village of Purek in Sushehri had opened fire on unarmed volunteer soldiers who were passing by, that after the village was searched, 95 deserters and 25 guilty privates were arrested, and that guns and bullets had been found.

On 30 March 1915, the Commander of the 11th Army Corps wrote to the Supreme Military Command that a gendarmerie detachment had fought for two hours with an Armenian band near the village of Murfe, which is at a distance of four hours from Bitlis.

On 22 April 1915 the Governor of Sivas sent the following telegram to the Ministry of the Interior:

“Within the province the areas having a dense population of Armenians are Shebinkarahisar, Sushehri, Hafik, Divrik, Gurun, Gemerek, Amasya, Tokat, and Merzifon. Until now, during the searches carried out in the Armenian villages of Sushehri and its vicinity, in the villages of Tuzhisar and Horasan of Hafik, and in the nahiye (district) of Olarash of the provincial capital, a great number of illegal weapons and dynamite have been found. According to the statement of the suspects who were caught, the Armenians have armed 30,000 people in this region,15,000 of them have joined the Russian Army, and the other 15,000 will threaten our Army from the rear, if the Turkish Army is unsuccessful. Armed confrontations took place between the Armenians and the security forces who were sent to the village of Tuzhisar where Murat, of the Armenian Dashnak Committee, was hiding; those who escaped are being pursued”.

The Governor of Diyarbekir wrote on 27 April 1915:

“In Diyarbekir searches have been carried out for deserters, weapons, and bullets. As a result a great quantity of arms, ammunition, military uniforms, and explosives was found. In the capital alone, among the Armenian revolutionaries, more than 1,000 deserters were found. Such was the internal situation of the country in May 1915, when the Russians were advancing in eastern Anatolia, when the British and the French were threatening the Dardanelles, and the canal operation was in progress in the south.

Rebellions had occurred in Zeitun, Van, and Mush; the Van rebellion resulted in the Russian occupation of the city: the rebellions of Zeitun and Mush were still continuing. Every inch of the country was filled with deserters, every part was subject to the attacks of brigands. Because every Turk capable of bearing arms was recruited, the field was left to the Armenians”.

On the one hand, the state was fighting the war, and on the other, it was forced to deal with these insurrections. The following information about the Zeitun rebellion is worthy of inclusion. On 24 February, the Russian Ambassador in London went to the Foreign Office and stated: ‘An Armenian of Zeitun has consulted Count Vorontzov-Dachkov, the King Regent of the Caucasus, and told him that they have gathered a force of 15,000 to attack the communication lines of the Turkish Armies, but that they lacked guns and ammunition, and that it would be very convenient to provide them with their needs. The French and the British might send the provisions by way of the Antakia harbor. How would England react to this possibility?

The project was abandoned as the British refused. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman Government was forced to take the decision for relocation. We have quoted various authors as they summarized the events leading to the relocation decision. None of these authors considered the decision unjust. Before dealing with the subject of relocation, we want to mention a few more points. The term tehjir (relocation) is Arabic and derives from the root hijret (emigration). It is used in the sense of having one emigrated. This word has no connotation of putting one in a concentration camp, but indicates changing one’s location. For this reason, the term ‘deportation used by the British and French is incorrect. Deportation has the connotation of forcing one to settle in a place under custody, that is, having one exiled.

The individual who is exiled, who is deported, is not free in the place he is sent to. He lives in a specific place, in a prison, fortress, or camp, without any contact with the outside world. The word tehjir has none of these meanings. If it was still used in Turkish today, we would be able to explain, for example, the transfer of those villagers whose villages were located on the site of the newly built Keban Dam, to other areas, using this term. Now, we use the term ‘relocation’ instead. In every language there are equivalents of this word tehjir. That they are not used, is another matter. In fact, even the term tehjir was not used in the decisions which were taken, as we shall see.

The second point we want to mention is that every country, during war, sends citizens of the enemy within its borders to concentration camps. This is an established practice implemented in every country. There have been cases when this practice was taken further, against individuals who had become citizens of a country. Now, naturally, it will be said that the Armenians were not foreign subjects. This is true, and for this reason they were not sent to concentration camps. However, remembering the attitude of the Armenians during the First World War, should they be considered Ottoman subjects or Russian subjects? This question cannot be easily answered. But one thing is certain, although the Armenians were legally Ottoman subjects they acted in fact as Russian subjects. We shall return to this point later.

We shall see that the Armenian leaders attempted to be known as belligerents. A third point is that any country at war will consider as traitors those who work for the enemy, and even those who interrupt the war effort of the country. The punishment for traitors is invariably the most severe punishment in that country. For example, if the Ottoman Government had executed the insurgents of Zeitun who rebelled after the war started, along with those who helped the insurgents by hiding them, or by providing them with clothing, food, weapons and ammunition, this would have been a legal and justifiable attitude under the circumstances. To relocate them instead of executing the insurgents surely cannot be considered more inhumane.

During war, the first obligation of the State is to protect the country, and this means to struggle with the enemies of the country according to the rules of war. We have seen the strangest and most far-fetched application of this rule, even in countries that were accusing Turkey most strongly. Oden Hedin has written:

“At a time when the British were pleading for the Armenians in the entire world, when Lord Kitchener invaded Sudan, he established order in the country by exterminating the whole population capable of bearing arms. The French Archives are full of atrocious pictures of concentration camps in the Transvaal, where tens of thousands of Boer women and children starved to death”.

“As the British”, wrote the Irishman George Chatterton-Hill in the magazine ‘Ord och Bild’ (1916, p. 561), “could not annihilate them (the Irish through outright murder or through laws) which would force the entire nation out of the country, they attempted another method, which they have also tried in India: organized hunger. And this method proved itself to be very efficacious. In a period of seventy years, from 1841 to 1911, the population of Ireland fell from 8,196,597 to 4,381,951! During the three years of the so-called great famine (1846-8) over one million people died of hunger in Ireland in the midst of rich fields of grain! During these three years, not less than 50 Million Pounds’ worth of foodstuff (grains and cattle) was taken out of Ireland under the charge of British bayonets, in order to pay taxes to the British State and rent t o the absentee British landlords. During the next three years (1849-51) approximately 400,000 more people died due to privation”.

If the ‘Protector of the small nations’, of 380 Million people, does not have enough elbow-room for her philanthropic activity, then she should knock on the door of her closest ally! In Russia, there is much more to be improved than in Turkey! The author of these statements is a Swede. Certainly many more examples can be added to the above, starting with the rebellion of the Sipahies in India.

We have already mentioned, in Chapter 2, the treatment of individuals of German origin in England during the First World War. There are many versions as to the number of people killed by France, another protector of the Armenians, during its notorious ‘pacification’ policy in North Africa, during the struggle for independence of Algeria and Tunisia. But what is important is not the number of dead, but the attitude of the State. What is even more interesting in France is the condition of those who were killed by court sentences, or even without them, after the liberation at the end of the Second World War, because they collaborated with the Germans during the occupation. Again there are divergent numbers of dead.

But we repeat, the import ant point is not the figures, but the attitude. After everything was over, and the country was liberated, old accounts were still being settled. It must not be forgotten that after 1923, no Armenian or Greek, let alone Turk, was persecuted. However, there were quite a few who collaborated with the Allied occupation forces in Istanbul.

As for the Russians, even if we do not dwell on how many people were killed during the rebellions under the Tsarist regime, what can be thought of the Crimean population which was collectively transferred to Siberia, on the grounds that they had collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War?

The same examples can be given for every state. The reason why we have mentioned only these three states is that they were the main defenders of the subject at that time. Thus, the attitude of every state during a rebellion, even when this rebellion does not occur within its borders but in occupied areas, is always the same. We have not encountered in the history of any state that the treatment was more merciful, when a rebellion occurred during wartime.

Moreover, the agreements made during the war by these three states we have mentioned, with regard to the dismemberment of Turkey, in which the Armenians were not mentioned, indicate to what extent these states were sincere in their interest in the Armenians. We shall return to this subject later.

As we shall see in the next section, before the Armenians were relocated their ringleaders were arrested on 24 April 1915 in Istanbul. The same day, the President of the USA received the following telegram from Catholicos Kevork of Etchmiadzin:

“Honorable President, according to the most recent information we have received from Turkish Armenia, massacres have started there, and organized terror has endangered the existence of the Armenian community. At this delicate time, I address to the noble feelings of Your Excellency and of the great American nation, and request, in the name of humanity and the Christian faith, that your great Republic interfere immediately through its Diplomatic Representatives, to protect my people in Turkey left to the horrors of Turkish fanaticism.

For the telegram to be received on 24 April, it is necessary for the Catholicos to have learned beforehand of the arrest, and to have sent the telegram before the 24th. As the American Ambassador sent his telegram about the arrest on the 27th, the telegram of the Catholicos is enough to point to the guilt of those who were arrested”.

On 27 April, the Russian Ambassador in Washington requested the intervention of the USA. The telegram sent by Bryan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USA to the Embassy in Istanbul, informs us that the Russian Ambassador stated that quite a few Muslims were living in Russia; but that these people were not exposed to terror for religious reasons. It is interesting that these arrests were seen as stemming from religious intolerance. The real significance of these initiatives is clear in the light of the information we have given above. In the next section we shall examine the relocation decision and its implementation, but let us first state that when the decision was made and its implementation was begun, the destructive activities of Armenians did not stop, and this situation made it necessary for the relocation to be implemented over a wider area.

As a matter of fact, rebellions occurred on 23 July 1915 in Boghazlian, on 1 August 1915 in Findikchik (Marash), on 9 August 1915 in the village of Germush of Urfa, on 14 September 1915 in Antakya (Musa Mountain), on 29 September 1915 in Urfa, on 7 February 1916 in Islahiye, on 4 April 1916 in Akdaghmadeni, and on 9 April 1916 in Tossia.

2.The relocation decision and its implementation

We have mentioned that Enver Pasha, in the message he sent to Talat Pasha on 2 May 1915, stated that the Armenians always start a rebellion where there are large Armenian communities, and that it was either necessary to force them into Russia, as the Russians had done with the Muslims, or to disperse them within Anatolia. It is clear that Enver Pasha’s intention was to prevent the Armenians raising another rebellion. If the Armenians could be relocated in such a way that they would not form large communities, but would live in small groups far from each other, then the chance of organizing a rebellion would disappear.

It is again apparent from Enver Pasha’s message that relocation was being considered for the instigators of rebellions and brigandage. As a matter of fact, the relocation was carried out in this manner. We sincerely believe that the uproar created by the powers at that time was due to the fact that they realized that the Armenian rebellions, upon which they had set great hopes, were now impossible. The initiative made by the Russians in the USA on 27 April cannot be explained otherwise. We have also mentioned, in Chapter 2, the real intention lying behind the massacre rumors.

In order to believe that the politicians who appeared as perfect humanitarians, and who shed tears claiming that Armenians were being killed, were concerned and saddened by the fate of the Armenians in Turkey, one must be not only rather naive but stupid. Let us now examine in chronological order the measures which the Ottoman Empire was compelled to take regarding the Armenians, for the reasons stated earlier, and their implementation.

On 6 September 1914, the Ottoman Government sent a coded circular to provinces with a dense population of Armenians, and instructed them to keep the activities of the leaders of the Armenian political parties under constant supervision. On 25 February 1915, the Supreme Military Command gave the following instruction to all the units, with order No. 8682:

“In Bitlis, Armenian brigands have appeared and some Armenian deserters are engaged in brigandage. In Aleppo, in Dortyol, Armenians have attacked soldiers and gendarmes, and in the sanjak of Kayseri a great number of bombs, codes in French, Russian, and Armenian were found in Armenian houses.

Although these incidents are not serious at the moment, they indicate that preparations for rebellion are being made by our enemies within our country. Consequently, it has been deemed necessary to circulate and announce again the points below.

1. Armenians will strictly not be employed in mobile armies, in mobile and stationary gendarmeries, or in any armed services. They shall not be employed even in the suites and offices of the Commandants and the Headquarters.

2. The Commanders of the Army and the Army Corps, the Assistant Commanders of the Army Corps and the Divisions, and the regional Commandants are authorized and compelled to have recourse to the Armed Forces immediately to eradicate aggression and opposition, should they be aware of any opposition, armed attack, or resistance to the Government from the people. Likewise, the Commanders have authority to declare martial law immediately whenever necessary.

3. Although vigilance will be maintained in all areas, in areas where there is no indication of aggression one must refrain from putting pressure on the people, which would terrify them. Thus, the conviction that those who have remained loyal and obedient will not be harmed must be strengthened, and the people must not be driven to rebellion by making them desperate.

4. Because all matters concerning defense and public order are the responsibility of the military authorities, owing to general mobilization, civil service officials will refer these matters to the Commanders. Only the officials of the province of Istanbul will refer to the General Headquarters for matters and measures related to public order.

5. For matters concerning public order, the highest authorities in the sectors of the Third and Fourth Army and Iraq are the Army Commanders. In the sectors of the First and Second Army, the highest authorities are the Commanders of the Army Corps. These Commanders of the Army Corps will provide information to the Army Commander and to their Assistant Commanders.

6. The Commanders of the Third and Fourth Army will immediately inform the Assistants of the Commander-in-Chief of the preventive measures they have conceived and adopted”.

On 24 April 1915, the Ministry of the Interior ordered with a circular that the Armenian Committee centers be closed, that their documents be seized, and that the committee leader be arrested.5s On 26 April, the Supreme Military Command sent a similar circular to the units, requesting that the leaders be sent to military courts and that the guilty ones be punished.

Upon this instruction of the Ministry of the Interior, 235 people were arrested in Istanbul. This day, 24 April, on which the Armenians hold demonstrations each year claiming it is the date of the massacre, is the day when these 235 people were arrested. On 26 May 1915, the Supreme Military Command sent the following message to the Ministry of the Interior:

“It was orally decided that the Armenians be sent from the eastern Anatolian provinces, from Zeitun, and from such areas which are densely populated by Armenians, to the south of the province of Diyarbekir, to the valley of the Euphrates, to the vicinity of Urfa and Suleymaniye. The following points must be taken as a basis for settling the Armenians to ensure that pockets of rebellion do not reappear:

1. the Armenian population must not exceed 10 per cent of the tribal and Muslim population in the areas where Armenians will be settled;

2. each of the villages which the Armenians will found must not exceed 50 houses;

3. the migrant Armenian families must not be allowed to change residence even for reasons of travel or transport”.

On the same day, the office of the Prime Minister received the following memorandum from the Ministry of the Interior:

“Some of the Armenians residing in quarters near military areas are hindering the activities of the Imperial Army which is engaged in protecting the Ottoman borders against the enemies of the State. They combine their efforts and actions with the enemy, they join the ranks of the enemy, they organize armed attacks within the country against the Armed Forces and innocent people, they engage in aggression, murder, terror, and pillage in Ottoman cities and towns, they provide the enemy with provisions, and manifest their audacity against fortified places. As it has proved necessary that such revolutionary elements be removed from the area of operations, and that the villages which serve as a base of operations and refuge for the rebels be evacuated, some measures are being taken. We have begun to transfer the Armenians residing in the provinces of Van, Bitlis and Erzurum and in the villages and towns of the districts of Iskenderun, Beylan, Jisri-i Shuur, and Antakia, with the exception of the city of Adana proper, the city of Sis proper, and the city of Mersin proper, to the southern provinces. We have begun to transfer and settle them in the sanjaks of Zor and Mussul, with the exception of the southern area bordering with the province of Van, to the southern part of Urfa, with the exception of the city of Urfa proper, to the southern and southeastern part of the province of Aleppo, and to the eastern part of the province of Syria. The Armenians are being settled in quarters designated and assigned for this purpose. This course of events is considered favorable to the essential interests of the state.

In short, Armenians residing in the provinces bordering the area of military operations and in proximity to the Mediterranean Sea would be relocated”.

On 27 May (14 May 1331), ‘The Temporary Law Concerning The Measures To Be Adopted By The Military Authorities For Those Whose Activities Are Against The Government In Wartime’ was adopted, and was published on 1 June (19 May 1331) in the Takvimi Vakayi (the Ottoman official gazette). We quote from Y. H. Bayur, who has included this law in his book:

“1. In wartime should the commanders of the Army, the Army Corps, or the divisions face any opposition, armed aggression, or resistance to operations and arrangements related to the decrees of the government, the defense of the country, and the maintenance of public order, they are authorized and compelled to immediately implement punishment through the Armed Forces, and to suppress the aggression and resistance.

2. The commanders of the Army, the Army Corps, and the divisions may transfer and settle in other quarters the inhabitants of villages and towns should they engage in spying or treason, or in view of military exigencies.

The third article of the law states that the law will come into effect on the date of its publication. Finally, on 30 May the Council of Ministers took the following decision: It is absolutely necessary to annihilate and destroy by effective operations this possible harmful activity which has a bad effect on the war’s operations which are designed for the benefit of protecting the state’s security and existence. The goal of the operation begun by this order of the Ministry is obvious. It is stated in the memorandum of the Ministry of the Interior that the Armenians who must be transferred, of those residing in the towns and villages, will be sent to their allotted local dwellings. Their transfer will be made in comfortable circumstances, their comfort will be provided on the way, and their lives and possessions will be protected. Until they are settled in their new dwellings, they will be fed through funds of the emigrants’ appropriation. In proportion to their previous economic and financial condition, they will be given property and lands; the Government will construct dwellings for the needy ones, will distribute seeds for sowing, tools, and implements to the farmers and craftsmen who need them.

Possessions and belongings left behind will be returned to them in an appropriate way. After the value of the possessions and immovable property belonging to the transferred emigrants has been calculated and registered, it will be distributed to the immigrants. Immovable properties such as warehouses, factories, shops, orange groves, vineyards, olive groves, orchards, which would remain outside the specialized sphere of the immigrants, will be sold at auction, or will be leased, and their value will be deposited in financial offices for safe-keeping to be paid to their owners. A regulation has been implemented by the said Ministry to the effect that the expenditures arising from these transactions and procedures be paid from the appropriation set aside for the emigrants. Through this decree, the administration and maintenance of the abandoned properties will be ensured.

The general transactions concerning the emigrants will be accelerated, regulated and supervised. Commissions will be formed, which will employ salaried officials who will have the duty and authority, and who will be directly dependent on the Ministry of the Interior. These commissions will be composed of one president and two appointed members, one of whom will be selected from among the officials of the Ministry of the Interior, and the other from among the officials of the Ministry of Finance. These commissions will be sent to their regions, and the quarters where a commission will be present, the Governor will submit to the said Ministry a note stating that they have begun the application of the said regulation, and they will give information to the responsible departments”.

These are the texts concerning the relocation decision. As can be seen, the text does not even mention the word ‘relocation’. The temporary law says ‘transfer and settle in other quarters’, the note of the Ministry of the Interior and the decision of the Council of Ministers refers to ‘transferring’ and ‘settling’ in the designated and appointed quarters.

First of all, we must point out that the relocation process was begun before the Council of Ministers decreed it. This becomes clear in the memorandum of the Ministry of the Interior, as well as in other instructions which we shall quote below. It can be accepted that the process was initiated after the instructions dated 24 April.

Secondly, although the Council of Ministers could put the relocation process into effect on its own responsibility without the need of a separate law, a temporary law was enacted in order that the military authorities, too, could be given the same authority.

Thirdly, a temporary law had to be enacted because Parliament was not in session. The Assembly opened on 15 September, and this temporary law was accepted by the Assembly. A regulation was prepared on the subject of relocation. Below we quote Articles 21 and 22 of this regulation whose original text is in the British Archives. (We shall return to this in section 5. For the original text, see Salahi Sonyel, Shocking new documents, London,1975; F.O. 371/9158 E.5523.)

“Article 21.

Should emigrants be attacked on their journey or in camps, the assailants will be immediately arrested, and sent to martial law court.

Article 22.

Those who take bribes or gifts from the emigrants, or who rape the women by threats or promises, or those who engage in illicit relations with them, will immediately be removed from office, will be sent to the martial law court and will be punished severely”.

A temporary law was passed on 26 September 1915 to conclude the process of liquidation. The text of this law follows.

“Article 1. The properties, debts, credits left behind by each person who was transferred to other quarters with the temporary law dated May 4,1331, will be liquidated by the courts according to the official report which the commissions formed for this matter will prepare for every person.

Article 2. The rented foundation properties [house properties and landed properties] which the individuals mentioned in the first article possessed at the time of their transfer will be transferred to the Ministry of Foundations, and the other immovable properties will be transferred to the Treasury, and their equivalent value will be included in the liquidation which will be made according to the first article...

Article 3. The credits will be collected by the commissions through lawsuits the deposits will be taken out of the banks, the movable properties will be sold by auction. The revenue will be deposited for safekeeping in the name of the owner to the financial office, and will be included in the liquidation. At the end of the liquidation the remaining sum will be paid to their owners ...

The relocation process was begun on the basis of these principles. Now let us see how this operation was implemented by referring to documents that we found in the files of the Ministry of the Interior during our research, which began in 1981. Preparations are being made to publish all the documents”.

On 18 May (5 May 1331) a message was sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the guberno rate of Erzurum. It stated that it was necessary for the Armenians who were evacuated from Erzurum to be sent to the southern parts of Urfa and Mussul and to the sanjak of Zor.

On 23 May (10 May 1331), the following instructions were given to Erzurum with message No.14, to Van with message No. 21 and to Bitlis with message No.14:

“The Armenians within the province will be transferred and settled in designated areas of the southern part of the province of Mussul with the exception of its northern part bordering with the province of Van, in the sanjak of Zor, and in the sanjak of Urfa with the exception of its central district. The Armenians arriving at their new settlements will be relocated in dwellings which will be constructed in the towns and villages, or in villages they will found in areas designated by the local government. The responsibility for transferring and relocating the Armenians who must be transferred belongs to the local administrators. The administrative officials along the way are responsible for protecting the lives and possessions of the Armenians sent to their new settlements, for feeding them, and for ensuring their rest. The Armenians who will be required to emigrate may take with them all their movable possessions. This transport will of course be made in areas free of war operations”.

On the same day a message was sent to the governorate of Mussul, and to the governors of the sanjaks of Urfa and Zor, which stated:

“The Armenians who will be sent from Van, Bitlis, and Erzurum will be transferred and settled in parts of Urfa which Armenians do not inhabit, in the southern part of the province of Mussul, in areas designated by the local government.

The Armenians arriving at their new settlements will either be resettled in small groups in dwellings they will construct in existing towns and villages, or in the villages they will found in areas designated by the local government. It will be necessary for the towns and villages where the Armenians will settle, and the villages which they will found, to be at least 25 km away from the Baghdad railway and other railways.

The officials on duty are responsible for protecting en route the lives and possessions of the Armenians being transferred, for feeding them, and for their rest. Armenians who are required to emigrate may take all their movable possessions”.

Message No. 17 sent on 27 May from the Ministry of the Interior to the province of Erzurum stated:

“Because the province borders with Russia, no Armenian must be left there. It is of course in their discretion that the Armenians in some areas are hastily transferred, and that the transfer of others is delayed. It has not been deemed necessary that the Armenians of Elazigh, Diyarbekir, and Sivas be required to emigrate”.

On 1 June 1915 the Ministry of the Interior sent a circular notice to all provinces, drawing their attention to the following points:

“It has become apparent that in some areas the instruction concerning the arrest relocation of dangerous Armenians and committee leaders has been misinterpreted. In many areas people who are not guilty have been arrested and transferred from one place to another, while no measures have been taken about the actual harmful individuals”.

On 5 June 1915, a message was sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the sanjak of Zor:

“There is no harm in Armenian muleteers going and coming to Aleppo. However, it is necessary for their movements and attitude to be watched constantly”.

A message dated 9 June:

“Because the equivalent value of the immovable properties of the Armenians will be paid by the Government to their owners, it is necessary that the properties left behind are protected, and that they are sold by auction in the name of their owners. It is suitable that the transfer of those who work in the Army, and of the feeble women is delayed”.

A significant message was sent on 14 June 1915 (1 June 1331):

“The province of Erzurum has informed us that a convoy of 500 Armenians who were evacuated from Erzurum has been killed by tribes between Erzurum and Erzinjan. It is expected that efforts will be made to protect the lives of the Armenians being transferred, and those who try to escape en route and attack the officials responsible for protecting them will be punished. But under no circumstances will the people be allowed to interfere. Incidents resulting in such killings will not be allowed to occur. For this reason it is absolutely necessary that every possible measure is taken to protect the Armenians against attacks by tribes and villagers, and that those who attempt murder and violence are severely punished”.

On 21 June, message No. 83 sent by the Ministry of the Interior to Mussul stated:

“The Armenians who will be sent into the province to be relocated and those who have already arrived must under no circumstances be brought near the northern and eastern part of the Baghdad railway, and must be settled only in areas to the west of the said railway”.

A message was sent on 22 June 1915:

“Among the Armenian families, the girls up to age 20, and boys up to age 10 who are orphaned will not be sent to the south, but will be adopted by families”.

On 23 June, message No. 21 was sent to the sanjak of Zor:

“During the settling of the Armenians it must be ensured that the inhabitants of the same county and locality are settled in different areas, that the Armenians are not allowed to open Armenian schools in their new places of residence, that their children are required to attend the public schools, that the villages which will be founded are at a distance of five hours from one another, and that they are not founded in high places which would facilitate defense”.

On 26 June 1915 a message was sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the governor of Elaziz:

“The Armenian convoys sent under protection from Erzurum have been attacked and killed by the brigands of Dersim. It is required that measures are immediately taken to ensure the protection of the convoys. These consistent attacks by the brigands of Dersim must be stopped. On 1 July 1915 (18 June 1331), the Ministry of the Interior sent a circular message: ‘It has been understood that some Armenians are converting to Islam collectively or individually, to be able to stay in their areas of residence. They must be transferred despite their conversion”.

On 4 July 1915 (21 June 1331), the Ministry of the Interior sent a message to the provinces of Trabzon, Sivas, Diyarbekir and Elaziz, and to the sanjak of Janik:

“It is ordered that the Armenians and their families whom the Government considers dangerous be removed, and that the merchants and artisans who are harmless be retained but that they be required to move out of their towns within the province”.

The relocation areas were extended by a circular of the Ministry of the Interior dated 5 July 1915. This message was sent by the Ministry of the Interior to the province of Elaziz on 10 July 1915:

“It is ordered t hat children are to be adopted in accordance with Muslim traditions by prominent people residing in towns and villages where Armenians are not present. If there are a great many children, they may also be adopted by less wealthy, but honorable and honest families, who will be paid 30 kurush per month per child. It is required that a list be made of the families which have adopted these children and that a copy of this list be sent to the center”.

On 12 July 1915 (29 June 1331), the Ministry of the Interior sent a message to the province of Diyarbekir: “We are informed that in recent times some Armenians within the province have been taken out of the city at night and had their throats cut like sheep. The number of those killed until now is estimated to be 2,000. It is ordered that this be absolutely prevented and that we are informed of the actual situation”.

On 12 July 1915 the Ministry of the Interior sent a circular:

“It is ordered that no one else will be sent to the sanjak of Zor, whose population ratio has exceeded 10 per cent”.

The Ministry of the Interior sent a circular message on 24 October 1916:

“The transferring of Armenians to other localities has been delayed. Information is requested as to the names and number of those harmful individuals who must be transferred”.

These telegrams are sufficient to determine the reasons behind the relocation decision, its extent and implementation. As can be seen, the Government particularly emphasized the protection of life and property, and continually gave instructions for necessary measures to be taken. Individuals who did not comply with these instructions, and those who were guilty, were arrested and sent for trial. A special investigative council was formed at the Ministry of War to examine such irregularities, and this council performed its duty until the beginning of 1918, when its duty was over. Those who were found guilty were sent to the martial law courts. The number of these individuals was as follows.

From the province of Sivas                  648

From the province of Elaziz                  223

From the province of Diyarbekir             70

From the province of Bitlis                   25

From the sanjak of Eskishehir               29

From the sanjak of Shebinkarahisar        6

From the sanjak of Nighde                    8

From the sanjak of Izmit                      33

From the province of Ankara                32

From the sanjak of Kaiseri                   69

From the province of Syria                  27

From the province of Hudavendigar       12

From the province of Konya                12

From the sanjak of Urfa                     189

From the sanjak of Janik                    14 (85)

The total is 1,397. They were given various sentences including execution. Talat Pasha, in the speech he gave at the last Congress of the Party of Union and Progress on 1 November 1918, mentioned the subject of relocation. This speech, which was published in the 12 July 1921 issue of the Vakit newspaper, has been quoted by Bayur, from whom we quote:

“The subject of relocating the Armenians is one of the most discussed subjects in the war cabinets in and especially outside the country.

First of all, it must be said, that the rumors of relocation and killings have been grossly exaggerated. The Armenian and Greek press, conscious that the rumors of oppression would have a great effect on public opinion in Europe and America where the Turks are unknown, or more exactly are known incorrectly, have created great uproar in the world through their exaggerations.

I do not wish t